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Executive Summary 
Globalisation, liberalisation and convergence of communication markets have triggered 
intensive debates about the options for regulatory reform, including the growing role of 
alternative modes of regulation (self-regulation, co-regulation). These alternatives or 
supplements to traditional statutory regulation are marked by the involvement of non-
governmental actors in regulatory processes. Both industry and policy makers consider 
alternative regulation to have great potential for solving problems in communication 
markets.  
Regulators are increasingly required to assess the potential and limitations of alternative 
regulatory institutions to inform or improve regulatory systems. As part of this, they are 
examining how existing alternative regulatory schemes work and what improvements 
can be made to them. Regulatory authorities are seeking to identify best practice in 
other countries in relation to self- and co-regulation and regulatory innovation. 
Empirical evaluations are intended to contribute to a better understanding of alternative 
modes of regulation and increase the knowledge base for decisions on whether various 
types of co- and self-regulatory solutions might be preferable to full statutory 
regulation. 
This report is intended to contribute to the regulator’s assessment- and regulatory 
choice-efforts. It examines whether and how success and failure of selected self- and 
co-regulatory schemes can be explained by their respective institutional design, by 
characteristics of the industries involved and by the established regulatory environment. 
In other words, the performance of selected self- and co-regulatory schemes is 
examined comparatively and it is investigated as to whether and how performance 
differences can be explained by differences in the organisational design of the 
alternative regulatory institutions (institutional/organisational success factors) and by 
differences regarding their particular industrial and regulatory environments (enabling 
contextual factors). 
Check list for regulatory choice and assumption-driven approach 
Investigations are based on an analytical framework comprising three sets of evaluation 
criteria and related empirical indicators. Performance criteria (adoption, awareness, 
attitude, and action) add up to a “4A concept”, which allows for the systematic 
assessment of alternative regulatory institutions’ outcome and impact. For further 
investigation it is assumed that schemes’ performance is influenced by 
institutional/organisational success factors and by enabling contextual factors. 
Institutional/organisational success factors (e.g. resources, stakeholder involvement and 
sanction power) may be modified within the respective organisations in order to 
increase the regulatory value added or to enhance the legitimacy of an organisation. 
Contextual factors (e.g. conflicts between public and private interests, intensity of 
competition and involvement of governmental actors) provide a more or less “enabling 
context” for self- or co-regulatory institutions. In contrast to institutional/organisational 
success factors, the modification of contextual factors is not possible at the 
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organisational level but – if at all – by reforms to the regulatory environment of 
alternative regulatory institutions.  
In sum, the evaluation criteria form a check list for regulatory choice, which in general 
allows both ex-post evaluations of existing schemes in order to improve regulatory 
systems and ex-ante evaluations in order to design regulatory schemes for upcoming 
regulatory issues.  
In this project, the analytical framework was applied for comparative ex-post 
evaluations of media content-rating schemes in the film/broadcasting industry and 
Internet codes of conduct in North America, Australasia and the European Union. The 
empirical analyses employed are based on an approach that involves two important 
selections.  
First, analyses prioritise different performance criteria for the two regulatory fields 
studied. For media content-rating schemes, the analyses focus on awareness and 
attitude, while adoption and action are applied as measures for Internet codes of 
conduct. Second, analyses are driven by basic assumptions regarding theoretically 
plausible interrelations between the selected performance criteria on the one hand and 
selected institutional/organisational success factors and contextual factors on the other. 
Basic assumptions include considerations regarding the relevance of the resources of 
organisations, of non-industry-member involvement and the involvement of 
governmental actors in the case of media content-rating schemes. For the evaluation of 
Internet codes, the assumptions focus on the relevance of competition, of international 
involvement and of the power to impose sanctions for malpractice.  
Key findings on media content-rating schemes  
There is a substantial public interest concerning media content. Effective media content-
rating schemes with reliable and consistent information can provide added value for 
consumers. Conversely, the failure to adopt a rating system, or a systematic failure in 
providing accurate, reliable and consistent information, involves transparency losses. 
The success of media content-rating schemes in the film/broadcasting industries 
depends on broad public and industry awareness of the scheme and of the meanings of 
the content classifications in use. It further demands public confidence in the rating 
institutions, the rating schemes and the ratings as such.  
Contextual factors suggest industry involvement and public oversight 
Regarding the provision of media content-rating schemes, analysis of contextual factors 
suggests a regulatory arrangement with significant industry involvement in the rating 
practice, combined with some degree of public oversight. Freedom-of-speech concerns, 
high costs of rating audiovisual content and little demand for uniform binding minimum 
standards support the suitability of alternative modes of regulation. Sharp conflicts 
between public and private interests, strong incentives for free-riders and the potentially 
strong economic impacts of a rating indicate that content rating is not suitable for pure, 
unlimited industry self-regulation. 
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Significant performance differences  
Evaluation of the prioritised performance criteria, awareness and attitude, shows 
significant differences among the four rating schemes studied. The Dutch rating scheme 
(NICAM/Kijkwijzer) is widely known, adopted and respected. The Malaysian rating 
scheme (CMCF) is supported by the industry and government, but public awareness 
seems to be lacking. The United States’ television rating system (TV Parental 
Guidelines) is known to the public, but public awareness seems to have declined. 
Moreover, there is evidence that ratings are applied inconsistently and incorrectly and 
that they are poorly understood by the public. The United States’ rating system for 
motion pictures (MPAA/CARA) is well known, used broadly by the film industry and 
considered useful by parents. The lack of transparency in how the ratings are 
determined and the way they are used in film marketing have, however, generated 
critics. 
Adequate resources, non-industry and governmental involvement contribute to the 
explanation of performance differences 
The performance differences among the four rating schemes led to examination of 
whether and how the differences may be explained by institutional/organisational and 
contextual factors. Results of empirical analysis partly support the assumption that 
adequate resources allow for broad public information campaigns, which lead to a high 
level of public awareness of the institutions. The consistency of the ratings depends on 
institutions assuring an ongoing dialogue with and between coders, raters and 
classifiers. Problems arise in systems that operate merely in a decentralised way without 
institutionalised compliance support. Systems that have delegated significant decision-
making power to non-industry members in general perform their roles better than the 
institutions dominated by industry members. And involvement of governmental actors 
in alternative regulatory institutions clearly promotes public policy makers’ awareness 
of the alternative regulatory institutions, which is important because the political 
responsibility to protect minors demands an awareness of rating/classification issues 
among policy makers, as well as awareness of how various rating schemes relate to each 
other across the communications industries. 
State authorities may adequately support and oversee alternative regulatory institutions 
in the area of rating schemes. Options for state involvement include soft forms of 
governmental involvement (symbolic support, inspiration, integration of personnel), 
financial subsidies, periodic reviews and direct control in a co-regulatory framework. 
Involvement in and support for alternative regulatory institutions differs considerably 
between the cases studied. It is very extensive in Malaysia, extensive in the 
Netherlands, and rather light in the US self-regulation schemes. The success of the 
Dutch NICAM system under a co-regulatory framework is often referred to as a best-
practice example in the literature. But results of comparative analysis show that periodic 
review can also contribute to further enhancements of an already working self-
regulatory scheme. 
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Key findings on Internet codes  
The regulation of Internet services is also a subject of intense international debate. 
Many of the issues discussed concern questions regarding adequate levels of consumer 
protection. Due to their gate-keeping position, Internet service providers (ISPs) are 
regarded as one of the key actors with respect to the achievement of regulatory goals. 
Since the mid-1990s, hotlines for reporting illegal Internet content have been installed 
in several countries. Moreover, national Internet service-providers associations (ISPAs) 
have developed Internet codes of conduct which include (combinations of) provisions 
regarding illegal activity, limiting access to material harmful to minors, hate speech, 
bulk e-mail, data protection and privacy.  
Significant differences in adoption and action 
Evaluation of the prioritised performance, criteria adoption and action, shows 
significant differences among the four Internet organisations and codes studied. The 
Irish ISPAI Code of Practice and Ethics seems to be well supported and adopted by both 
industry and government, serving as a valuable complement of the hotline, which is 
what the public associates with ISPAI. The Canadian CAIP Code of Conduct was the 
first such Internet code, and has since been used by many outside Canada as a model. 
But the enthusiasm for the code among Canadian stakeholders, as measured in adoption 
and compliance, seems to have decreased over the years. There is hardly any up-to-date 
information available on Hong Kong and the HKISPA’s Code of Practice, but in early 
reviews its adoption and effectiveness were regarded as being successful. The Internet 
service providers in New Zealand have clearly and repeatedly failed in terms of code 
adoption. The debate about InternetNZ’s new Code of Practice is still ongoing.  
Intensity of competition, sanction powers and international involvement contribute to 
the explanation of performance differences 
The evaluation of institutional success and the contextual factors that might explain 
performance differences focused on the intensity of competition in the ISP markets of 
the countries studied, on the international involvement of national Internet organisations 
and their powers to impose sanctions for malpractice related to the codes of conduct. 
Findings are partly in line with the theoretical assumption that a high number of players 
and greater competition in a market is linked to lower adoption of alternative regulatory 
institutions. However, the New Zealand example shows that comparatively positive 
market conditions for self-regulation have not yet led to the adoption of a code. Further 
results of analyses tend to indicate that the extent of adoption of alternative regulatory 
modes at a national level is related to the involvement of a national Internet organisation 
in an acknowledged international Internet organisation. And Ireland serves as an 
example for the assumption that strong powers to impose sanctions for violations of 
principles of a code of conduct promote industry compliance with rules and obligations 
under a code.  
Further conclusions were derived on the question of how state authorities may 
adequately support alternative regulatory institutions in the area of consumer protection 
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on the Internet. In general, self-regulation efforts on the Internet occur in an atmosphere 
where there is a greater barrier to regulation and a strong demand for transnational 
regulatory solutions. Inhope (the International Association of Internet Hotlines), in 
particular, serves as an example of alternative regulatory reaction to transnational 
challenges by means of internationalisation. Inhope can draw on financial support under 
the EU Safer Internet Action Plan, which suggests the potential of “soft” intervention 
resources that (inter)governmental actors can utilise to support self-regulation.  
The empirical evaluations presented must be understood as basic attempt to search for 
and to explain interrelations between performance, contextual and 
institutional/organisational success factors. Hence the analyses are more comprehensive 
and go beyond the best-practice assessments that are often applied in the field of self- 
and co-regulation. However – at the given stage – they are based on reasonable 
selections of individual performance criteria and influencing factors. Consequently, not 
all performance differences can be explained by the way the regulatory check list is 
applied. The analyses point to some additional factors that have to be taken into 
account, e.g. the maturity of an alternative regulatory institution, its cultural 
background, enforcement practices apart from sanction powers and the sophistication of 
the actors involved. It goes without saying that the quality of empirical assessment 
improves with the number of factors researched. The check list elaborated for regulatory 
choice addresses most of these further factors and it proves to be suitable for extensive 
and systematic empirical follow-up investigations. 
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Introduction 
Regulatory agencies are increasingly required to assess the potential and limits of 
alternative modes of regulation (self-regulation and co-regulation) so as to inform the 
way regulatory systems function. To facilitate this effort, knowledge of the key 
institutional factors affecting the performance of alternative regulatory institutions is 
desirable. A resulting framework may enable regulators to determine which alternative 
modes of regulation are relevant in addressing new challenges (ex-ante evaluation), and 
in improving already established schemes (ex-post evaluation). 
This report is intended to contribute to the regulator’s assessment- and regulatory 
choice-efforts. The study’s primary goal is to examine whether and how success and 
failure of selected self- and co-regulatory schemes can be explained by their respective 
institutional designs, by characteristics of the industries involved and by the particular 
regulatory environments.  
Translated into analytical terminology, we examine comparatively the performance of 
selected self- and co-regulatory schemes and then investigate whether and how varying 
performance can be explained by institutional success factors at the organisational level 
and by enabling factors at the contextual level (i.e. the industrial and regulatory 
environments). 
To this end, the study investigates objectives, institutional settings, industry 
characteristics and the performance of eight selected self- and co-regulation schemes 
outside of the UK: in North America, Australasia and the European Union. Taking into 
account Ofcom’s specification regarding the scope of selected self- and co-regulatory 
schemes studied, the comparative research incorporates two different fields of 
application: 
• Internet codes of conduct – adopted by the industry in order to increase 
consumer protection on the Internet; 
• Media content-rating schemes in the film/broadcasting industry – established in 
order to increase transparency and to facilitate consumer choice through 
information provision. 
Given the tight time schedule, the appropriate methodology for this study is desk 
research. The analytical framework for the assessment of schemes – the performance, 
institutional and contextual factors – has been derived from a review of existing studies 
and academic literature on the evaluation of alternative modes of regulation. Empirical 
investigations into the institutional characteristics of selected cases have been carried 
out by examining available online sources regarding the eight schemes studied. 
Institutional details have been found in the institutions’ mission statements, their rules 
of internal procedure and annual reports. Information on the legal, policy and industry 
contexts has been compiled by analysis of legal frameworks, policy statements and 
sectoral industry reports. Interviews with representatives of the organisations studied 
have been conducted in order to verify available information and to acquire additional 
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information on performance and institutional details. Empirical investigation of the 
success and impact of selected schemes is based on reviews of existing assessments of 
the eight cases. 
Section A of the report provides the analytical framework for the evaluation of 
alternative regulatory institutions. It presents a check list for regulatory choice which 
includes performance criteria (A-1), enabling contextual factors (A-2) and 
institutional/organisational success factors (A-3). For each of these criteria/factors, 
respective empirical indicators are presented that permit an empirical assessment of 
individual criteria/factors. Subsequent empirical analyses in section B comprise 
evaluations of content-rating schemes in the film/broadcasting industry and Internet 
codes of conduct. Analyses are based on an approach (B-1) that selects prioritised 
performance criteria in the two application fields studied, and which is driven by basic 
assumptions regarding theoretically plausible interrelations between these selected 
performance criteria on the one hand and selected institutional/organisational success 
factors and contextual factors on the other. The approach is applied for comparative 
evaluation of media content-rating schemes (B-2) and Internet codes of conduct (B-3) in 
North America, Australasia and the European Union. The main findings and 
conclusions are summarised in a final section (B-4). Additional empirical details about 
the institutions studied are provided in the endnotes and in the annex. 
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A Analytical Framework: 
A Check List for Regulatory Choice 
The analytical framework for the systematic assessment of alternative regulatory 
institutions, developed further below, allows both ex-post evaluations of existing 
schemes in order to improve regulatory systems and ex-ante evaluations in order to 
design regulatory schemes for upcoming regulatory issues. 
In order to develop a coherent check list for regulatory choice, three interrelated 
analytical categories are distinguished (see Figure 1): (1) Performance criteria, (2) 
enabling contextual factors and (3) institutional/organisational success factors.  
Figure 1: Analytical Categories for the Evaluation of Self- and Co-Regulation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance criteria facilitate the systematic assessment of alternative regulatory 
institutions’ outcome and impact. This set includes criteria for the measurement of 
success according to the respective objectives (e.g. public awareness of rating schemes 
for media content), the key metrics for the assessment of compliance with the schemes 
(e.g. number of proceedings regarding violations against Internet codes of conduct) as 
well as factors for the assessment of the main impacts on consumers/citizens, industry 
and the regulator (e.g. reputation of self-regulatory organisations). 
The performance of schemes is primarily influenced by institutional/organisational 
success factors and by enabling contextual factors (marked by the bold arrows in Figure 
1). Institutional success factors can be designed or modified at the organisational level 
of self- and co-regulation. They include, for example, the transparency of the scheme, 
Performance criteria 
Institutional / organisational 
success factors 
Enabling contextual factors 
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stakeholder involvement and representation, incentives for participation, adequate 
sanction power and defined fallback scenarios in case of failure.  
Characteristics of industries, markets and regulations that might influence the 
appropriateness and performance of self- and co-regulation are summarised as enabling 
contextual factors. The potentials and limits of alternative modes of regulation heavily 
depend, for example, on risks and consequences of regulatory failure, the required 
intensity of regulatory intervention, conflicts between public and private interests, 
differences in market power of the companies involved, the industry’s reputation-
sensitivity to regulation and the support of statutory bodies. These factors are related to 
the market and policy context of alternative regulatory institutions. In combination, they 
can provide a more or less “enabling context” for self- or co-regulatory institutions. 
They affect the possibilities for the establishment of such institutions, and the way in 
which already established institutions perform in practice. In contrast to 
institutional/organisational success factors, the modification of contextual factors is not 
possible at the organisational level but – if at all – by reforms to the regulatory 
environment of alternative regulatory institutions.  
However, there are also various other interrelations between these three analytical 
categories (marked by thin arrows in Figure 1). Growing public awareness of a 
regulatory issue and the responsible regulatory institutions (performance criterion 
awareness), for example, might lead to growing reputational sensitivity (enabling 
contextual factor). Increasing reputational sensitivity (enabling contextual factor) may 
then result in an increase in the number of complaints (performance criterion/indicator) 
and in adjustments of complaints procedures and the resources therefore needed 
(institutional success factor). 
A second example: deficits in industry participation in a newly established alternative 
regulatory institution (performance criterion adoption) may have negative effects on the 
institution’s funding (institutional success factor adequate resources) if the scheme 
depends upon membership fees. Hence, state authorities may support the alternative 
regulatory institution with subsidies (contextual factor governmental involvement) over 
a limited period of time. 
In the following sections of the report, the three sets of criteria/factors of the analytical 
framework (performance, institutional/organisational design, and context) are grouped 
and summarised. Suitable indicators are needed for the empirical evaluation of these 
criteria/factors and have been derived for each factor in this study. The existence of an 
own budget and of a unit for marketing, for example, are empirical indicators that 
should be checked in order to evaluate whether alternative regulatory institutions 
possess adequate resources (institutional/organisational success factor) to assure that 
objectives of alternative regulatory institutions are not compromised. Other examples of 
empirical indicators would be a defined division of responsibilities between government 
and alternative regulatory institutions in order to assess the adequate involvement of 
governmental actors (enabling contextual factor). Altogether, the criteria/factors and 
their respective empirical indicators result in an exhaustive check-list for the ex-ante or 
ex-post assessment of alternative regulatory institutions. 
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When using the check list for empirical evaluations, it must be borne in mind that it will 
not always be possible to apply all the criteria. Not all factors and indicators have the 
same relevance with regard to different regulatory issues. The interplay of factors and 
the intensity of each particular indicator have to be taken into account. The suitability of 
an alternative mode of regulation depends on the mix of factors and indicators in each 
individual case. This has to be considered when the check list on contextual factors 
(section 2) is used for an ex-ante evaluation of the suitability of alternative regulatory 
modes for the solution of a new regulatory challenge. But ex-post evaluations of 
existing alternative regulatory institutions also demand the selection of sound 
performance indicators (section 1) that reflect the public policy objectives in the 
respective regulatory field. The institutional success factors (section 3) mentioned 
below may promote the achievement of public policy objectives, and can be used to 
design new regulatory institutions and to assess existing ones. However, successful 
institutional design of an organisation does not necessarily demand the fulfilment of all 
success factors and related indicators. A successful institutional design depends on the 
appropriate mix of measures, which has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. There 
are no one-size-fits-all solutions and the factors and criteria do not represent a 
technocratic formula that can be applied mechanically. Any regulatory system is 
ultimately the result of a political (and public) process that aims to reconcile various 
interests and goals into an appropriate response.  
 
1 Performance Criteria 
As mentioned, performance criteria are necessary for the systematic assessment of 
alternative approaches to a regulatory task. But measurement of criteria for “success,” 
“outcome” or “impact” is a complicated though basic task. Articulating regulatory 
objectives is essential for shaping key metrics; once articulated, however, their very 
articulation has a feedback impact on the institutional setting and environment.1  
One might argue that “performance” is simply the level of compliance by the industry 
involved with the objectives established in the standards for self- or co-regulation. We 
argue, however, that this notion alone does not capture the complexity of 
“performance”. Instead, we suggest what we call a “4A” concept. The performance of 
self-regulatory schemes is determined by awareness by the institutional players; the 
processes of adoption of the regulatory scheme (including institution(s), rule(s) and 
process(es)); the public (and legislative) attitude, including acceptance and appreciation 
of the regulatory institutions and their rules/processes; and, of course, the actions 
undertaken by those that regulate, are regulated or affected by the regulations in 
question. 
Performance then becomes a more nuanced concept, involving both direct impact on 
those who are part of the industry and the perceptions of ways in which the various 
schemes are working. One has to examine not only the level of compliance, but the 
mode and standard of adoption of the self regulatory scheme, which in itself implies the 
participation or awareness of the major players. 
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Another way to put all of this is that performance is a set of interrelationships between 
awareness, adoption, attitude and actions: 
• Compliance, and thus performance, is determined by the relationship(s) that 
exist between regulators and their regulated communities at all stages of the 
regulatory process. 
• The relationship between regulators and their constituencies (including the 
general public and the government) is contingent upon: 
▪ the level of public and industry awareness of the regulatory schemes 
and processes 
▪ the level of adoption of the regulatory schemes and acceptance of the 
authority of the regulatory institution 
▪ the reputation or public attitude, including the perceived legitimacy, of 
the regulatory institution 
▪ the behaviour of the actors (primarily from industry) responsible for 
complying with the regulatory goals, and those affected by the 
rules/processes (primarily the public and the government sector) 
The increased adoption of alternative modes of regulation is often premised upon the 
belief that self-regulatory institutions are more effective and more cost-efficient than the 
strictly governmental command-and-control approach in making targeted groups act 
responsibly. This greater efficiency and effectiveness is explained by highlighting the 
unique relationships among the “regulators” and those “regulated” or responsible for 
complying. In particular, stronger partnerships with regulated communities, better 
communication and reputation and better incentives to comply (voluntarily) with 
regulations are all arguments used in favour of self-regulation. 
Further, it is often assumed that self-regulatory agencies, given their origins in the 
private sector, are more likely to embrace the ethos of “service”, which is believed to be 
less important/central to government regulators. If this enhanced ethos were indeed the 
case, customer satisfaction with their regulatory services would then determine their 
performance plans; compliance assistance would be a legitimate and important line of 
business; agencies would encourage their partners (and the public) to get involved in 
rule-making early in the process, through a constant feedback loop; and communities 
and citizens would get real-time information so they could take steps to protect 
themselves. 
At the same time, given their limited enforcement mechanisms, self-regulatory agencies 
are highly dependent upon their relationships with those responsible for compliance, 
and with government. How they perform depends on how they communicate, on their 
legitimacy and accepted authority, and on how they establish (or provide incentives for) 
compliance. 
In sum, to measure the impact and/or performance of self-regulatory bodies in achieving 
their respective social goal(s) (e.g. encouraging responsible behaviour among industry 
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actors, protecting consumers, achieving technical interoperability), one must consider 
the following four criteria of “effect”-iveness, and make them “measurable” by means 
of selected indicators: 
a) Awareness: 
Knowledge and understanding of schemes 
Indicators include: 
• Public awareness of the existence, goals and substance of the alternative 
regulatory institution, its guiding norms (e.g. codes of conduct) and processes 
(e.g. complaints procedure) and how it relates to the public 
• Industry awareness of the alternative regulatory institution and of industry’s 
rights and obligations under the alternative regulatory system 
• Awareness across the communications sectors and among public policy makers 
of how the alternative regulatory institution relates to other schemes 
b) Adoption: 
Concurrence with schemes and acceptance of authority 
Indicators include: 
• Industry (and government) support for creation of code/institution/rating 
scheme 
• Adoption and use of code/rating scheme among industry players/content 
providers 
• Acceptance of authority among industry/content providers 
• Public concurrence with or acquiescence to goals and methods 
c) Attitude: 
Perception, especially in terms of trust, credibility and legitimacy 
Indicators include: 
• Public trust in alternative regulatory regimes and institutions (and how these can 
address the public’s concerns/interests) 
• Legitimacy and public image (credibility) 
• Implications of media coverage 
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d) Action: 
Includes specific code or self and co-regulatory output, including compliance with 
schemes in an objective sense; complaints received and disputes handled; presence or 
absence of threats by government to intervene; and general satisfaction with the level 
of enforcement. 
Indicators include: 
• Industry (non)compliance with rules, rating schemes and obligations of a code 
• Complaints filed and disputes registered or other modes of industry notice to 
members  
• Adjudications and sanctions 
• Governmental (non-)engagement (e.g. proposed regulations/court decisions) and 
other modes of potential intervention 
Further, each performance criterion must be translated and prioritised according to the 
different types of alternative regime considered (see section B-1).  
 
2 Enabling Contextual Factors 
A second set of evaluation criteria consists of factors related to the particular 
characteristics of the industries involved and to their particular regulatory environment. 
For example, the potential and limits of alternative modes of regulation are highly 
dependent on the risks and potential of negative consequences in case of regulatory 
failure, the required intensity of regulatory intervention, conflicts between public and 
private interests, differences in market power of the companies involved and on the 
reputational sensitivity of the industry. These factors are related to the market and 
policy context of alternative regulatory institutions. In combination, they can provide a 
more or less enabling context for self- or co-regulatory institutions. They affect the 
possibilities and probabilities of their establishment (e.g. incentives and capabilities of 
companies to cooperate), as well as the performance of already established institutions 
(e.g. their effectiveness in the reduction or avoidance of market failure). 
The enabling contextual factors and their respective empirical indicators provide 
guidance for the systematic assessment of alternative regulatory forms. They can be 
applied to discuss the appropriateness/suitability of alternative modes of regulation for 
the solution of a regulatory problem from a public policy perspective. These factors can 
support the regulatory choice process when new regulatory problems are encountered 
(ex-ante evaluation), but also prove useful when examining existing regulatory 
arrangements (ex-post evaluation).  
The following nine factors2 (a-i) are derived from theoretical and empirical analyses of 
advantages and disadvantages, and success factors for alternative regulatory modes.3 
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For each factor, a set of indicators is provided to facilitate an empirical assessment of 
the respective contextual factor. Furthermore, generally/theoretically assumed 
interrelations are briefly outlined.4 
a) Intervention capacity of governmental actors 
• higher, if there are legal remits for authorities and regulatory responsibilities in 
the respective regulatory field 
• higher, if there is leeway for legal action (considering possible differences at 
various levels of the multi-level governance regime: international, supranational, 
national, regional, local) 
• higher, if state authorities can resort to appropriate resources and instruments 
available for enforcement and imposition of sanctions 
• lower, if there is strong demand for international coordination  
There is a high capacity for intervention if governmental actors can resort to proper 
means to adopt and enforce statutory regulation. The intervention capacity of 
governmental actors may affect the industry’s willingness to adopt self-regulatory 
solutions in order to pre-empt statutory regulation. The greater the government’s 
capacity for intervention, the higher is the feasibility of adopting alternative modes of 
regulation. 
b) Impact in case of regulatory failure (and the need for uniform and binding  
minimum standards) 
• higher, if the costs in the event of regulatory failure are considerable  
• higher, if there are substantial public concerns, i.e. if a product supplied is 
essential to the welfare of individuals (e.g. major public health and safety 
concerns; threat to children and minors; detrimental affects on communications 
infrastructures) 
• higher, if universal application/participation is required in order to assure the 
necessary level of goal achievement5 
The impact in the case of regulatory failure and the need for uniform and binding 
minimum standards determine the necessary level of governmental intervention. The 
higher the potential negative impact might be, the stronger is the need for minimum 
binding standards. Strong demand for minimum binding standards decreases the 
suitability of alternative regulatory solutions. 
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c) Intensity of required regulatory intervention 
• higher, if regulatory intervention restricts fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of 
communication) 
• higher, if regulatory intervention restricts market access  
• higher, if regulatory intervention changes prices/revenues 
• lower, if regulatory intervention changes certain aspects of the quality of 
products 
• lower, if regulatory intervention does not change prices and/or quality, but 
provides additional information about quality and/or prices (e.g. aims at 
enhancing transparency) 
The intensity of the regulatory intervention required is highly dependent on the 
characteristics of the regulatory problem and the available means for intervention. In 
general, it can be assumed that – from a democratic point of view – the demand for 
direct government involvement increases with the intensity of required regulatory 
intervention. One of the central questions in the course of the establishment of 
regulatory arrangements is whether there is scope for applying soft intervention 
mechanisms without compromising the public regulatory objectives. The lower the 
intensity of regulatory intervention, the better the suitability of alternative regulatory 
solutions may be. 
d) Conflicts of public and private interests in a regulatory question 
• higher, if companies, consumers and the wider community do not share a 
common interest in avoiding market failure  
• higher, if the interest of companies in avoiding market failure diverges 
significantly 
The degree of conflict between public and private interests for any given regulatory 
matter affects the feasibility and the suitability of alternative regulatory solutions. If 
companies share a common interest in avoiding market failure, their willingness to 
group together and to adopt alternative regulatory solutions will be high, and an 
alternative regulatory solution is feasible. But even if companies share a common 
interest and agree on an alternative regulatory mechanism, it is not certain that there will 
be no conflicts between their private interests and the public interest. The lower the 
divergence between public and private interests, the more suitable is an alternative 
regulatory solution. 
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e) Intensity of competition 
• higher, if there is a high number of market participants 
• higher, if there is a low degree of market concentration (no significant market 
power) 
• higher, if market entry barriers are low (regulatory barriers, sunk cost etc.) 
The level of adoption of alternative regulatory modes depends on the number of market 
participants and on the intensity of competition in a market. Intensive competition may 
decrease the incentives to accept additional regulatory authorities alongside statutory 
authorities. At the same time, it has to be considered that alternative regulatory 
institutions might entail or encourage anti-competitive behaviour. In particular, great 
differences in market power and high market entry barriers might encourage this 
potential disadvantage of alternative regulation. In reaction, governmental regulatory 
oversight might be introduced. 
f) Reputational sensitivity of the industry  
• higher, if strong public awareness and public concern is generated/exists 
regarding regulatory issues (e.g. protection of minors, privacy, environmental 
pollution) 
• higher, if companies have already invested heavily in the development of their 
reputation 
• higher, if non-compliance leads to a loss of reputation and to a drop in sales 
figures 
• higher in B2C-markets with direct consumer contact 
• lower in B2B-markets with indirect consumer contact 
The reputational sensitivity of the industry is considered as a central factor for the 
feasibility of the adoption of an alternative regulatory solution. The more the 
companies’ success depends upon their own reputation and on the reputation of their 
industry segment in general, the greater are the incentives to adopt alternative regulatory 
solutions in order to avoid losses of reputation.6  
g) Availability of organisations that could take over regulatory tasks 
• industry expertise regarding self-/co-regulation (e.g. another self-/co-regulatory 
scheme is already in place) 
• an already acknowledged industry association with a high reputation, adequate 
resources and the ability to reconcile diverging company interests 
• an already acknowledged industry association with widespread support of 
industry (near universal participation) 
• adequate international cooperation among recognised organisations to meet 
transnational regulatory challenges (mutual exchange of opinions, transnational 
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coordination, agreements on common objectives, minimum standards and 
enforcement mechanisms) 
• number of alternative regulatory institutions in the sector and a level of 
regulatory competition 
• number of single- and multiple-issue organisations 
The feasibility of adopting alternative modes of regulation for a new regulatory 
challenge depends on the existing industry environment. The practicability of adoption 
is in general higher if there is already a recognised organisation that can take over 
additional regulatory tasks or if an industry segment already has experience with 
alternative modes of regulation. The ability to cope with transnational regulatory 
challenges depends on the existence of adequate international cooperation. Further, the 
feasibility of adoption also increases with the number of alternative regulatory 
institutions dealing with the same issues in the respective sector (e.g. e-commerce 
seals), because companies may choose between various organisations (forum shopping). 
This may lead to regulatory competition and decreasing standards (“race to the 
bottom”). Moreover, regulatory competition and the existence of many single-issue 
organisations may cause transparency and awareness problems.  
h) The extent to which public policy objectives are supported by the existing 
industry culture 
• high, if there is a pre-existing sensitivity to public interests on the part of the 
industry (awareness of public objectives; pre-existence of a “responsible 
industry culture”) 
• high, if there is a tradition of cooperation with state authorities and stakeholders 
• high, if there is a cohesive industry with like-minded participants, motivated to 
achieve common goals 
• high, if there is little scope for the benefits of self- or co-regulation being shared 
by non-participants (free-riding) 
• high, if there is effective pressure from within the industry to solve the 
regulatory problem 
The practicability of the adoption of alternative modes of regulation for a new 
regulatory challenge depends on the extent to which public policy objectives are 
supported by the existing industry culture. A pre-existing sensitivity to public interests 
and a tradition of cooperation with state authorities, for example, will support the 
adoption of alternative regulatory solutions.  
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i) Involvement of governmental actors7 
• encouragement of self-regulation by government/state authorities (carrot, 
inspiration) 
• political appreciation of the scheme, its outcomes, etc. by governmental 
agencies (symbolic support) 
• financial support (subsidy) 
• involvement of government personnel (information) 
• collaboration between governmental agencies and alternative regulatory 
institutions (cooperation) 
• co-regulation within a legal framework (direct control) 
• periodic review of the scheme by state authorities 
• definition of fall-back-scenarios in the case of failure (government intervention; 
stick) 
• in any case or form of state involvement, clear division of responsibility between 
the self-/co-regulatory institution and the state authorities involved 
Successful alternative regulation depends on an adequate level of support and 
involvement of governmental actors/state authorities. In most cases, alternative 
regulatory institutions are not set up completely without governmental influence or 
government pressure, and in many cases there are ongoing connections to governmental 
agencies during their operation. State authorities can draw on a range of instruments to 
support alternative regulatory institutions, to make active use of them and to control 
them. The options range from soft forms of governmental involvement (symbolic 
support, inspiration, integration of personnel) to financial subsidies, to direct control in 
a co-regulatory framework. Not all the above listed indicators are likely to be fulfilled in 
a single regulatory arrangement. A successful institutional design depends on an 
appropriate mix of measures. 
 
3 Institutional/Organisational Success Factors and 
Respective Indicators for Empirical Evaluations 
The following eight success factors and their respective indicators for empirical 
evaluations are related to the institutional/organisational design of alternative regulatory 
institutions. The factors are derived from the analysis of potential failures of alternative 
modes of regulation (i.e. disadvantages compared to governmental regulation) on the 
one hand, and their potential benefits (i.e. advantages compared to governmental 
regulation) on the other.8 Institutional/organisational success factors comprise the 
measures and provisions that can be made at the organisational level of an alternative 
regulatory institution in order to promote the potential advantages/benefits and to reduce 
potential disadvantages/failures. In contrast to contextual factors, these may be modified 
within the respective organisations, for example in order to: 
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 increase the regulatory value added (a-e), or to  
 enhance the legitimacy of an organisation (f, g).  
a) Rule making: Clearly defined remit, intelligible objectives and (measurable) 
standards that go beyond governmental regulatory requirements 
• a general statement of principles in the scheme (e.g. a mission statement 
comprising commitments to public policy objectives, not merely 
individual/private interests) 
• clear definition (operational, measurable) of objectives  
• definition of intended outcomes and measurable standards regarding these 
outcomes (performance indicators, operational/measurable as far as possible) 
• clarification regarding how these objectives contribute to the achievement of 
regulatory added value, a value that goes beyond already existing governmental 
provisions9  
b) Enforcement: Adequate enforcement mechanisms (ex-ante and ex-post-
enforcement) 
• an organisational structure comprising a responsible enforcement unit (e.g. 
body/board that deals with complaints) 
• a defined enforcement procedure (e.g. a complaints procedure) 
• adequate enforcement remit, measures/instruments and resources (e.g. for 
continuous monitoring of compliance) 
• visible, well-known contact point to report on potential infringements (or, in the 
case of a dispute-resolution schemes, ease of access for consumers) 
• an appropriate appeals mechanism (independent of previous decision-making 
board/body) 
c) Adjudication: Adequate sanction power in case of malpractice (effective, credible, 
commercially significant sanctions) 
• powers to enforce revocation, relief, change of malpractice (requirement for 
specific changes in output) 
• reputational sanctions (e.g. publication of violations, withdrawal of a quality 
seal, etc.) 
• financial sanctions (e.g. fines) 
• organisational sanctions (e.g. exclusion from an industry association) 
• existential sanctions (e.g. withdrawal of a license) 
d) Review: Periodic internal and external review (control, evaluation, monitoring, 
auditing) 
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• definition of performance indicators (related to the objectives of the scheme, to 
the measurable standards) 
• internal, adequately resourced evaluation/auditing body and defined 
evaluation/auditing procedures (“organisational self-assessments”) 
• published reports on results of internal evaluation (e.g. compliance letter) 
• periodic reviews by state authorities (based on key performance indicators) 
• openness for review/auditing/control by other interested parties (public actors, 
consumer-protection organisations, scientists/experts, etc.)10 
e) Resources: Adequate resources to assure that objectives are not compromised 
• adequate budget (an adequate “own” overall budget and dedicated budgets for 
special purposes, e.g. a marketing budget if the scheme is heavily dependent on 
interaction with and awareness of consumers/public) 
• sufficient staff 
• effective internal division of labour (e.g. specific units, such as an advisory 
body, a governing board, bodies for compliance support, complaints handling 
and appeals; units for finance, marketing and review) 
• adequate “communications strategies and technical support,” related to: 
▪ consumers/citizens (e.g. public education programme, image campaign, 
hotline) 
▪ industry (industry training, compliance support, compliance guidelines, 
manuals) 
▪ government (regulatory information, round tables, etc.) 
• adequate means to achieve participation by those who are affected by the 
regulation (incentives, threat/stick) 
f) Participation and representation: Balanced representation, involvement of 
stakeholders, independence from interference by interested parties  
• provisions for organisational independence from the individual interested 
parties (legal, contractual, infrastructural independence) 
• provisions for financial independence from the individual interested parties (e.g. 
balanced sources of funding) 
• openness/accessibility for all interested stakeholders (industry, government, 
consumers, scientists/experts, etc.) 
• proactive measures to involve all relevant stakeholders in the design of the 
scheme in order to achieve broad participation (e.g. broad public consultation) 
• provisions to integrate non-industry members in the operation of the scheme 
(balanced representation in the decision-making bodies of the schemes, e.g. the 
advisory body, the governing body, complaints body, etc.) 
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g) Transparency: Transparent institutional design and transparent regulatory 
processes (decision making) 
• the right to access all relevant information on regulatory processes for all 
interested parties (e.g. government, stakeholders, public/media, 
scientists/experts) 
• public information (e.g. website) about key institutional features (e.g. decision-
making boards/units, accountabilities/main responsibilities, complaints 
procedure, funding arrangements, performance indicators) 
• (public) consultation in the course of the establishment of the institution 
• (public) consultation on significant changes to procedures, governance, appeal 
mechanisms, funding arrangements, etc.11 
• public information (e.g. website) on progress in ongoing regulatory processes 
(agenda, protocols, draft resolutions, decisions) 
• the obligation to provide reasonable justification (arguments) for all relevant 
decisions in order to assure that decisions can be criticised based on 
arguing/reasoning (discursive structure) 
• periodic (e.g. annual) reports on progress/performance and significant changes 
of institutional designs (e.g. reports accessible to government, stakeholders, 
public/media, scientists/experts) 
h) International involvement: Appropriate measures to contribute to international 
efforts for the solution of transnational regulatory problems12 
• direct participation/involvement (e.g. membership) in a transnational (e.g. 
continental) alternative regulatory organisation 
• formal agreements for cooperation with national alternative regulatory 
organisations in other countries 
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Table 1: Check List for Regulatory Choice – Overview of Evaluation Criteria 
Performance Criteria  
a) Awareness: Knowledge and understanding of schemes 
b) Adoption: Concurrence with schemes and acceptance of authority 
c) Attitude: Perception, especially in terms of trust, credibility and legitimacy 
d) Action: Compliance with schemes, complaints received, disputes handled, governmental engagement 
 
Contextual Factors 
a) Intervention capacity of governmental actors 
b) Impact in case of regulatory failure (and need for uniform and binding minimum standards) 
c) Intensity of required regulatory intervention 
d) Conflicts of public and private interests in a regulatory question 
e) Intensity of competition 
f) Reputational sensitivity of the industry  
g) Availability of organisations that could take over regulatory tasks 
h) Extent to which public policy objectives are supported by the existing industry culture 
i) Involvement of governmental actors 
 
Institutional/organisational success factors 
a) Rule making: Clearly defined remit, intelligible objectives and (measurable) standards that go beyond 
governmental regulatory requirements 
b) Enforcement: Adequate enforcement mechanisms (ex-ante and ex-post-enforcement) 
c) Adjudication: Adequate sanction power in case of malpractice (effective, credible, commercially significant 
sanctions) 
d) Review: Periodic internal and external review (control, evaluation, monitoring, auditing) 
e) Resources: Adequate resources to assure that objectives are not compromised 
f) Participation and representation: Balanced representation, involvement of stakeholders, independence from 
interference by interested parties  
g) Transparency: Transparent institutional design and transparent regulatory processes (decision making) 
h) International involvement: Appropriate measures to contribute to international efforts for the solution of 
transnational regulatory problems 
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B Comparative Analysis of Selected Cases 
1 Overview and Approach 
The analytical tools, developed and presented in section A allow for a systematic 
comparative evaluation of self- and co-regulation schemes. For this study, a selection of 
non-UK schemes with a focus on consumer-protection issues has been made (see Table 
2). The eight cases chosen offer a mixture of  
• application fields (Internet codes of conduct; content-rating schemes) 
• geographical regions (European Union, North America, Australasia) 
• self- and co-regulation (intensity of governmental involvement) 
• particularly successful/best-practice and unsuccessful schemes (according to the 
literature) 
Table 2: Selected Cases 
 Successful schemes outside of the UK Unsuccessful 
schemes  
 European Union North America Australasia  
Internet Codes of 
Conduct 
Consumer 
Protection on the 
Internet 
Internet Service Providers 
Association of Ireland 
(ISPAI, Ireland)* 
Canadian Advanced 
Technology Alliance – 
Canadian Association of 
Internet Service 
Providers (CATA-CAIP, 
Canada) 
Hong Kong Internet 
Service Providers 
Association (HKISPA, 
Hong Kong) 
Internet Society 
of New Zealand 
(InternetNZ, 
New Zealand)  
 
Content-Rating 
Systems 
Choice & 
Information 
Provision in the 
Film/Broadcasting 
Industry 
Netherlands Institute for 
the Classification of 
Audiovisual Media 
(NICAM, Netherlands)* 
Motion Picture 
Association of 
America/Classification 
and Rating 
Administration 
(MPAA/CARA, USA) 
Communications and 
Multimedia Content 
Forum of Malaysia 
(CMCF, Malaysia) 
TV Parental 
Guidelines  
(USA) 
Note: Cases marked with an * in the table are described as good or best practice in the literature 
Approach 
The starting point is the study’s primary goal to examine whether and how success and 
failure of selected self- and co-regulatory schemes can be explained by their respective 
institutional design, by characteristics of the industries involved and by the established 
regulatory environment. Evaluation is supposed to show if differences regarding the 
performance of the institutions studied can be explained by differences of contextual 
factors and institutional success factors. 
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The evaluation of successful or unsuccessful performance calls for different 
approaches in the two fields of application, because the primary objectives (intended 
outcomes, impacts) vary considerably. Hence, from application field to application 
field, there are differences in the mixture of performance criteria selected for empirical 
analyses.  
For media content-rating schemes, we prioritise the performance indicators awareness 
of and attitude towards the rating schemes. The rationale for the selection of awareness 
and attitude as key criteria is given because success of a content-rating scheme depends 
on broad public awareness and understanding of the scheme and of the meanings of the 
content classifications in use. It further demands public confidence in the rating 
institutions, the rating schemes and the ratings as such. A successful rating institution 
also depends on industry (content providers) awareness of rating schemes. Industry 
needs to know the schemes, how to use the rating systems and how to comply with 
rating rules. Moreover, the growing number of rating schemes (motion pictures, 
television, Internet, games) demands awareness of schemes across the communications 
sectors and for awareness on how the ratings relate with other schemes. Finally, the 
political responsibilities regarding protection of minors demand an awareness of 
rating/classification issues among the public policy makers. 
For the Internet codes of conduct, we focus mainly upon adoption and action variables, 
as these are considered as priority criteria for their performance. Success of an Internet 
code of conduct heavily depends on the level of adoption by the industry. A code 
without any signatories hardly provides any added regulatory value. Action – i.e. in 
terms of compliance with a code of conduct – is referred to as a second crucial 
performance criterion. Added regulatory value is achieved if the signatories of a code 
effectively comply with the objectives and standards they have agreed on.  
Evaluation should show if differences regarding performance in the respective fields of 
priority can be explained by contextual factors and institutional success factors. 
Theoretically it would be possible to assess all the above-listed success and contextual 
factors (section A-2 and A-3) and to investigate the significant differences. However, 
given considerable differences regarding the explanatory potential of the various factors 
and indicators developed, further selections of factors are useful and necessary.13 
The selection of success and contextual factors for empirical investigations is based on 
an approach driven by basic assumptions regarding theoretically plausible interrelations 
between performance indicators (outcome/impact) on the one hand and 
institutional/organisational success factors and contextual factors on the other. Each 
assumption combines at least one performance criterion with one 
institutional/organisational success factor or with one contextual factor. Among many 
possible assumptions only those which are considered particularly relevant for the 
selected/prioritised performance criteria in the two fields of application have been 
selected for empirical investigation (Content-rating schemes: Awareness & Attitude; 
Internet Codes: Adoption & Action).14 
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Selected Basic Assumptions on Awareness of and Attitude Towards Media Content-
Rating Schemes in the Film/Broadcasting Industry: 
 A 1: The range of resources that alternative regulatory institutions can draw on 
essentially promotes their ability to increase public awareness of the 
institutions. 
Rationale: The ability of alternative regulatory institutions to gain public awareness 
(visibility, knowledge, and understanding) for their content rating-schemes depends – 
inter alia – on adequate resources in terms of funding, staff, and communications 
strategies (marketing activities, technical support). The awareness among the general 
public is particularly relevant because the success of media content-rating schemes 
strongly depends on broad knowledge and understanding of the scheme. 
 A 2: Strong involvement of non-industry members in alternative regulatory 
institutions promotes the attitude towards the institution in terms of trust, 
credibility and legitimacy. 
Rationale: The attitude towards alternative regulatory institutions in terms of trust, 
credibility and legitimacy depends – inter alia – on adequate involvement of non-
industry members in media content-rating schemes. Adequate involvement of non-
industry members can counter self-serving tendencies by the industry (i.e. provide a 
watchdog function) thus contributing to public trust in a rating scheme and its overall 
legitimacy. Involvement of non-industry members (e.g. consumer representatives, 
independent experts) may be achieved, for example, by appropriate representation of 
non-industry members in the decision-making bodies of the alternative regulatory 
institution.  
 A 3: Involvement of governmental actors in alternative regulatory institutions 
promotes the awareness of the institution among policy makers and it 
contributes to the attitude towards the regulatory institution in terms of trust, 
credibility and legitimacy. 
Rationale: Awareness and credibility of alternative regulatory institutions depend – 
inter alia – on adequate involvement of governmental actors in alternative regulatory 
institutions. State oversight of rating institutions may counter the industry’s self-serving 
tendencies. Political responsibilities regarding protection of minors call for an 
awareness of rating/classification issues among the public policy makers and for 
awareness of how various rating schemes across the communications industries relate to 
each other.  
Table 3 shows the prioritised fields for empirical evaluation of the selected media 
content-rating schemes. It summarises and operationalises the “4A concept” and the 
related contextual and institutional/organisational success factors. 
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Table 3: Selected Evaluation Criteria for Media Content-Rating Schemes 
Performance criteria Awareness (and knowledge) Attitude: trust, credibility and 
legitimacy  
Selected indicators for  
empirical analysis 
 
public awareness of the existence, goals 
and meaning of rating schemes and their 
processes (and how the public can use 
them) 
industry (content providers) awareness of 
rating schemes, and how to use or comply 
with them 
awareness across the communications 
sectors, and among public policy makers, 
and how the ratings relate with other 
schemes 
public trust in rating 
schemes/methodologies and how they 
are implemented (and how these can 
address the public’s 
concerns/interests) 
legitimacy of rating bodies (credibility) 
media coverage  
 
Institutional/organisational 
success factors 
Adequate resources in terms of 
funding, staff, and communications 
strategies 
Balanced representation, 
involvement of stakeholders, 
independence from interference by 
interested parties  
Selected indicators for  
empirical analysis 
 
adequate overall/total funding/budget 
adequate funding dedicated for special 
purposes (e.g. marketing; educational 
training) 
sufficient staff/personnel 
effective internal division of labour 
adequate “communications strategies and 
technical support” related to citizens, 
industry, government 
means/instruments to achieve industry 
participation (incentives, pressure) 
adequate involvement of non-industry 
members in the decision-making units 
of the schemes: 
… advisory/supervisory unit  
… governing unit 
… complaints unit 
… appeals unit 
Contextual factor Adequate involvement of governmental actors 
Selected indicators for  
empirical analysis 
 
encouragement of self-regulation by government (carrot; inspiration)  
demand for self-regulation by government (stick; threat) 
financial government support (subsidy) 
involvement of government personnel (information) 
government involvement via contracts (contractual) 
collaboration between government and the alternative regulatory institution (ARI) in 
regulatory practice (cooperation) 
defined division of responsibilities between government and ARI 
(periodic) review of the scheme by state authorities 
political appreciation of the scheme and its outcomes (symbolic support) 
co-regulation within a legal framework  
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Selected Basic Assumptions on Adoption of Internet Codes of Conduct and 
Action/Compliance with the Codes of Conduct:  
 A 4: A high intensity of competition in the ISP market in a country decreases the 
incentives for ISPs to adopt and accept alternative regulatory institutions on a 
large scale. 
Rationale: The level of acceptance of alternative regulatory organisations and the level 
of adoption of alternative regulatory modes in a country depend – inter alia – on the 
intensity of competition in the ISP market in the respective country. Strong competition 
in an ISP market decreases the incentives of ISPs to accept additional regulatory 
authorities alongside statutory authorities. Moreover, intense competition reduces the 
incentive to comply with voluntary codes of conduct, which put additional restraints on 
the options for market behaviour in a competitive market. In effect, intense competition 
hampers the adoption of alternative regulation on a large scale, i.e. adoption by many 
market participants. At the same time, intense competition can promote the adoption of 
alternative regulatory institutions on a limited scale, i.e. adoption by some market 
participants who aspire to the reputation benefits accruing from self-regulatory 
measures. 
 A 5: Strong international involvement of a national Internet organisation with an 
international Internet organisation and intensive modes of cooperation within 
this international Internet organisation contribute to a high level of adoption of 
alternative regulatory modes at national level. 
Rationale: The level of consumer protection on the Internet in a country depends – inter 
alia – on adequate international cooperation between national Internet organisations. 
The international involvement of a recognised national Internet institution (e.g. via 
membership or formal agreements) is a prerequisite for transnational cooperation in 
order to meet transnational regulatory challenges. A high level of adoption of standards 
at international level combined with intensive modes of cooperation within the 
respective international Internet institution (i.e. cooperation going beyond mutual 
exchange of opinions) increases pressure on national Internet organisations to adopt and 
comply with standards on which agreement has been found at international level.  
 A 6: Extensive powers of alternative regulatory organisations to impose 
sanctions on violations of principles of a code of conduct promote industry 
compliance with rules and obligations under a code.  
Rationale: The level of compliance with a code of conduct depends – inter alia – on the 
powers to impose sanctions where there are violations. Hence, adequate power of 
sanction in the case of malpractice (violations/non-observance of principles/objectives) 
is considered to be a key success factor for alternative modes of regulation. The level of 
sanction powers available to an alternative regulatory institution affects the credibility 
of the whole alternative regulatory system, the room for manoeuvre and action of the 
alternative regulatory organisation and the incentives of industry members to comply 
with rules and obligations. Strong incentives for compliance are present if violations of 
principles result in significant disadvantages for the respective violator. 
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Table 4 shows the prioritised fields for empirical evaluation of the selected Internet 
codes of conduct. It summarises and operationalises the “4A concept”, and the related 
contextual and institutional/organisational success factors. 
Table 4: Selected Evaluation Criteria for Internet Codes of Conduct 
Performance criteria Adoption: concurrence with schemes and 
acceptance of authority 
Action: compliance, complaints and 
disputes 
 
Selected indicators for 
empirical analysis 
 
industry support for creation of code/institution 
adoption of code among industry players 
acceptance of authority among industry players 
public concurrence with goals and methods 
industry (non)compliance with rules and 
obligations of code 
complaints and disputes on how code is 
implemented (if at all) 
sanctions and adjudications  
governmental (non-)engagement (e.g. 
proposed regulations/court decisions) 
 
Contextual factors  
 
Intensity of competition 
Availability of  international organisations that 
could take over regulatory tasks 
 
Selected indicators for 
empirical analysis 
 
number of market participants 
intensity of competition in the ISP market in a country 
 
recognised international Internet organisations  
adequate modes of international cooperation to meet 
transnational regulatory challenges 
… mutual exchange of opinions 
… agreement on common objectives 
… transnational cooperation in practice 
… minimum standards and enforcement mechanisms 
 
 
Institutional/ 
organisational 
success factors 
International involvement: Adequate measures to 
contribute to international efforts for the solution 
of transnational regulatory problems 
Adjudication: Adequate powers to 
impose sanctions in case of 
malpractice  
Selected indicators for 
empirical analysis 
 
membership of international Internet organisations 
formal agreements with other national internet 
organisations 
powers to enforce revocation, relief, 
change of malpractice (requirement for 
specific changes in output) 
reputational sanctions (e.g. publication 
of violations; withdrawal of a quality 
seal, etc.) 
financial sanctions (e.g. fines) 
organisational sanctions (e.g. exclusion 
from an industry association) 
existential sanctions (e.g. withdrawal of 
a license) 
Using the above outline approach for empirical investigations it has to be borne in mind, 
that it is based on a range of selections according to prioritised fields for analysis. Many 
additional contextual and institutional/organisational success factors do in fact influence 
the performance of an alternative regulatory institution, but these additional factors are 
omitted in the subsequent empirical analyses. While the quality of empirical assessment 
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improves with the number of factors researched, a reduction of factors was unavoidable 
given the limited resources of this research project. The following analysis of the 
selected criteria must be understood as a basic attempt to search for and to explain 
interrelations between performance, contextual and institutional/organisational success 
factors. The analytical framework developed, especially the elaborated lists of 
performance criteria, success factors, contextual factors and the related indicators for 
empirical measurement (see sections A) can be guidance for systematic follow-up 
research. 
 
2 Media Content-Rating Schemes in the 
Film/Broadcasting Industry 
The great impact of audiovisual media on social, democratic and cultural developments 
is one of the main reasons for regulatory intervention in film and broadcasting markets. 
One starting point here is market failure resulting from information asymmetry between 
producers and consumers of media content. Because of the characteristics of media 
products (experience goods), consumers find it almost impossible to assess the quality 
of media content before consumption. This results in difficulties for rational choices 
regarding the selection of media content. There are a number of reasons why consumers 
want to be adequately informed about the content of a media product in advance. One of 
the major driving forces is the question of whether content is suitable for consumption 
by minors.  
In order to support users in their selection process and to increase transparency, a wide 
range of rating and filter systems are being developed for analogue and digital media 
content. The debate on content rating and filtering predominantly concerns Internet 
content, where complex regulatory arrangements with major industrial participation are 
emerging. But rating and filtering is also a regulatory technique in the film and 
broadcasting industries, which have been subject to major changes in the course of 
convergence. Regulatory agencies are increasingly required to assess the various 
options for effective media content rating, which includes an evaluation of the potential 
and limits of alternative modes of regulation (self- and co-regulation). In particular, 
knowledge of the key institutional factors affecting the performance of alternative 
regulatory institutions may enable regulators to determine whether alternative modes 
are relevant in addressing the regulatory challenges that occur with an increasing 
amount of media content. 
Most of the evaluation criteria are closely related to the industry and policy context in 
the respective country and they consequently have to be assessed case by case. 
However, some criteria refer to more general characteristics of industries, products and 
regulatory demands.  
The more general contextual factors for self- and co-regulation in the area of content-
rating schemes are discussed in section 2.1.1 in order to provide an overview of the 
general conditions for alternative regulation in the area of content-rating schemes. This 
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is followed by a comparison of basic characteristics of the four cases studied (2.1.2). 
Analysis shows basic differences among the four institutions selected for empirical 
investigation, which have to be borne in mind when it comes to the assessment of 
regulatory performance. The subsequent part of the analysis provides a comparative 
evaluation of the performance of the institutions studied (2.2) applying selected 
performance criteria (awareness and attitude) from the 4A concept. This is followed by 
a detailed comparative analysis of institutional success- and contextual factors (2.3), 
which were derived from the selected basic assumptions on interrelations between 
performance indicators on the one hand and institutional/organisational success factors 
and contextual factors on the other. The analyses show commonalities and differences 
of institutional designs of the four rating schemes that serve as the basis for the 
discussion of interrelations between performance and institutional designs of the 
schemes. 
 
2.1 Context and Characteristics of Selected Cases 
The potentials and limits for alternative modes of regulation are highly dependent on 
characteristics of the industries involved and on the established regulatory environment. 
Contextual factors that have to be considered when it comes to choices between 
regulatory modes are, for instance, the risk and consequences of regulatory failure, the 
required intensity of regulatory intervention, conflicts between public and private 
interests, differences in market power of the companies involved, reputation-sensitivity 
of the industry to regulation, and the support of statutory bodies (see A-2). These factors 
are related to the market and policy context of alternative regulatory institutions. In 
combination they can provide a more or less “enabling context” for self- or co-
regulatory institutions. They affect the possibilities for their establishment and the way 
in which established institutions perform in practice. The criteria can be used to discuss 
the appropriateness of alternative modes of regulation from a public policy perspective. 
The evaluation shows the feasibility of the emergence of alternative regulatory solutions 
and their general suitability for the solution of a regulatory problem. 
Some of these criteria are strongly related to the industry and policy context in the 
respective country and they consequently have to be assessed case by case.15 Other 
criteria refer to more general characteristics of industries, products and regulatory 
demands. Some of these more general contextual factors for self- and co-regulation in 
the area of content-rating schemes are discussed in the following section (2.1.1) in order 
to provide an overview of the general conditions for alternative regulation in the area of 
content-rating schemes. This is followed by a comparison of basic characteristics of the 
four cases studied (2.1.2). Analysis shows basic differences among the four institutions, 
which have to be borne in mind when it comes to the assessment of regulatory 
performance. 
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2.1.1 Evaluation of Selected Contextual Factors 
Intervention Capacity of the State 
The intervention capacity of governmental actors may affect the industry’s willingness 
to adopt self-regulatory solutions in order to pre-empt statutory regulation. The greater 
the government’s capacity for intervention the higher is the feasibility of adopting 
alternative modes of regulation. However, the state’s intervention capacity in the area of 
media content-rating schemes in the film and broadcasting industry is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, intervention capacity is high as there are regulatory responsibilities for 
state authorities regarding content regulation aimed at the protection of minors. There 
are usually clearly defined legal remits for communication authorities regarding 
protection of minors, which provides leeway for state legal action, inter alia with regard 
to content rating. Moreover, in the case of motion pictures and television programmes, 
there is little demand for international coordination of rating systems even if 
international solutions would reduce transaction costs. National solutions are basically 
possible, and regionally biased rating schemes seem necessary as there are cultural 
differences that call for a certain level of differentiation. 
On the other hand, intervention capacity is low, because every state intervention in 
media affairs is generally sensitive with regard to freedom-of-speech concerns 
(censorship) even if the heights of the barriers to government intervention vary between 
different types of media (motion pictures, television, Internet) and between countries.16 
But at least in western democracies, the industry’s self-regulatory solutions are 
generally preferred. Moreover, intervention capacity is low because the estimated 
expenditures for enforcement are high. The coding, rating and classifying of an 
increasing amount of audiovisual content17 involves very high costs of a “do-it-yourself 
solution” on the part of the state.18 This is a further powerful argument for delegation of 
regulatory powers to the industry. 
In sum, the sensitiveness with regard to freedom-of-speech concerns and the high costs 
of rating argue for a regulatory arrangement with significant industry involvement in the 
rating practice. The state’s intervention capacity may, however, be used to implement 
modes of state oversight in order to avoid the failure of an industry rating scheme.  
Impact in the Case of Regulatory Failure and Need for Uniform and Binding 
Minimum Standards  
The impact in the case of regulatory failure and the need for uniform and binding 
minimum standards determine the necessary level of governmental intervention. The 
higher the potential negative impact, the greater is the need for minimum binding 
standards. High demand for minimum binding standards diminishes the suitability of 
alternative regulatory solutions. Assessment of the impact in the case of regulatory 
failure of a content-rating scheme and assessment of the need for uniform and binding 
minimum standards for content ratings leads to a differentiated result of evaluation: 
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Regulatory failures may result from the absence of a rating scheme or from a systematic 
failure of an established rating scheme in providing accurate, reliable and consistent 
information for consumers. The main impacts of regulatory failure due to information 
asymmetries are a lack of transparency and subsequent difficulties for consumers in 
making rational choices when it comes to the selection of media content.  
It is impossible to assess the overall costs of such a market failure, but it is possible to 
outline some of its potential impacts. As some media products involve a significant 
threat to the development of minors, parents in particular want to be adequately 
informed in advance. Given this substantial public-interest concern, non-adoption of a 
rating system or systematic failure in providing accurate, reliable and consistent 
information involves transparency losses for consumers. This could lead to decreasing 
trust in the media system as a whole, to adverse selection,19 to refusal of consumption 
and subsequent economic losses for the industry. An effective rating scheme, in 
contrast, provides significant added value for parents. 
The need for uniform and binding minimum standards is generally considered to be 
low. There is a desire for a high level of consistency in the rating practice,20 which calls 
for a certain level of uniformity in the application of a rating scheme. But universal 
application by all the market participants and binding minimum standards are not 
required in order to assure a satisfactory level of goal achievement. The impact of a 
problem caused in a single case of non-compliance is low, because the effects of one 
not rated product or one wrongly rated product are comparatively innocuous. Failures in 
individual cases may hardly damage an otherwise effective rating scheme and do not 
involve welfare losses to a community on a dangerous scale. 
In sum, there is no need for uniform and binding minimum standards, which is one 
argument in favour of alternative modes of regulation. But there are potentially negative 
impacts of non-adoption of a rating system or its systematic failure in providing 
accurate and reliable information and there is a desired high level of consistency in the 
rating practice. Substantial public-interest concerns and the threat of transparency 
losses call for measures in order to avoid failures. Such measures may be adopted by the 
industry itself or by the state authorities responsible.  
Intensity of Required Regulatory Intervention 
The required intensity of regulatory intervention is highly dependent on the 
characteristics of the regulatory problem and the available means for intervention. In 
general it can be assumed that the lower the intensity of regulatory intervention, the 
better the suitability of alternative regulatory solutions. 
At first glance the intensity of regulatory intervention via content rating schemes seems 
rather low. Regulatory intervention via rating does not change the media product as 
such. Rating mainly aims at enhancing transparency by providing additional 
information about content, e.g. its suitability of consumption by minors.  
However, on the other hand, there may be a strong economic impact resulting from 
rating. A certain rating may change the mode of delivery of a service/product. 
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Transmission of “highly rated” products is often limited to certain air times (watershed 
regulations) and this may have a considerable effect on prices/revenues.21 Certain 
ratings may restrict market access for providers22 and it has even been argued that rating 
constrains fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of communication). 
In sum, potentially strong economic impacts call for institutional dispositions to object 
to a given rating and to guarantee fair practice. Such dispositions may be constituted in 
the institutional design of the alternative regulatory institution (e.g. independent appeals 
units) and/or by possibilities to take legal action. 
Conflicts between Public and Private Interests in a Regulatory Question 
The degree of conflict between public and private interests in a regulatory question 
affects the feasibility and the suitability of alternative regulatory solutions. The lower 
the divergence between public and private interests the more suitable is an alternative 
regulatory solution. 
Conflicts between public and private interests in the case of rating schemes are high, 
because companies, consumers and the wider community do not share a common 
interest in reducing information asymmetries. TV stations and film and DVD 
distributors have an immediate interest in the outcomes of the ratings. The better a 
rating, the larger is the potential audience. Each restriction due to a certain rating may 
reduce audience share and thus revenue.23 Hence producers have an incentive to 
“consistently underlabel their products”.24 The audience on the other hand expects 
accurate and reliable ratings and a high level of protection. 
Due to the evident conflict of public and private interests, content rating is not suitable 
for pure, unlimited industry self-regulation. Some kind of public oversight is 
indispensable.  
Reputational Sensitivity of the Industry 
The reputational sensitivity of the industry is considered to be a central factor for the 
feasibility of the adoption of an alternative regulatory solution. The more the 
companies’ success depends upon their own reputation and on the reputation of the 
whole industry segment, the greater are the incentives to adopt alternative regulatory 
solutions in order to avoid losses of reputation. The question of reputational sensitivity 
of the media-content industry does not have an across-the-board answer. 
On the one hand there is a high level of public awareness and concern regarding the 
regulatory issue as it affects the protection of minors.25 Moreover, the audiovisual sector 
is a b-2-c market with direct consumer contact, where reputation losses may result in 
changing consumer’s choices. Content suppliers, especially in the quality segment and 
the producers of special programmes for children, have incentives to pay close attention 
to and invest heavily into their reputations. Reputation strategies may involve an 
emphasis on accurate and reliable ratings for their programmes.  
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However, other content producers and suppliers (e.g. in the down-market segment) do 
not consider reputation a central value. There are incentives to free-ride on the benefits 
of an established and effective rating-scheme. Moreover, not complying with a rule or a 
rating in individual cases will not lead to a significant loss of reputation and to a drop in 
sales figures. However, a systematic aberration which is obvious to the audience might 
lead to reputation losses resulting in a drop on sales figures. 
Differentiated levels of reputational sensitivity and the free-rider problematic involved 
are further aspects that have to be borne in mind when it comes to the establishment of 
alternative modes of regulation for media content rating. The development of 
instruments to counter free-riding and to achieve sufficient participation in the scheme 
might be considered.  
Summary and Interim Conclusions on Selected Contextual Factors for Content-
Rating Schemes 
 Evaluation of selected contextual factors for content-rating schemes shows that 
there is a substantial public-interest concern regarding media content. Effective 
rating schemes with accurate, reliable and consistent information about media 
content can provide added value for consumers, especially for parents and their 
content choices regarding consumption by minors. Non-adoption of a rating 
system or systematic failure in providing accurate, reliable and consistent 
information involves transparency losses for consumers and subsequent 
difficulties for rational choices when it comes to the selection of media content. 
 Regarding the provision of rating schemes, at least in western democracies, self-
regulatory initiatives of the industry are the generally preferred solution. State 
intervention in media affairs is generally sensitive with regard to freedom-of-
speech concerns (censorship). Moreover, expenditure on coding, rating and 
classifying of an increasing amount of audiovisual content would involve very 
high costs for a “state rating solution”, which is a second strong argument in 
favour of industry solutions. The low need for uniform and binding minimum 
standards due to the low impact of a problem caused in an individual case of 
non-compliance is a third one. 
 However, consumers – especially parents – are demanding a high level of 
accuracy, reliability and consistency of media content rating and an adequate 
level of protection for minors. The potentially strong economic impact resulting 
from a rating for an individual company and the high degree of conflict between 
public and private interests may undermine the public desire for reliable content 
rating. Moreover, not all producers and suppliers of media content share a 
common level of interest in reducing the market failures and there are strong 
incentives to free-ride on benefits of an effective established system. These are 
central arguments for some degree of public control of a rating scheme. 
 The capacity for public control via state intervention is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, there are concerns regarding restrictions on freedom of speech. On the 
other, there are regulatory responsibilities for state authorities regarding content 
regulation aimed at the protection of minors. In sum these arguments favour a 
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regulatory arrangement with significant industry involvement in the rating 
practice combined with some degree of state oversight (e.g. co-regulation, 
periodic review etc.)  
 
2.1.2 Comparison of Selected Basic Characteristics 
Four non-UK schemes were selected for comparative analyses of media content-rating 
schemes. The four institutions studied vary considerably in their basic characteristics 
(see Table 5). These differences have to be borne in mind when comparing the 
institutions on performance criteria, enabling contextual factors and success factors. 
Table 5: Selected Basic Characteristics of Content-Rating Schemes 
* Audiotext Hosting Service enables a caller to receive a pre-recorded message or interact with a programme to receive 
information. 
** In order to be classified as co-regulation, it requires an explicit unilateral legal basis for the alternative regulatory arrangement 
(cf. Latzer et al. 2002). 
The four schemes studied were not founded in the same period of time. The maturity of 
a system may have an effect on public awareness of the system and on the availability 
of data regarding the performance of the schemes. The MPAA rating scheme for motion 
pictures, founded in 1968, is a mature system with experience of almost four decades of 
operation. Compared to the MPAA’s rating scheme, the NICAMs Kijkwijzer (2001) 
and the CMCF Content Code, which introduced the voluntary TV programme 
classification system (2004), are comparatively new rating schemes. TV Parental 
Guidelines have been in existence for 10 years. 
Background: 
Basic characteristics 
Cases 
 
Evaluation Indicators 
NICAM 
[NL] 
CMCF  
[MAL] 
TVPG 
[USA] 
MPAA/CARA 
[USA] 
Maturity and experience I: 
Year of foundation of the organisation 
 
NICAM 1999  
 
CMCF 2001  
 
TVPG 1997 
 
MPAA 1922  
Maturity and experience II: 
Year of foundation of the rating-scheme 
 
Kijkwijzer 2001 
 
Content Code 
2004 
 
TVPG 1997 
 
CARA 1968 
Institutional embeddedness: 
Single- or multiple-issue organisation 
single-issue 
organisation 
single-issue 
initiative within a 
multiple-issue 
organisation 
single-issue 
organisation 
single-issue 
initiative within 
a multiple- 
issue 
organisation 
Modes of rating: 
Self-coding; self-rating; 3rd party rating 
 
self-coding 
 
self-rating 
 
self-rating 
 
3rd party rating 
Scope:  
Services/content covered  
by the rating-scheme 
motion pictures; 
video/DVD; TV 
programmes; 
music videos; 
(mobile services) 
TV programmes; 
(audiotext hosting 
services) * 
TV programmes motion pictures; 
video/DVD 
Intensity of state involvement 
Classification: self- or co-regulation** 
co-regulation co-regulation self-regulation self-regulation 
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The four rating schemes differ considerably in their institutional embeddedness. The 
formal affiliation(s) of a rating organisation may affect its independence and the 
resources available to perform its duties in general and to take measures to increase 
awareness in particular. CARA is an independent single-issue initiative within the 
MPAA, which is one of the worldwide leading industry trade associations coping with 
various industry tasks (multiple-issue organisation). NICAM is a single-issue 
organisation which focuses on rating issues only. NICAM was set up by the Dutch 
audiovisual industry in consultation with stakeholders and in close cooperation with the 
government.26 The TV Parental Guidelines are also a singe-issue organisation set up and 
run by the US television industry, however, with significant state influence in the course 
of their establishment. The voluntary television-programme classification scheme in 
Malaysia is a single-issue initiative, embedded in the broader framework of a general 
content code, which was set up and is enforced by the multiple-issue organisation 
CMCF. CMCF deals with various tasks in the area of communications content. 
Rating systems vary considerably in their key modes of operation. The central decision-
making unit in rating schemes are individuals who code and/or classify an audiovisual 
product. It makes a difference if the coding and classification mode is self-coding 
and/or self-rating or third-party rating. The mode of classifying, for example, affects the 
possibilities of including stakeholders (consumer representatives) in decision-making 
processes. Third-party rating by a classification board is still applied in the motion-
pictures sector with a manageable amount of movies.27 Circumstances are different for 
television rating. Due to the large amount of audiovisual material,28 content rating is 
mostly decentralised. Methods of self-coding and self-rating are applied and the main 
responsibility for decision making rests with the coders and classifiers who are usually 
employees of the suppliers (industry). But different approaches to coding and rating 
can be found: 
In the Netherlands, the coding selections29 are made by the individuals but they do not 
themselves allocate an age category to the productions. The NICAM system determines 
the final classification on the basis of the answers given (technology-supported decision 
making). In contrast, in the USA rating based on the TV Parental Guidelines is carried 
out directly by employees of the television networks. But as the Malaysian example 
shows, even a large number of television programmes can be controlled (censorship and 
rating) by statutory authorities. Almost all television programmes have to be approved 
by the national Film Censorship Board in advance (censorship and third-party rating). 
Television material is not submitted to the Board, but the Board has employees who 
work directly in the TV stations (for free-to-air TV).30 In contrast, rating in accordance 
with the provisions of the content code of the Content Forum is voluntary and carried 
out – if at all – by employees of the television stations (self-rating).  
Moreover, the rating schemes studied vary in their scope regarding the services and 
types of content covered by the scheme. The Dutch Kijkwijzer scheme is applied to 
various types of content such as movies, videos, DVDs and television programmes, 
including music videos. Since April 2005, Kijkwijzer has also been applied to some of 
the services provided on mobile telephones.31 In the USA there is no common rating 
system for audiovisual content. MPAA/CARA ratings apply to motion pictures 
distributed theatrically, by video and DVD, and they apply to unedited movies on 
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premium cable channels. The TV Parental Guidelines are given to all television 
programming except news, sports, and unedited movies on premium cable channels. In 
Malaysia, guidelines for rating and classification are applied to broadcasting content 
and (in a reduced form) to audiotext hosting services. Government broadcasters are not 
subject to the content code. 
Finally, the intensity of state involvement in and state support for an alternative 
regulatory institution is considered a crucial contextual factor for the adoption and the 
performance of an alternative regulatory institution. While NICAM and CMCF operate 
within a co-regulatory framework (legal basis) with significant state involvement, the 
formal influence of statutory authorities on the US rating schemes (TV Parental 
Guidelines, MPAA/CARA) is comparatively low.32 
 
2.2 Comparative Analysis of Performance Criteria 
In this section we summarise our findings of the application of the performance criteria 
to evaluate the rating systems that were the subject of our analyses. We refer to Annex I 
for a more detailed analysis (along with concrete facts and figures). 
Kijkwijzer/NICAM seems to score best in terms of performance criteria. They have very 
high public awareness, very high industry involvement, a coherent process of adoption 
and a transparent and integrated process of adoption and enforcement. The legitimacy 
and integrity of the self-regulatory effort is unchallenged, while there is also close 
involvement and support by parliament, which monitors whether suitable performance 
criteria have been met. In this instance, it is our conclusion that a relatively high number 
of complaints is in fact a sign of system health rather than one of system failure. 
The Content Forum of Malaysia seems stronger with regard to industry awareness than 
public awareness. Greater public awareness might lead to greater respect for self-
regulation by both the public and policy makers. The continued proposals for direct 
regulation by legislators may be a consequence of low levels of public awareness. The 
lack of complaints could also be an indication of a lack of public awareness, a function 
of barriers to making complaints or of a fundamental weakness in the adoption of the 
mechanism.  
Public awareness of the TV Parental Guidelines (and the V-chip) seems to have 
declined in the period since implementation and is poorly understood. The 
implementation has occurred in two parts, each of which has its 
awareness/adoption/action problems. The “ratings” aspect of the system is fairly 
comprehensively implemented. Enforcement of this aspect would mean more even 
application of rating labels across programmes and categories. But for the system to 
work fully there would have to be more television sets with the chip installed and 
greater public awareness of the chip’s existence and utility. With the two parts 
implemented, “action” would be on the part of the parent (or controller of the household 
set). Here, “success” as measured by the performance criteria would imply much fuller 
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understanding and use of the self-regulatory system by parents. It is important to note 
that the V-chip model does not include a strong self-regulatory entity. Rather, 
enforcement is in the hands of programme makers and distributors, with enforcement 
left to the Federal Trade Commission or Congressional oversight. Further, and perhaps 
more importantly, the parental guidelines are generally poorly understood by the public. 
One of the biggest concerns with the performance of the parental guidelines involves 
the belief (and evidence) that the ratings are used inconsistently and incorrectly, a belief 
that undermines public trust in the rating scheme. 
Evaluating the MPAA system provides particular challenges. Unlike the other systems 
evaluated, the MPAA conducts its own centralised evaluations in terms of applying 
labels or ratings. “Industry involvement” here means the submission of the film, rather 
than its self-evaluation. As a result, “action” or “attitude” takes on a different colour, 
namely whether there is respect for the mode and practice in attaching ratings. Because 
of the structure of the industry and the relationship between the industry and the MPAA, 
and the availability of an appeal system, this process seems quite smooth. Taken as a 
whole, the MPAA system probably has the greatest contact and recognition by 
consumers. This could be a function of several factors: the iconic stature of the motion 
picture industry, the political sophistication of the stewards of the system; the marketing 
of the system to cinema owners and consumers as a preventive tool against state 
censorship efforts; a recognition that the industry can shift the discourse from applying 
standards to explaining and being transparent about content. None of this success, 
however, has prevented some criticism of the particular ratings (e.g. setting the wrong 
age category for a film or not giving it a rating at all). 
 
2.3 Comparative Analysis of Selected Institutional Success Factors 
and Contextual Factors 
The performance of alternative regulatory institutions is influenced by 
institutional/organisational success factors and by enabling contextual factors.33 Some 
contextual factors (reputational sensitivity, for example, requires intensity of regulatory 
intervention) are related to general characteristics of products and services which allows 
for general assessment without reference to the market and policy environment in a 
country (see section 2.1.1). However, other contextual factors (e.g. the modes of state 
involvement) and all institutional/organisational success factors have to be assessed 
case by case. 
Section 2.3 provides an overview of findings of a comparative analysis of selected 
contextual and institutional/organisational success factors. Selections were made 
according to the basic assumptions regarding theoretically plausible interrelations 
between performance indicators (outcome/impact) on the one hand and 
institutional/organisational success factors and contextual factors on the other (see 
section 1). It is assumed that awareness of content-rating schemes and attitude towards 
media content-rating schemes in the film/broadcasting industry depends, inter alia, on 
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adequate resources (section 2.3.1), on the involvement of non-industry members 
(section 2.3.2) and on adequate involvement of governmental actors (section 2.3.3). 
 
2.3.1 Adequate Resources 
Adequate funding and sufficient staff are frequently referred to as important success 
factors in the literature.34 Whether or not an institution can draw on adequate resources 
may further be assessed by investigating whether there is an effective internal division 
of labour (special units for special purposes such as marketing/public relations; internal 
review etc.) and whether an institution has access to adequate means to assure broad 
participation (incentives; pressure).  
Moreover, an important but widely neglected success criterion is the ability of the 
institutions to have a well-founded dialogue with their constituencies, including the 
public, industry and government. The respective measures are summarised as 
communications strategies and these include, for example, supporting resources for the 
industry to adopt and comply with the alternative regulatory schemes (technical support, 
hotlines, industry training, manuals etc.), public education programmes and awareness 
campaigns or regulatory round tables with the industry and with state authorities to 
discuss performance and to review regulatory strategies.  
Assessing the performance of media content-rating schemes, we prioritised the 
performance-indicator awareness of rating schemes. The general public’s awareness is 
particularly relevant because the success of media content-rating schemes is heavily 
dependent on broad knowledge and understanding of the scheme. The ability of 
alternative regulatory institutions to gain public awareness (visibility, knowledge, and 
understanding) for their rating schemes depends – inter alia – on adequate resources 
(Assumption No. 1). Differences regarding selected resources of the four institutions 
studied are summarised in Table 6.  
Table 6: Selected Resources of Media Content-Rating Schemes 
Success Factor: 
Adequate resources to assure that objectives are not compromised 
Cases…  
 
Evaluation Indicator* 
NICAM  
[NL] 
CMCF 
[MAL] 
TVPG [USA] MPAA/CARA 
[USA] 
Sufficient overall funding (budget) yes no yes yes 
Adequate communications strategies related to:     
… consumers/citizens** yes (no) yes (yes) 
… industry yes yes no no 
… government yes yes no no 
* Besides the evaluation indicators mentioned in the table (funding; communications strategies), there are further evaluation 
indicators related to resources (e.g. staff/personnel; internal division of labour etc.). However, no explanatory differences among 
the institutions were found with regard to these additional factors. 
** All institutions use “communications strategies related to public/citizens”. But only NICAM and TVPG use traditional mass media 
(television) for broad public information campaigns. MPAA/CARA uses Internet information services, CMCF activities focus on 
road shows. 
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There are differences among the four institutions regarding funding/budget. NICAM, 
the TV Parental Guidelines and the MPAA Classification and Rating Administration 
(CARA) consider their funding satisfactory; only the Malaysian CMCF complains 
about its limited financial resources.35 
This may result from differences in the funding sources of the four institutions. NICAM 
and CMCF can rely on fixed annual budgets provided by industry membership fees and 
state subsidies. While the share of industry funding of NICAM has increased over the 
years,36 the CMCF efforts to increase its membership and to find additional sources of 
funding have not been very successful to date.37 The MPAA/CARA budget is based on 
fees from producers and distributors of motion pictures submitted for rating (sale of 
service).38 The TV Parental Guidelines cannot rely on a fixed annual budget in advance 
as funding is based on “a case-by-case assessment”. Industry participants cover the 
expenses for all activities considered necessary and which have been agreed in the 
Monitoring Board.39 TV Parental Guidelines and the MPAA Rating Board in particular 
do not complain of any financial problems. One reason might be that both rating 
systems are underwritten by the extensive and powerful associations of the US 
film/broadcasting industry.40 Also, NICAM is based on broad industry participation in 
terms of membership, but is financially supported by the government and is calling for 
the continuation of the co-financed system.41 
It is assumed that differences among the institutions in terms of funding/budget affect 
their ability to develop and implement communications strategies related to 
consumers/citizens, which then results in differences regarding the public awareness of 
the schemes. This assumption is only partly supported by empirical findings: 
CMCF mentions that it particularly lacks financial resources for broad public-awareness 
campaigns in the mass media.42 This is one central reason why the CMCF and the 
Malaysian Content Code have so far not been well recognised in the wider public. Both 
NICAM and the TV Parental Guidelines consider their funding satisfactory and both 
have made substantial investments to promote their rating schemes in the mass media. 
This included broad public-awareness campaigns with public-service announcements, 
television advertising spots, etc. But the Dutch Kijkwijzer rating scheme is well known 
and understood in the Netherlands while awareness and understanding of the US 
television ratings based on the TV Parental Guidelines is comparatively low.43 
Finally, the maturity of a system has to be borne in mind as a further factor when it 
comes to the assessment of the level of public awareness and its causes. While NICAM, 
CMCF and the TV Parental Guidelines are comparatively new institutions, which have 
to undertake active measures to gain and to increase public awareness, the situation is 
different for the MPAA rating system for motion pictures. This was established in 1968, 
so it can look back on a long tradition and it has had sufficient time to gradually 
increase public awareness. Performance in terms of awareness does not depend as 
heavily on broad public campaigning as it does for the newly established rating-
schemes. 
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Further differences are found with regard to communications strategies related to the 
industry. CMCF and NICAM have developed and implemented strategies to ensure an 
ongoing, regular and well-founded dialogue with industry. CMCF has a Content 
Advisory Centre (CAC) which provides an institutional interface between the industry 
and CMCF, and which gives day to day compliance support.44 NICAM provides wide-
ranging support for the coders, comprising initial training, annual quality tests, written 
manuals for coding, a fulltime help desk and regular inter-coder reliability tests. These 
“institutionalised communication strategies” related to the industry mark a difference to 
the US rating systems, where communication with the industry is limited to meetings of 
the Monitoring Board (TV Parental Guidelines) initial training for film classifiers 
(MPAA/CARA) and the written guidelines for content classification (TV Parental 
Guidelines, MPAA Rules for Classification and Rating). While members of the 
MPAA/CARA Rating Board can exchange views and knowledge in their day-to-day 
working practice, the rating of the US television programmes is completely 
decentralised, without any exchange of views between the content classifiers of the 
many TV stations and without continuous institutionalised support of the TV Parental 
Guidelines Monitoring Board. This may be one reason why it is considered that the 
ratings are used inconsistently, undermining public trust in the rating scheme. 
Summary, Interrelations between Performance and Success Factors, and Interim 
Conclusions 
 Comparison of resources shows that the operation of media content-rating 
schemes is based on various sources of funding. Modes applied comprise fixed 
membership fees (NICAM, CMCF), sale of services (MPAA/CARA), and state 
subsidies (NICAM, CMCF). The TV Parental Guidelines cannot resort to a fixed 
annual budget, but there is agreement within the industry to bear the expenses 
for all activities considered necessary by the Monitoring Board. 
 Results of analyses partly support the assumption that the level of public 
awareness of an institution depends on the available resources (Assumption No. 
1). However, analysis also clearly shows that additional factors have be taken 
into consideration when it comes to the assessment of the reasons for strong or 
rather weak public awareness: CMCF lacks financial resources, which results in 
deficits regarding broad public awareness campaigns via traditional mass media 
and this results in a lack of public awareness of CMCF. Based on adequate 
funding, NICAM and TV Parental Guidelines have made substantial investments 
to publicly promoting their rating schemes, but results in terms of the level of 
public awareness of the schemes differ strongly. Hence, public awareness does 
not exclusively depend on adequate resources for effective public 
communication strategies. Factors other than funding and communications 
strategies may influence the performance differences between NICAM and the 
TV Parental Guidelines. The maturity of a system seems to be a further 
influential factor, as seen in the case of the MPAA/CARA, which draws on a 
very long tradition. 
 Differences between the rating schemes were found regarding communications 
strategies related to the industry, and these may explain why ratings are applied 
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more or less consistently in different countries. NICAM has developed and 
implemented strategies to assure an ongoing, regular and well-founded dialogue 
with coders. In contrast, rating of the US television programmes based on the 
TV Parental Guidelines is completely decentralised, without institutionalised 
support of the Monitoring Board. The level of institutionalisation of 
communications strategies related to the industry marks a difference that has to 
be borne in mind when considering how ratings can be applied (more) 
consistently.  
 
2.3.2 Involvement of Non-Industry Members 
Adequate involvement of non-industry members (e.g. independent experts, consumer 
representatives) in alternative regulatory institutions is considered a crucial success 
factor for alternative modes of regulation. It is argued that non-industry members may 
control the practice of alternative regulatory institutions (providing a watchdog 
function) and thus counter self-serving tendencies. This could contribute to increased 
public trust in a rating scheme and its overall legitimacy (Assumption No. 2). The 
involvement of non-industry members is analysed on the basis of the decision-making 
units (boards, panels, commissions etc.) of the four cases studied (see Table 7). 
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Table 7: Involvement of Non-Industry Members in Media Content-Rating Schemes 
Success Factor: Representation & Participation 
Indicator: Involvement of non-industry members (e.g. consumer representatives) 
Cases…  
Evaluation Indicator 
NICAM 
[NL] 
CMCF 
[MAL] 
TVPG 
[USA] 
MPAA/CARA 
[USA] 
Consumer representatives in supervisory body/board 
Proportion of non-industry members 
YES  
(82.4%) - 
No 
(0%) 
NO 
(0.0%) 
… governmental actors no - no no 
… industry members yes (3)  - yes (3)chair yes (2) 
… consumer representatives yes (3) - no no 
… other public-interest groups yes (3) - no no 
… independent experts (e.g. scientists) yes (2) - no no 
… lay members  yes (3) - no no 
… others yes (3) - no no 
Consumer representatives in the governing bodies 
Proportion of non-industry members 
NO  
(10.0%) 
YES 
(15.8%) 
YES 
(21.7) 
(NO)* 
(100.0%) 
… governmental actors no no no no 
… industry members yes (9) 
yes 
(16)chair yes (18) 
no 
… consumer representatives no yes (1) yes (5) no 
… other public-interest groups no yes (1) no no 
… independent experts (e.g. scientists) yes (1)chair yes (1) no no 
… lay members  no no no yes (10-13) 
Consumer representatives in classification units 
Proportion of non-industry members 
NO*** 
(0.0%) 
NO 
(0.0%) 
NO 
(0.0%) 
(NO) 
(100.0%) 
… governmental actors no No no No 
… industry members yes yes yes No 
… consumer representatives no no no No 
… other public-interest groups no no no no 
… independent experts (e.g. scientists) no no no no 
… lay members  no no no yes (10-13) 
Consumer representatives in unit for complaints handling 
Proportion of non-industry members 
NO 
(100.0%) 
YES 
(28.6%) - 
 
-** 
… governmental actors no no - - 
… industry members no yes (5) - - 
… consumer representatives no yes (1) - - 
… other public-interest groups no no - - 
… independent experts (e.g. scientists) yes (7) yes (1)chair - - 
… lay members  no no - - 
Consumer representatives in appeals unit 
Proportion of non-industry members 
NO 
(100.0%) - - 
NO 
(23.4%) 
… governmental actors no - - no 
… industry members no - - yes (13) 
… consumer representatives no - - no 
… other public-interest groups no - - no 
… independent experts (e.g. scientists) yes (3) - - yes (4) 
… lay members  no - - no 
- means that there is no respective unit within the organisation; 
* In the case of the MPAA rating system the “governing body” is identical with the “classification unit”. Main “governance 
responsibilities” rest with the Rating Board in general and with its chairman in particular.  
** In the case of the MPAA rating system there is no unit and no procedure for complaints from the public. There is a possibility for 
the industry to submit movies to CARA for “re-rating”.  
*** In the case of NICAM there are additionally a “Coder Commission” (composed of industry members) and a “Scientific 
Commission” (composed of independent experts/scientists). 
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Ofcom’s (2004, 11) consideration that it would be appropriate for independent 
representatives to make up half to three-quarters of a co-regulatory organisations 
governing body is only partly fulfilled in the cases studied.45 Only MPAA/CARA 
(100% lay members/parents in the Classification Board) and NICAM (100% 
independent experts in the units for complaints handling and appeals; 82.4% in the 
Advisory Committee) decided to provide significant influence to non-industry 
members. In all other units of the institutions studied the proportion of non-industry 
members is less than a third.  
The key decisions in a content-rating scheme are made by the individuals who code and 
classify an audiovisual product. With the trend from “third-party rating” towards “self-
coding and self-rating”, the influence of the industry is increasing and influence of other 
parties (e.g. consumer representatives, public interest groups, governmental actors) is 
decreasing.  
Third-party rating by classification boards such as the MPAA’s Classification and 
Rating Administration (CARA) theoretically allows for involvement of non-industry 
members (e.g. consumer representatives) in the rating board. CARA is composed of 
non-industry members (parents, lay members). It does not include representatives from 
organised consumer groups. The chairperson of the board attempts to select a group of 
film classifiers who represent the diversity of American parents.46 
For television content rating mostly self-coding and self-rating methods are applied and 
the main responsibility for decision making lies with the coders and classifiers, who 
usually are employees of the suppliers (industry). Involvement of non-industry members 
at this stage of the process is costly. Hence coding and/or classification decisions under 
the CMCF rating system, the TV Parental Guidelines and the NICAM/Kijkwijzer 
system are made without any direct influence by non-industry members. 47 
If non-industry members cannot be involved in key decision making regarding self-
coding and self-rating, the question emerges of whether and how alternative regulatory 
institutions can and do involve consumer representatives, representatives of civic 
groups, and/or independent experts in their organisational design. Empirical examples 
reveal different methods according the institutional structures of organisations studied:  
NICAM involves representatives of parents’ organisations and other social 
organisations in its Advisory Committee, but its governing board is composed of 
industry representatives under an independent chairperson.48 The CMCF (CMCF 
Council) and the TV Parental Guidelines (Monitoring Board) integrate members of 
“civic groups” and “advocacy groups” in their governing bodies.49 CMCF additionally 
involves representatives from “civic groups” in the unit for complaints handling, which 
moreover is led by an independent chair (Complaints Bureau). With the exception of the 
CMCF example, members of civic groups are not involved in the units dealing with 
complaints and appeals. Decision making at these stages of the policy cycle lies with 
members of the industry (e.g. MPAA) and/or with independent experts (e.g. NICAM). 
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State authorities play a significant role in assuring involvement of non-industry 
members:  
In the Netherlands, involvement of consumer representatives is explicitly required in the 
legal basis for the co-regulatory framework.50 In Malaysia the legal framework requires 
openness of the alternative regulatory institution for interested parties.51 In the United 
States, the initial Industry Proposal for the organisational structure of the Monitoring 
Board of the TV Parental Guidelines did not include provisions for involvement of any 
stakeholders outside the industry.52 Following a public consultation by the FCC, the 
industry submitted a Revised Industry Proposal, under which an additional five 
representatives of the advocacy community were to be added to the monitoring board in 
order to provide input from representatives of parents and family and child advocacy 
groups.53  
The involvement of non-industry members in general and consumer representatives in 
particular is a highly controversial topic in theory and practice. From a theoretical point 
of view, Ofcom (2004, 10f.) points out that there is a clear tension between the 
desirability of achieving independence and the objective of introducing industry 
expertise.54 In practice, in the USA as in the Netherlands, it is mainly parents’ 
organisations that complain about their roles in broadcasting rating schemes. 
In the Netherlands one parents’ organisation claims that it is not involved in the 
NICAMs Board (governing body).55 Parents’ organisations have called for the 
establishment of a media expertise centre in order to monitor and control NICAM 
ratings and other activities. In the USA, parents’ organisations and independent rating 
organisations have pressed industry to “encourage programmers and distributors to 
permit independent rating services to have prior access to content, so that such services 
could provide information as to the type of violence depicted” (Kinney 2004, 7). They 
further want their own ratings to be adequately displayed in television for consumer 
information. With regard to this, the independent rating organisations are confident that 
future technical television standards56 will accommodate multiple ratings. The providers 
of independent rating systems argue that multiple rating will “provide healthy 
competition in the market to give parents and other caregivers’ objective information on 
the degree and type of violence in a particular programme” (Kinney 2004, 8). This kind 
of regulatory competition could, however, lead to an increasing lack of transparency 
and to confusion among consumers.  
Summary, Interrelations between Performance and Success Factors and Interim 
Conclusions 
 The success factor of adequate involvement of non-industry members (e.g. 
consumer representatives) is partly fulfilled in the cases studied. MPAA/CARA 
and NICAM have delegated significant decision-making power to non-industry 
members at selected stages of the decision-making process. In all other units 
(bodies, subdivisions, boards) studied, the ratio of non-industry members is less 
than a third.  
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 Whether the strong involvement of non-industry members in alternative 
regulatory institutions results in good attitude (trust, credibility and legitimacy) 
towards the institution (Assumption No. 2) is not completely ascertainable from 
the available data. Analysis shows that the attitude towards the institutions with 
significant non-industry influence at selected stages of the decision-making 
process is high in the case of NICAM and medium in the case of MPAA/CARA. 
The attitude towards the TV Parental Guidelines – which are dominated by 
industry members – is low, but the attitude towards the CMCF is so far 
unknown. 
 Considering the overall performance of the rating schemes, data shows that the 
two institutions with significant non-industry influence at selected stages of the 
decision-making process (MPAA/CARA and NICAM) also seem to perform 
their roles better than the institutions dominated by industry members in all 
decision-making units. However, here it has to be borne in mind that 
involvement of non-industry members is by far not the only success factor in the 
overall performance of an alternative regulatory institution. 
 Involvement of non-industry members can be supported by governmental 
actors/state authorities. The legal demand for adequate stakeholder involvement 
in general (Malaysia) and for consumer representatives in particular 
(Netherlands) is a typical technique used in co-regulatory schemes, where 
alternative regulatory institutions may not gain accreditation without appropriate 
stakeholder involvement. 
 Investigations show that there is no standard pattern for involvement of non-
industry members in alternative regulatory institutions. The modes of 
involvement differ depending on the institutional structure of the organisations 
(involvement in supervisory bodies, governing bodies, complaints boards, 
appeals units). Adequate involvement of non-industry members does not depend 
on significant involvement of non-industry members in each individual unit but 
on an appropriate mix of industry and non-industry members of the various 
decision-making units. 
 Moreover, policy makers have to consider the potential drawbacks of direct 
involvement of consumer representatives in alternative regulatory institutions 
with regard to a watchdog function in relation to an alternative regulatory 
institution (capture). Under certain circumstances, non-industry groups may 
fulfil such a critical function (even better) from outside the alternative regulatory 
institution (e.g. criticism of industry rating schemes; periodic review; provision 
of alternative/independent rating schemes etc). 
 An alternative to assuring non-industry participation in alternative regulatory 
institutions could be to enhance the position of critical non-industry groups 
outside the alternative regulatory institution (e.g. support with resources for 
periodical review; monitoring). 
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2.3.3 Involvement of Governmental Actors 
In most cases, alternative regulatory institutions are not set up completely without 
governmental influence or government pressure and in many cases there are 
connections to governmental agencies during ongoing operation. Hence in most cases 
the term self-regulation can be considered as a misnomer.57 State authorities draw on 
many instruments to support alternative regulatory institutions, to make active use of 
them and to control them. The options range from soft forms of governmental 
involvement (symbolic support, inspiration, integration of personnel), to financial 
subsidies, right through to direct control in a co-regulatory framework.  
Adequate involvement of governmental actors is considered to be an important success 
factor. State oversight of rating institutions may counter the industry’s self-serving 
tendencies. Political responsibilities regarding protection of minors call for an 
awareness of rating/classification issues among the public policy makers and for 
awareness of how various rating schemes across the communications industries relate to 
each other. For the following analyses it is therefore assumed that adequate involvement 
of governmental actors in alternative regulatory institutions promotes the awareness of 
the institution among policy makers and the attitude towards the regulatory institution in 
terms of trust, credibility and legitimacy (Assumption No. 3). Table 8 shows the modes 
of state involvement in the four cases studied. 
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Table 8: Involvement of Governmental Actors in Media Content-Rating Schemes 
Contextual Factor: 
Adequate involvement of governmental actors 
Cases…  
 
Evaluation Indicator 
NICAM 
[NL] 
CMCF 
[MAL] 
TVPG 
[USA] 
MPAA/CARA 
[USA] 
Encouragement of self-regulation  
by government (carrot; inspiration)  
yes yes yes n.a. 
Demand for self-regulation  
by government (stick; threat) 
n.a. yes yes (yes) 
Financial government support  
(subsidy) 
yes yes no no 
Involvement of government  
personnel (information) 
no no no no 
Government involvement via  
contracts (contractual) 
yes no no no 
Collaboration between government and alternative regulatory 
institution (ARI) in regulatory practice (cooperation) 
no yes no no 
Defined division of responsibilities  
between government and ARI 
yes yes no no 
(Periodic) Review of the scheme 
 by state authorities 
yes (yes)*** (no)* yes 
Political appreciation of the scheme and 
its outcomes (symbolic support) 
yes n.a. yes 1997 
no 2007 
yes/no 
Co-regulation within a legal framework  
(direct control), with 
yes yes (yes/no)** no 
… defined areas of operation for ARIs yes yes yes no 
… mode of accreditation of ARIs yes yes no no 
… mode of ratification of regulatory processes/outcomes  no yes (yes/no)** no 
… provisions regarding structure/organisation of ARI yes yes no no 
… provision to assure near universal participation yes yes no no 
… provisions regarding transparency (e.g. annual report) no no no no 
… definition of fall-back-scenarios in the case of failure yes yes (yes/no)** no 
* There is no periodic review of the TV Parental Guidelines by state authorities, but the Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) in 2007 presented a report with a critical discussion about the performance of TV Parental Guidelines. 
** There is no “co-regulatory framework” for the ongoing regulatory practice of the TV Parental Guidelines, but co-regulatory 
techniques were applied in course of the establishment of the scheme. 
*** There is a legal provision for (periodic) review of industry forums in Malaysia, but the CMCF has not been under review so far.  
Frequently, the establishment of alternative regulatory institutions and reforms of their 
institutional structure are a reaction to the threat of governmental intervention (stick; 
threat) or the result of governmental encouragement of self-regulation (inspiration; 
carrot): 
In the Netherlands, for example, the policy document “Niet voor alle leeftijden” (Not 
for all ages, 1997) argued for the establishment of an independent body that would act 
as the national support group for self-regulation within the audiovisual sector. Most 
members of parliament expressed a preference for self-regulation and a belief that the 
audio-visual sector could take responsibility for this (encouragement; carrot). This 
resulted in the establishment of NICAM.  
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In Malaysia, the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 provided the leeway for 
alternative modes of regulation, stating that “an industry forum may prepare a voluntary 
industry code dealing with any matter provided for in this Act” (CMA 1998, Section 
95). But the CMA 1998 also provides that “the Malaysian Communications and 
Multimedia Commission (MCMC) may determine a mandatory standard for any matter 
which may be the subject matter of a voluntary industry code if the Commission is 
satisfied that the voluntary industry code has failed” (CMA 1998, Section 104).  
In the United States, the US Congress used a weak stick-and-carrot strategy for 
intervention in the course of the establishment of a television rating system. Section 551 
(b) (1) (1) of the Telecommunications Act states, that the FCC shall “prescribe . . . 
guidelines and recommended procedures for the identification and rating of video 
programming that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent material about which 
parents should be informed before it is displayed to children.” However, the provision 
would have come into force only if a self-regulatory arrangement58 had not been 
established within one year. The television industry developed the TV Parental 
Guidelines within the statutory time schedule.  
With regard to the establishment of the MPAA rating scheme for movies, Jack Valenti 
(MPAA chairman in 1968) stated that it was “the mix of new social currents, the 
irresistible force of creators determined to make ‘their’ films and the possible intrusion 
of government into the movie arena”59 that demanded his immediate action.60 
The establishment of alternative regulatory institutions and their ongoing operations 
may be supported by state authorities in many ways. Potential instruments of state 
authorities include governmental tax resources such as subsidies (financial support), 
personnel resources (involving personnel), contracts and means of cooperation in the 
regulatory practice:61  
In Malaysia and in the Netherlands, for example, the alternative regulatory institutions 
are supported financially by the governments. The establishment of NICAM was 
supported by government subsidies and the share of government subsidies on the 
overall costs of NICAM has been decreasing since 2003.62 Moreover, NICAM and the 
Broadcasting Authority are working and cooperating on the basis of an official 
covenant.63 Also, the Malaysian Content Forum cannot support its operations through 
membership fees alone. The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission 
(MCMC) has given annual grants to the Content Forum for its operations and 
management.64 Moreover, the Content Forum was assisted in its regulatory practice by 
the commission. The commission drafted guidelines for the establishment of industry 
forums and industry codes, and it supported the CMCF in its publicity activities in order 
to increase the public awareness for the forum and the code.65  
In the cases studied there is no personnel involvement by the government (e.g. a 
political actor being a member of an advisory board).  
Periodic review is referred to as one of the key success factors for alternative modes of 
regulation. Besides “self-assessment” by an alternative regulatory institution and review 
by other stakeholders (e.g. public-interest groups), state authorities may also resort to 
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(periodic) review as a means of control. Review may force/promote reforms of 
unsuccessful schemes and it may increase the awareness of policy makers for 
alternative modes of regulation:  
In the Netherlands the supervisory role is delegated to the Media Authority, which 
regularly investigates and evaluates the functioning of the system of self-regulation.66 
Early in 2004, NICAM and Kijkwijzer were evaluated by the cabinet and parliament. In 
Malaysia there is a legal provision for review of industry forums and codes by the 
MCMC.67 However, the Content Forum and the Content Code have not yet been subject 
to review. In the United States there is no legal provision for periodic review of the TV 
Parental Guidelines and the MPAA rating system for motion pictures, but state 
authorities do review the systems. Since 2000 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
released six reports reviewing self-regulation and industry practices in the motion-
picture, music recording and electronic-game industries.68 The Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) in 2007 presented a report with a critical discussion about the 
performance of TV Parental Guidelines.69 
Looking at the conclusions of governmental review of selected schemes, major 
differences regarding the performance of the schemes become obvious:  
In the Netherlands, in 2004 there was appreciation of the results achieved within a short 
time. The conclusion was that, although there are certainly areas for improvement, 
NICAM works well.70 In the United States, periodic review of the MPAA rating system 
showed that since 2000 “the movie industry made progress in limiting marketing of R- 
and M-rated products to children.”71 Regarding the TV Parental Guidelines, the FCC in 
1997 adopted an order “finding acceptable the video programming rating system”, 
which “will help provide parents with the information and ability to make informed 
viewing decisions for their families.”72 However, 10 years later, the FCC 2007 states 
that “although the V-chip and TV rating system appear useful in the abstract, they are 
not effective at protecting children from violent content for a number of reasons.”73 In 
the same report the FCC discusses options and limits for alternative measures such as 
“time channelling”, “a la carte or bundling approaches in the cable and DBS context”, 
“viewer-initiated blocking” and “mandatory ratings”. The report will be delivered to the 
US Congress for debate. The modes of procedure and the findings indicate that state 
involvement could increase in the future. In Malaysia there is a legal provision for 
review of industry forums by the MCMC, but the CMCF has not so far been subject to 
review. 
The formally most intensive mode of state involvement in alternative regulatory 
institutions is co-regulation within a legal framework. The de facto intensity of 
government involvement then depends on the actual provisions in the basic legislative 
act. Among other things, the legal basis enables state authorities to define the public 
policy objectives for co-regulation, the areas of operation for alternative regulatory 
institutions, the modes of accreditation of alternative regulatory institutions, the modes 
of ratification of regulatory processes/outcomes, the provisions regarding 
structure/organisation, provisions to assure near universal participation, provisions 
regarding transparency (e.g. annual report) and the definition of fall-back scenarios in 
the case of failure: 
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Co-regulation is applied in the Netherlands (Media Act) and in Malaysia 
(Communications and Multimedia Act). In both cases the mode of official approval is a 
system of accreditation of alternative regulatory institutions.74 In Malaysia, additionally, 
the outcome of regulatory processes (the Industry Codes of Conduct) requires 
ratification by the MCMC.75  
Both co-regulatory systems include provisions regarding the structure of the alternative 
regulatory institution,76 provisions that support (near) universal participation77 and 
defined fall-back scenarios.78 However, in both cases the legal basis does not include 
provisions regarding transparency (e.g. mandatory annual report), but both institutions 
frequently report to state authorities.79  
“Techniques of co-regulation” were also applied in the case of the US TV Parental 
Guidelines, but only in the course of the establishment of the rating scheme.80 After the 
scheme was established in 1997, there were no further requirements regarding control of 
the scheme by state authorities. This could be one reason for the comparatively poor 
performance of the TV Parental Guidelines. 
Summary, Interrelations between Performance and Contextual Factors and Interim 
Conclusions 
 State involvement and support for alternative regulatory institutions varies 
considerably across the cases studied. Due to the co-regulatory framework with 
accreditation and ratification procedures and additional relations between 
CMCM and the CMCF (subsidies, cooperation in practice), state involvement 
and support is very extensive in Malaysia. It is extensive in the Netherlands 
where NICAM operates also within a co-regulatory framework, but under less 
government involvement (e.g. no cooperation, no ratification of regulatory 
outcomes). Compared to Malaysia and the Netherlands, state involvement in the 
US self-regulation schemes is rather light. In the case of the MPAA no formal 
state involvement exists, but there are periodic reviews. In the case of the TV 
Parental Guidelines, the recent FCC report and its discussion in the US Congress 
could lead to new modes of state involvement.  
 State authorities can draw on a whole raft of instruments to support alternative 
regulatory institutions, to make active use of them and control them. The options 
range from soft forms of governmental involvement (symbolic support, 
inspiration, integration of personnel), to financial subsidies and direct control in 
a co-regulatory framework. The intensity of state involvement may vary 
depending on the different combinations of instruments of intervention applied. 
 State support for alternative regulatory institutions and involvement of state 
authorities in alternative regulatory institutions reflects and promotes public 
policy makers’ awareness of the alternative regulatory institutions. Analysis 
supports the assumption that extensive state involvement (in terms of 
instruments applied) results in policy makers having a high level of awareness of 
the scheme (Assumption No. 3). Policy makers’ awareness of alternative 
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regulatory institutions is particularly high in co-regulatory arrangements with 
significant state involvement. It is lower in self-regulatory arrangements. 
 Whether or not extensive state involvement in alternative regulatory institutions 
also results in improved attitude (trust, credibility and legitimacy) towards the 
institution (Assumption No. 3) is not completely ascertainable from the available 
data. Analysis shows that the attitude towards the institutions with little state 
involvement is medium (MPAA/CARA) and low (TV Parental Guidelines). 
Attitude towards the state-supported NICAM is high (NICAM) but attitude 
towards the CMCF is unknown so far. 
 Co-regulation is not the only available means to assure and to promote the 
awareness of policy makers for alternative modes of regulation. A valuable 
(capable, efficient) alternative to a potentially costly co-regulatory arrangement 
is transparent (periodic) state review of a scheme, its outcomes and its impacts 
along with key performance indicators.  
 Moreover – from a theoretical perspective – (periodic) review may not only 
increase awareness of policy makers, but it may also stimulate public debate 
about the scheme, increase public awareness of the scheme and it may enhance 
the overall credibility of the alternative regulatory institution. Results of 
(periodic) review may stimulate reforms of the scheme if it proves to be 
unsuccessful. Results of periodic review may re-stipulate internal reform 
processes that had been terminated (e.g. following divergence of interests). 
 
3 Internet Codes of Conduct 
The regulation of Internet services is a subject of intensive international debate. Many 
of the issues discussed concern questions regarding the options and measures to ensure 
an adequate level of consumer protection. Key consumer-protection issues that the 
Internet raises include privacy and security, protection from illegal or inappropriate 
content and protection from malicious software (Ofcom 2006, 1).  
Regulatory action to promote consumer protection can be taken at many different levels 
of the Internet value chain. Informal social standards for Internet users (netiquette) and 
formal technical standards (codes) are increasingly being supplemented by institutions 
for collective self- and co-regulation. Since the mid-1990s, national Internet service 
providers associations (ISPAs) have been set up to assume self-regulation tasks and 
develop codes of conduct. Hotlines for illegal Internet content are being installed,81 
which use “notice and take down procedures” (NTDs) to support governmental agencies 
in combating illegal content. In addition to the initiatives by cross-industry associations, 
various sectoral initiatives have been started at the Internet content provider (ICP) 
level.82  
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Due to their gate-keeping position, Internet service providers (ISPs) are regarded as one 
of the key actors with respect to the achievement of regulatory goals. Codes of conduct 
of Internet service-provider associations (ISPAs) are a widespread tool to promote 
consumer protection by alternative modes of regulation. The codes usually comprise 
(combinations of) provisions regarding illegal activity, limiting access to material 
harmful to minors, hate speech, bulk e-mail, data protection and privacy (PCMLP 2004, 
50). The various fields of activity involve very different characteristics of regulatory 
issues. An overall evaluation of general contextual factors for Internet codes of conduct 
(as applied in the case of the rating-schemes) is therefore not possible. Evaluation calls 
for case-by-case-assessments, which will be carried out in four steps: 
Evaluation starts with a comparison of basic characteristics of the four cases studied 
(3.1). Analysis shows important differences among the four institutions selected for 
empirical investigation, which have to be borne in mind when it comes to the 
assessment of regulatory performance. The subsequent part provides a comparative 
evaluation of the performance (3.2) applying selected performance criteria (adoption, 
action) from the 4A concept. This is followed by a detailed comparative analysis of 
institutional success and contextual factors (3.3), which were derived from the selected 
basic assumptions on interrelations between performance indicators on the one hand and 
institutional/organisational success factors and contextual factors on the other. Analyses 
show commonalities and differences between institutional designs of the four rating 
schemes, which serve as the basis for the discussion of interrelations between 
performance and institutional designs of the schemes. The final section (3.4) 
summarises key findings of the comparative analyses. 
 
3.1 Basic Characteristics of Selected Cases 
Four non-UK schemes were selected for comparative analysis of Internet codes. All 
four Internet organisations studied were established during the Internet boom in the mid 
1990s. Regarding other characteristics there are a couple of noteworthy differences (see 
Table 9). These differences have to be borne in mind, when comparing the institutions 
by performance criteria, enabling contextual factors and success factors. 
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Table 9: Selected Characteristics of Internet Organisations and Codes of Conduct 
Background: 
Basic characteristics 
Cases 
 
Evaluation Indicators 
InternetNZ 
[NZL] 
ISPAI 
[IRL] 
CAIP 
[CAN] 
HKISPA 
[HK] 
Maturity & experience: Year of 
foundation of the Internet 
organisation 
 
1995 
 
 
1998 
 
1996 
 
 
1996 
Institutional embeddedness 
Single- or multiple- issue 
organisation 
Internet 
organisation with 
membership of 
ISPs 
detached ISP 
Association (ISPAI) 
ISP Association 
(CAIP) within a 
trade association 
(CATA) 
ISP Association 
(HKISPA) within a 
trade association 
(HKITF) 
Type of basic code (conduct, 
practice, ethics, etc.) & mode 
of adoption 
(mandatory/voluntary) 
 
Code of Practice 
(CoP), Draft 
 
Code not in force 
Code of Practice 
and Ethics (CoP&E) 
 
mandatory adoption 
by ISPAI members 
Code of Conduct 
(CoC) 
 
voluntary adoption 
by CAIP members 
Code of Practice 
(CoP) 
 
voluntary adoption by 
HKISPA members 
 
Prominent commitment to self-
regulation (e.g. mission 
statement; organisations 
objectives) 
 
no 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
yes 
Year(s) of adoption and reform 
of the basic code 1997; 1999;  
2005; 2007 
2002 1996 1997 
Additional regulatory activities 
besides the basic code DNS 
Administration  
Spam Code of 
Practice (2007), 
Draft 
Hotline (1999) CAIP Privacy Code 
(2000) 
(Fair Practices 
Initiative)  
 
Anti-Spam Code of 
Practice (2005) 
Practice Statement on 
Regulation of Obscene 
and Indecent Material 
(1997; 2003) 
The institutional embeddedness of an Internet organisation in terms of formal 
affiliation(s) may affect its independence and the resources available to perform its 
duties: 
While the Irish ISPAI is a detached/independent Internet service providers association 
without formal affiliation to an industry body, HKISPA and CAIP are subdivisions of 
larger trade organisations. CAIP merged with the high-tech trade association Canadian 
Advanced Technology Alliance (CATAAlliance) in 2002.83 HKISPA is an Internet 
service providers association and formed as a focus group of the Hong Kong 
Information Technology Federation (HKITF). Hence, both HKISPA and CAIP can 
draw on the resources of trade organisations.  
InternetNZ84 is a detached/independent non-profit Internet organisation which is not 
exclusively made up of Internet service providers. InternetNZ’s ordinary membership is 
open to Internet service providers (ISPs), but also to web designers, academics, public-
information groups and Internet users.85 Besides InternetNZ there is also another 
independent Internet service providers association operating in New Zealand (NZISPA, 
founded 1997). However, in contrast to the other cases studied, activities for an Internet 
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code of conduct in New Zealand are not driven by the national Internet service 
providers association (ISPANZ), but by an Internet society (InternetNZ). 
There are differences regarding the institutions’ general commitment to self-regulation 
in mission statements and in general objectives:  
ISPAI makes a strong commitment to self-regulation in its mission statement. The 
principal aims of the association include self-regulatory objectives such as “to establish 
a Code of Practice for service providers, to establish accepted standards of service, a 
uniform code of practice acceptable to members and to foster the industry’s image”.86 
Also the mission of the HKISPA states “establishing and maintaining of a Code of 
Practice” as a central aim.87  
In contrast, InternetNZ and CAIP do not refer explicitly to self-regulation as central 
objectives of their activities. InternetNZ’s mission is “high performance and unfettered 
access for all so the Internet continues to operate in an open environment that cannot be 
captured by any entity or individual for their own ends.” Also the detailed objectives in 
the InternetNZ’s statutes do not mention self-regulation as a central aim.88  
CAIP aims at providing “effective industry advocacy respecting public policy and 
regulatory matters (e.g. access, copyright, privacy and security issues, e-commerce 
guidelines) affecting Canada's ISP industry; promoting a positive image for the Internet 
industry and the association through pro-actively educating Canadians about, and 
building awareness of Internet industry issues; and offering value to members through 
the timely communication of relevant business information.” Despite the rather vague 
commitment to “respecting public policy matters” there is no further prominently placed 
commitment to self-regulation.  
Despite variations in their basic commitments to self-regulation, all the organisations 
have developed basic self-regulatory instruments. Basic codes of conduct or codes of 
practice – which are the focus of our further analysis – were adopted between 1996 
(CAIP) and 2002 (ISPAI):  
The ISPAI Code of Practice and Ethics is mandatory for an ISPAI member, as a 
member agrees that “in subscribing to ISPAI it shall abide by the Code.”89 In contrast, 
adoption of the HKISPA Code of Practice and the CAIP Code of Conduct is 
voluntary.90  
New Zealand’s Internet Code of Practice of InternetNZ is not in force yet and it has not 
been decided if adoption should be voluntary or mandatory.91 There have been efforts to 
develop an Internet code for New Zealand since 1997, but the attempts to bring it into 
force failed in 1999 and again in 2005 after some of the larger ISPs refused to back it 
(see Box 1). 
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Box 1: Adoption of an Internet Code in New Zealand 
• The first “ISP Code of Practice” was designed by ISOCNZ in 1997 and it was signed by 25 
Internet service providers. 
• In 1999 the ISP Code of Practice was relaunched as an “Internet Code of Practice”, but adoption 
was stymied by the reluctance of the country’s biggest ISP, Xtra, to become a member.92 
• In March 2005 a Code of Practice for ISPs was released in draft form by InternetNZ. According to 
the time schedule it was intended to “launch the Code and commence signups” in November 
2005. 
• However, adoption is still “on hold” for two main reasons: a) The Code of Practice has been 
adopted by some of the larger ISPs but not by others. b) Another communications industry forum, 
the Telecommunications Carrier’s Forum (TCF) has produced the Customer Complaints Code 
(CCC) and set up a telecommunications dispute-resolution service (TDRS). 
• In 2007, InternetNZ is redrafting the Internet Code of Practice to remove duplication with the CCC 
and TDRS. 
• According to InternetNZ it is considered that the new Internet Code of Practice should focus on 
“behavioural” issues and take the form of a best-practice document for ISPs. It may, for example, 
have more detail on Internet issues such as acceptable use policies, rather than focus on 
complaint handling, which is covered by the TCF codes.93 
 
The feasibility of the adoption of alternative modes of regulation for a new regulatory 
challenge depends on the existing industry environment. The practicability of adoption 
is in general higher if there is an already recognised organisation that can take over 
additional regulatory tasks or if an industry segment already has experience with 
alternative modes of regulation. Analyses show that the basic codes of conduct and 
codes of practice are not the only regulatory activities of the four institutions studied. 
Manifold regulatory activities complementing the basic codes have been adopted, but 
apart from the basic codes there is no common pattern of regulatory activities across the 
institutions:  
InternetNZ administers the New Zealand domain name system (DNS) through the 
Office of the Domain Name Commissioner, and InternetNZ is actively involved in a 
recent initiative for the adoption of an Anti-Spam Code of Practice.94  
HKISPA adopted an anti-spam code of practice in 2005 and HKISPA made a Practice 
Statement on Regulation of Obscene and Indecent Material in 1997, amended in 2003.  
CAIP’s basic Code of Conduct is complemented by a Privacy Code adopted in 2000 
and a Fair Practices Initiative. The initiative is strongly related to consumer-protection 
issues, but it is more “informatory” than “regulatory” in nature.  
In Ireland, the ISPAI not only adopted the Code of Practice and Ethics but it is also the 
provider of the national hotline for illegal child pornography on the Internet 
(www.hotline.ie). 
All the institutions are self-regulating with regard to their basic codes of conduct. 
However some of the institution’s other initiatives show some state involvement. The 
Irish hotline for illegal child pornography on the Internet (www.hotline.ie) is partly 
funded by the EU Safer Internet Action Plan. The anti-spam code of practice in New 
Zealand was created in keeping with the requirements of the government’s Unsolicited 
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Electronic Messages Act 2007. Hence forms of governmental involvement in self-
regulatory organisations exist in complex institutional arrangements with manifold 
regulatory activities. This makes it very hard to provide precise classifications for a 
single Internet organisation. Differentiated assessments of the organisation’s individual 
regulatory initiatives are necessary in order to draw conclusions on the intensity and the 
modes of state involvement.  
 
3.2 Comparative Analysis of Performance Criteria 
In this section we summarise our findings of the application of the performance criteria 
to evaluate Internet organisations and Internet codes of conduct that were the subject of 
our analyses. We refer to Annex II for a more detailed analysis (along with concrete 
facts and figures). 
In evaluating the findings for codes of conduct as compared to content-rating systems, a 
variety of distinctions emerge. Content-rating systems are usually designed and 
employed against a background of traditional spheres of regulation. Self-regulatory 
arrangements are in many cases formed as part of a deregulatory phase. In terms of 
codes of conduct (e.g. for Internet service providers), self-regulation efforts occur in an 
atmosphere where there is an assumption of greater barriers to regulation.  
The Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers (CAIP) has the longest 
experience in developing a code of conduct among the four cases studied. It performs 
satisfactorily in the area of industry support and stated adoption, including around 30% 
of Canadian ISPs and 80% of all Internet traffic. Many of the CAIP members provide 
consumers with safety information, Internet filtering software and online complaint 
lines while declaring adherence to Canadian laws and cooperation with law-
enforcement officials. CAIP performs well in its efforts to raise public awareness by 
offering online safety tools such as CyberTip.ca, WebAware, and by contributing to the 
establishment of the Canadian Coalition Against Internet Child Exploitation (CCAICE). 
CAIP scores high in terms of attitude, being internationally acclaimed as a model of the 
right way to fight hate and terrorism on the Internet. However, paradoxically, there are 
significant internal shortcomings, notably at the level of possible punishments of 
behaviour that breaks the CAIP Code of Conduct. This lack of punitive teeth originates 
in the fact that adoption of the code by CAIP members is purely voluntary and does not 
determine membership status. Moreover, the code itself does not contain any reference 
to sanctions. Thus, breaking the code does not lead to a loss of membership and, 
moreover, there is no apparent way by which a consumer can verify whether or not a 
member complies with the code’s principles. The relationship between the CAIP and 
the government is also relatively undefined. While the government has been involved in 
drafting several guides on voluntary codes, it is unclear at what point and to what extent 
there is significant governmental involvement in handling major complaints and 
sanctions. 
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The Internet Society of New Zealand (InternetNZ) scores lowest in terms of 
performance. There is no lack of membership in the organisation. More than half of all 
ISPs in New Zealand participate in InternetNZ, but the latest Internet Code of Practice 
has been under construction since 2005, its drafting process having been characterised 
by repeated internal misunderstandings among the members of the association. The 
difficulty of reaching an internal agreement on a final text of the code could lead to the 
conclusion that the ISP community in New Zealand is simply not ready or “mature” 
enough to act unanimously and provide a generally applicable standard for Internet 
safety at the national level.  
The Internet Service Providers Association of Ireland (ISPAI) scores best in terms of 
adoption both by the industry and government, as well as in terms of cooperation 
between the two. More than 40% of Irish ISPs participate in ISPAI and their traffic 
represents approximately 90% of all Internet traffic generated within Ireland. In this 
case, the requirement for all ISPAI members to adhere to the ISPAI Code of Practice 
and Ethics reveals its benefits in terms of public awareness and confidence. Awareness 
on the ISPAI itself is high but less due to its practice code and more due to the 
popularity of the hotline service provided and widely promoted by the association. 
There is low activity at the level of action and sanctions: no valid complaints have been 
directly made against any ISPAI members. 
The Internet Service Providers Association of Hong Kong (HKISPA) has the benefit of 
experience, its basic Code of Practice having been in effect since 1997 and widely 
adopted among Hong Kong ISPs, which represent around 30% of the Hong Kong ISPs 
and over 95 % of the Internet traffic in Hong Kong, revealing a good performance in 
terms of industry support. While early reviews (1998) of the code concluded that it was 
successful, there has been a noticeable absence of more recent official data and survey 
reports to gauge public awareness, attitude and use of the code. Thus, with no recent 
data to reach conclusions either way, the assessment HKISPA’s effectiveness at the 
level of action and sanctions is based on rather outdated information. 
 
3.3 Comparative Analysis of Selected Institutional Success Factors 
and Contextual Factors 
3.3.1 Market Structure and Competition 
Little attention is being paid in the literature to the effects of market structures and 
competition on the adoption of alternative regulatory institutions. However, it seems 
plausible that the ability of the industry to group together in order to adopt alternative 
regulatory modes is more difficult in a highly fragmented industry branch with many 
market participants. Hence the level of acceptance of alternative regulatory 
organisations and the level of adoption of alternative regulatory modes in a country may 
depend – inter alia – on the number of players and on the intensity of competition in an 
ISP market in the respective country. Intensive competition in an ISP market may 
decrease the incentives of ISPs to accept additional regulatory authorities alongside 
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statutory authorities. Moreover, intensive competition may reduce the incentive to 
comply with voluntary codes of conduct, which put additional restraints on the options 
for market behaviour in a competitive market. In effect, intensive competition could 
hamper the adoption of alternative regulation on a large scale i.e. adoption by many 
market participants. Nevertheless, intense competition can promote the adoption of 
alternative regulatory institutions on a limited scale, i.e. adoption by some market 
participants who aspire to the reputation benefits accruing from self-regulatory 
measures. 
For empirical investigation it is therefore assumed that a high number of ISPs and 
intensive competition in an ISP market in a country decreases the incentives for ISPs to 
adopt and accept alternative regulatory institutions on a large scale. Of the many 
potential indicators for the level of competition in an ISP market we selected the number 
of ISPs per million inhabitants and the number of ISPs per million Internet subscribers 
for evaluation. The level of adoption of alternative regulatory institutions is assessed by 
the percentage of a country’s ISPs participating in the Internet organisation studied. The 
results of the evaluation of interrelations between market structure, competition and 
adoption are summarised in Table 10. 
Table 10: Intensity of Competition in ISP Markets 
Contextual factor: 
Intensity of Competition 
Cases 
Evaluation Indicators 
InternetNZ 
[NZL] 
ISPAI 
[IRL] 
CAIP 
[CAN] 
HKISPA 
[HK] 
Basic data market structure         
… number of inhabitants, 2006 (population)95 4,143,279 4,239,848 31,612,897 7,013,832 
… number of Internet subscribers, 200696 1,197,600 1,035,800 7,997,000 2,743,000 
… number of ISPs in the Country97 ** 57 (2007) 53 (2007) > 467* (2005) 176 (2007) 
… number of members of the national Internet 
organisation, 200798 *** 31 23 142 56 
     
Contextual factor: competition     
… number of ISPs per 1 m. inhabitants 13.8 15.3 > 14.8* 25.1 
… number of ISPs per 1 m. subscribers 47.6 51.2 > 58.4* 64.2 
     
Performance criterion: adoption     
Membership in national Internet organisation     
… Percentage of ISPs participating in national 
Internet organisation  54.4%* 43.4% < 30.4%* 31.8% 
* The number of ISPs in Canada does not include Internet access provided through cable and wireless services. The total number 
of ISPs will be over 467, with the effect of more intensive competition and a lower degree of participation with CAIP.  
** The number of ISPs in these countries was limited to Internet access providers (ISPs who provide host services only are 
excluded). 
*** The number of members of the national Internet organisation includes all members (access and host providers). Due to lack of 
information on membership categories, limitation to Internet access providers was not possible.  
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Taking into account the shortcomings of the available data for this analysis,99 the 
following findings can be provided. 
Assessment of competition in the four ISP markets studied shows that there are 
differences which, although not very pronounced or extremely statistically significant, 
are nevertheless worth noting.  
The assessment of competition (ISPs per m. inhabitants) suggests that the intensity of 
competition is greatest in Hong Kong (25.1) and similar in Ireland (15.3), Canada (> 
14.8) and New Zealand (13.8). Another indicator of the intensity of competition (ISPs 
per m. Internet subscribers) confirms that competition is highest in Hong Kong (64.2). It 
further shows that it is high in Canada (>58.4) and lower in New Zealand (47.6) and 
Ireland (51.2). However, due to the exclusion of cable and wireless operators the 
available Canadian data systematically underestimate the level of competition in 
Canada. Taking this into account, a more realistic conclusion would be that competition 
in Canada and Hong Kong is to some degree higher than in New Zealand and Ireland. 
According to the basic assumption for this analysis, intense competition in a country’s 
ISP market reduces the incentives for ISPs to adopt and accept alternative regulatory 
institutions on a large scale. The available data, which have to be interpreted with some 
caution, would indicate that greater competition is in fact combined with lower 
adoption.  
Adoption of alternative regulatory institutions – in terms of membership in an Internet 
organisation – is lowest in Canada (CAIP: <30%) and low in Hong Kong (HKISPA: 
32%) – that is, in the countries with a higher number of ISPs and greater competition. 
Membership of Internet organisations is higher in Ireland (ISPAI: 43%) and highest in 
New Zealand (InternetNZ: 54%) where lower competition was found according to the 
available data.  
Summary, Interrelations between Performance and Success Factors, and Interim 
Conclusions 
 The intensity of competition in an ISP market was measured by the number of 
ISPs per m. inhabitants and by the number of ISPs per m. Internet subscribers. 
Findings suggest that competition in Canada and Hong Kong is to a certain 
degree more intensive than in New Zealand and Ireland. However, for full 
reliability the preliminary results need further confirmation, specification and 
underpinning by assessment of further indicators.100 
 The available data are in line with the theoretical assumption that a high number 
of players and greater competition in a market is combined with lower adoption 
of alternative modes of regulation. In the two countries with a higher number of 
ISPs and greater competition (Hong Kong, Canada), membership of Internet 
organisations is lower than in the two countries with less competition (New 
Zealand, Ireland).101 However, in New Zealand the comparatively positive 
market conditions for self-regulation (lower number of providers, less intense 
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competition, higher membership of Internet organisation) have not yet led to the 
adoption of a code. 
 Finally, the findings regarding competition and adoption may further be 
connected to those of the analysis on sanction power (see section 3.3.3). Results 
show that in countries with a higher number of ISPs, greater competition and 
lower membership of Internet organisations (Canada, Hong Kong), the Internet 
organisations cannot resort to powerful sanction mechanisms. This leads to the 
conclusion that a high number of market participants and intense competition are 
factors that are hampering agreement on significant and credible sanctions.  
 
3.3.2 International Involvement and Cooperation 
The level of consumer protection on the Internet in a particular country depends, among 
other things, on adequate international cooperation regarding both coordination and 
cooperation at intergovernmental regulatory level, and coordination and cooperation 
between alternative regulatory institutions.102 In practice there are several examples of 
“regulatory internationalisation” happening through vertical extensions of governance 
(Latzer/Saurwein 2007). Nevertheless, it is stated that: “Effective consumer protection 
on the internet requires more significant levels of international cooperation than 
currently exist” (Ofcom 2006, 6).  
The ability to cope with transnational regulatory challenges – inter alia – involves three 
institutional factors for analysis: It depends on the existence of a recognised 
international Internet organisation (contextual factor). A national Internet organisation 
can decide whether or not to participate in an existing international organisation (e.g. 
via membership) and/or to cooperate with other national regulatory organisations (e.g. 
via agreements) on a bilateral basis (institutional success factor). The ability to cope 
with transnational challenges further depends on the modes of cooperation within the 
respective international organisations (contextual factors).  
For alternative modes of regulation we assume that close international involvement of a 
national Internet organisation in an international Internet organisation and intensive 
modes of cooperation within this international Internet organisation contribute to a high 
level of adoption of alternative regulatory modes at national level (see Assumption No. 
5).  
The modes of international involvement of the four Internet organisations studied and 
the modes of cooperation in the respective international Internet organisations are 
summarised in the Tables 11 and 12. 
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Table 11: International Involvement of National Internet Organisations 
Success factor: 
International involvement  
Cases…  
Evaluation Indicator 
InternetNZ 
[NZL] 
ISPAI 
[IRL] 
CAIP 
[CAN] 
HKISPA 
[HK] 
Direct involvement (e.g. membership) in a 
transnational/continental Internet organisation 
AIPA EuroISPA 
Inhope 
no no 
Formal agreements with other transnational/continental 
Internet organisations 
no no EuroISPA EuroISPA 
Formal agreements with national Internet organisations in 
other countries  
no no no no 
Besides APIA, EuroISPA and Inhope, there are further international Internet organisations operating in the countries and 
continents studied. However, analysis here focuses on international organisations that maintain formal relations with the four 
national Internet organisations studied. 
The four Internet organisations established since the mid-1990s have been undergoing a 
process of internationalisation. However, the degree of internationalisation varies 
across continents: 
In Ireland, the national hotline for illegal internet content (www.hotline.ie) is run 
directly by the Internet service providers association ISPAI and the hotline is part of the 
International Association of Internet Hotlines (Inhope). Moreover, ISPAI is a full 
member organisation of the European Internet Service Providers Association 
(EuroISPA).  
In North America, the Canadian CAIP is not involved in a comparable 
transnational/continental Internet association. However, CAIP has signed a formal 
bilateral agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) with EuroISPA and it supports 
the national hotline for illegal internet content (www.cybertip.ca), which is part of the 
Inhope network.  
In Australasia, New Zealand’s Internet organisation, InternetNZ, is member of the Asia 
& Pacific Internet Association (APIA). But InternetNZ does not operate a hotline to 
report illegal Internet content and is not involved into an international hotline network 
like Inhope. A hotline to report objectionable material on the Internet is run by ECPAT 
NZ.103 ECPAT NZ supported the development of an Internet code by InternetNZ,104 but 
there are no further formal relations between the ECAPT NZ hotline and InternetNZ.  
HKISPA in Hong Kong has also signed a formal bilateral agreement (Memorandum of 
Understanding) with EuroISPA. But HKISPA is not member of a 
continental/transnational Internet association (e.g. the Asia & Pacific Internet 
Association APIA) and there is no national hotline for illegal Internet content in Hong 
Kong that forms part of the Inhope network. 
With regard to internationalisation, the modes of cooperation within the international 
organisations also differ (Table 12). 
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Table 12: Modes of Cooperation in International Internet Organisations 
The national hotlines for illegal Internet content are connected in a strong international 
network. The International Association of Internet Hotlines (Inhope) was established in 
1999 under the EU’s Safer Internet Action Plan. Inhope currently has 28 members and 
represents hotlines from all over the world. Besides 22 European partner hotlines, six 
hotlines from outside Europe are cooperating within the framework of Inhope (USA, 
Canada, Australia, South Korea, Chinese Taipei, and Japan). The modes of cooperation 
within the Inhope network are comparatively intensive. Members undertake to 
cooperate with other members by exchanging information on illegal content. But 
cooperation is not limited to mutual exchange of opinions. Cooperation within Inhope is 
based on the Articles of Association105 and focuses on common objectives and 
principles and on intensive cooperation in practice. Membership of Inhope is subject to 
strict requirements, among other things to guarantee high transnational standards for the 
hotlines.106  
In Europe, nine national ISPAs, including the Irish ISPAI, are members of the 
European Internet Service Providers Association (EuroISPA) which was established in 
1997 as the pan-European association of ISP associations from the EU member states. 
Similar to the Inhope network, members of EuroISPA agreed on common statutes the 
EuroISPA Articles of Association and on the common objectives/principles which form 
part of these articles. In addition to representing the members’ interests, EuroISPA 
commits itself to promote self-regulation and develop professional standards.107 Recent 
major EuroISPA projects in relation to consumer-protection issues include support for 
the Safer Internet Day,108 an Anti-Phishing Campaign,109 and support for Inhope is also 
manifested in a Memorandum of Understanding (2003) between EuroISPA and Inhope. 
With regard to Internet codes of conduct, EuroISPA’s activities are limited. It 
contributes to coordination and dissemination of best-practice and provides a 
harmonised set of measures common to all national codes of conduct, which can be 
used as a template for new ISPAs.110 Six of the nine EuroISPA full-member 
organisations have developed codes of conduct at national level. 
Compared to Inhope and EuroISPA, transnational cooperation within the Asia & Pacific 
Internet Association (APIA) is rather weak. Established in 1997, APIA is a platform for 
mutual exchange of opinions. “APIA is committed to continue to play a key role in 
educating and training the Internet operators in the Asia Pacific region. This is done by 
providing and promoting educational opportunities by hosting, endorsing, or co-
organizing conferences, seminars, forums, workshops, and other training events.”111 
Context Factor: Available organisations to take over regulatory tasks 
Indicator: Modes of international cooperation 
Cases…  
 
Evaluation Indicator 
Inhope  
 
EuroISPA AIPA 
Mutual exchange of opinions yes yes yes 
Agreement on common objectives/principles yes yes no 
Transnational cooperation in practice yes yes no 
Minimum standards and enforcement mechanisms yes no no  
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AIPA for example hosts the Asia-Pacific Regional Internet Conference on Operational 
Technologies (Apricot) an annual conference with the mission “to provide a forum for 
those key Internet builders in the region to learn from their peers and other leaders in 
the Internet community from around the world.”112 In contrast to EuroISPA, APIA does 
not have common statutes setting out common principles/objectives, and self-regulation 
is not mentioned in a mission statement. Consequently there are no collaborative efforts 
to agree on minimum standards and enforcement mechanisms. APIA does not deal with 
consumer-protection issues but rather with the interests of the industry. Even though 
Internet security has been a topic on some of the annual meetings, it has not been 
followed up by taking action on a transnational/continental level. 
Summary, Interrelations between Performance and Success Factors, and Interim 
Conclusions 
 National Internet organisations are undergoing a process of internationalisation, 
but the extent of this varies across continents. International cooperation in 
Europe is intense, with the European Internet Service Providers Association 
(EuroISPA) on the one hand and, on the other, the 22 European Internet hotlines 
participating in the International Association of Internet Hotlines (Inhope). 
Regulatory internationalisation appears to be less intensive in North America, 
where there is no transnational ISP association, and in Australasia, where 
transnational cooperation within the Asia & Pacific Internet Association (APIA) 
is limited to mutual exchange of opinions. 
 Results of the analysis support the assumption (see Assumption No. 5) that the 
extent of adoption of alternative regulatory modes at national level is interrelated 
with the involvement of a national Internet organisation in an acknowledged 
international Internet organisation. The Irish ISPAI shows a high level of 
adoption and it is closely involved in acknowledged international organisations 
(EuroISPA, Inhope). Adoption and international involvement are lower in the 
other cases studied (InternetNZ, HKISPA, and CAIP). However, analysis here 
was limited to formally institutionalised relations with international Internet 
organisations. Further involvements in other domestic or international consumer-
protection initiatives were not investigated, although these might have a 
(positive) influence on adoption and attitude. 
 Results of analysis do not permit an assessment of whether “effective consumer 
protection on the internet requires more significant levels of international 
cooperation than currently exist” (Ofcom 2006, 6). But it should be recognised, 
that EuroISPA and Inhope are engines of regulatory internationalisation of 
alternative regulatory institutions. Both organisations are undertaking significant 
efforts to broaden their international outreach. EuroISPA has signed bilateral 
agreements with national ISPAs outside Europe (e.g. HKISPA, CAIP). The 
Inhope network is successively expanding through the involvement of additional 
partner hotlines inside and outside Europe (e.g. USA, Canada, Australia, South 
Korea, Chinese Taipei, and Japan).  
 Inhope in particular serves as an example for alternative regulatory reaction to 
transnational challenges by means of regulatory internationalisation. It was 
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launched in 1999 with the financial support under the EU Safer Internet Action 
Plan. This shows “soft” control resources, which governmental players can 
utilise to support self-regulation (e.g. framework agreements, financial 
subsidies). 
 
3.3.3 Sanction Power in Case of Malpractice 
Alternative regulatory modes are frequently analysed against the background of the 
policy cycle. This involves assessment of institutional designs and performance at the 
various stages of the regulatory process, i.e. legislation (norm setting, rule making), 
enforcement (ex-ante and ex-post enforcement) and adjudication (determination of 
sanctions in case of violations). Some alternative regulatory institutions are active at all 
the stages of the policy cycle, other organisations focus their action on one or two of the 
stages. In some cases, regulatory responsibilities are divided between private and 
governmental actors.113 
Adequate power to impose sanctions for malpractice (i.e. violations, non-observance of 
principles/objectives) is often referred to as a central institutional/organisational success 
factor in the literature.114 Reaching agreement on enforcement and sanction mechanisms 
is a crucial challenge in the course of the establishment of an alternative regulatory 
institution.115 The level of sanction powers available to an alternative regulatory 
institution affects the credibility of the whole alternative regulatory system, the room for 
manoeuvre and the action of the alternative regulatory organisation and the incentives 
of industry members to comply with rules and obligations. 
For the subsequent analysis it is assumed that strong powers of alternative regulatory 
organisations to impose sanctions for violations of principles of a code of conduct 
promotes industry compliance with rules and obligations under a code (Assumption No. 
6). If violations of principles result in significant disadvantages for the respective 
violator, there are strong incentives for compliance with a code. 
The power to impose sanctions for malpractice is analysed along with the different 
sanction instruments available to alternative regulatory organisations according to the 
codes of conduct (Table 13). Instruments comprise (1) provisions to demand revocation, 
relief, or change of malpractice, (2) reputational sanctions, (3) financial sanctions (4) 
organisational sanctions and (5) existential sanctions. 
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Table 13: Sanction Power of Internet Organisations in Case of Malpractice 
Success factor: 
Adequate sanction power in case of malpractice  
Cases…  
 
Evaluation Indicator 
InternetNZ 
[NZL]* 
 
ISPAI 
[IRL] 
CAIP 
[CAN] 
HKISPA** 
[HK] 
Powers to impose sanctions for violations of the code 
 
yes* yes no no*** /  
yes**** 
Powers to demand revocation, relief, change of malpractice 
(requirement for specific changes in output) 
yes yes no no 
Reputational sanctions broad publication of violations; withdrawal of 
a quality seal, etc.) 
yes yes no yes**** 
 
Organisational sanctions (e.g. exclusion from an industry 
association) 
yes yes no 
 
no 
Financial sanctions (e.g. fines) 
 
no yes no no 
Existential sanctions (e.g. withdrawal of a licenses) 
 
no no no no 
* The Internet code in New Zealand is not in force; the table refers to the suggestions for sanctions according to the draft code. 
Discussion on the draft code could also lead to the adoption a best practice document for ISPs without provisions regarding 
enforcement and sanctions. 
** The HKISPA’s Code of Practice is subdivided into three parts: The basic Code of Practice, an additional Practice Statement on 
Regulation of Obscene and Indecent Material, and an Anti-Spam – Code of Practice. Possibilities to impose sanctions for 
malpractice vary between the three codes. 
*** There are no formal sanction powers under the HKISPA basic Code of Practice. 
**** There are reputational sanction powers under HKISPA Anti-Spam Code of Practice. 
The four Internet organisations differ considerably with regard to their sanction powers: 
CAIP cannot resort to any sanction powers under its basic Code of Conduct. The code 
only provides “guidelines” for the conduct of Internet service providers. Functioning of 
the code depends solely on the voluntary adoption and respect by CAIP members. 
Powers to impose sanctions are left to the legal system and applicable laws.116  
A special case is the rather secretive sanction power of HKISPA. First, there is a vague 
provision in the basic Code of Practice that the “HKISPA may request consultation with 
the Member in extreme circumstances”. Second, the Practice Statement on Regulation 
of Obscene and Indecent Material provides that the “HKISPA will take appropriate 
disciplinary action” against a member who refuses to take action against diverse content 
or if it is found that a member repeatedly breaches the practice statement. However 
neither code specifies a formal procedure or formal sanctions. 
In contrast to CAIP and HKISPA, the Irish ISPAI can and the InternetNZ is planning to 
impose sanctions for violations of their code, based on formal procedures and 
instruments that allow for comparative analysis: 
Adjudication processes usually start with various requests that violators of rules should 
change their behaviour. Formal demands for revocation, relief, or change of 
malpractice do not involve sanctions in the strict sense, but from an institutional 
perspective they are a measure to determine a violation and they are a first step to open 
the way to sanctions in the case that demands are not met. 
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In Ireland, the ISPAI Board may request a written remedy of the breach of the code,117 
and also in New Zealand under the proposed code a signatory of the code may have to 
“remedy the breach of the Code within a reasonable time as agreed by the Board”. In 
both cases the board may additionally “require a written assurance” relating to the 
future behaviour in terms required by the boards.118 
ISPAI and InternetNZ further make use of organisational sanctions. In Ireland, the 
ISPAI may impose suspension or even expulsion from the organisation.119 In New 
Zealand suspension for one year and expulsion would be possible under the draft; these 
measures do not include suspension or expulsion from the organisation (InternetNZ) but 
suspension or expulsion from the Internet Code of Practice.120 
Only the ISPAI can resort to financial sanction powers, as “the Board may suspend the 
Subject Member from ISPAI without any reimbursement of membership fees in whole 
or in part.”121 Nevertheless, this sanction instrument will not be used if a financial 
sanction has already been imposed by a regulatory body. 
In general, reputational sanctions are often used by alternative regulatory institutions 
and the ISPAI, InternetNZ and HKISPA can also make use of these.  
The ISPAI and InternetNZ do not use reputational sanctions as a stand-alone-
mechanism but in addition to other instruments. In New Zealand the board may choose 
to use publication of the penalty, ISPAI may publicise the fact of a suspension or 
expulsion from the ISPAI. 
In Hong Kong the HKISPA provides a branding scheme for members who comply with 
the Anti-Spam Code of Practice. In case of non-compliance with the code of practice, 
the HKISPA may “remove the right to advertise compliance under the Anti-Spam 
Initiative”122. 
Summary, Interrelations between Performance and Success Factors, and Interim 
conclusions 
 The four Internet organisations differ considerably with regard to their sanction 
mechanism in the case of malpractice. CAIP can resort to any sanction powers, 
the sanction possibilities of the HKISPA are not clearly defined, and InternetNZ 
is planning considerable sanctions mechanisms (including organisational 
sanctions) but the code is not in force so far. In sum, only the ISPAI has a 
defined adjudication procedure in place and can in fact already impose credible 
sanctions (including financial sanctions). 
 Overall, the analysis tends to support the assumption that strong powers to 
impose sanctions for violations of principles of a code of conduct promote 
industry compliance with rules and obligations under a code (Assumption No. 
6). Comparative analysis shows that the ISPAI can resort to the strongest 
sanction powers and that action under the ISPAI code is low, which indicates 
high industry compliance with code. The HKISPA and CAIP do not have 
sanction powers and there was more “action” found in the performance analysis. 
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 However, in analysing relations between sanction powers on the one hand and 
action on the other, the limits of the assessment instruments applied become 
evident. The number of complaints or actions of course not only results from 
sanction powers of an Internet organisation under a code of conduct. Further 
factors have to be taken into account, e.g. the age of the entity, its enforcement 
practice, and the conformance to prevailing norms of the institutions that are 
regulated. Little action under a code may also result from a rather weak 
alternative regulatory enforcement regime, which only theoretically provides 
credible sanction powers. Paucity of action of an alternative regulatory 
institution may also result from rather strict governmental monitoring, 
enforcement and adjudication measures, which restrict the leeway for self-
regulatory action. But, as indicated, lack of adjudications and sanctions may be a 
sign that the system is working well in terms of incentives for voluntary 
responsible behaviour or a conformity of norms to market activities. 
 
4 Conclusions 
The comparative analysis of selected self- and co-regulatory schemes is based on an 
analytical framework comprising three sets of evaluation criteria (performance criteria, 
institutional success factors and contextual factors) and respective empirical indicators. 
This check list for regulatory choice allows both ex-post evaluations of existing 
schemes in order to improve regulatory systems and ex-ante evaluations in order to 
design regulatory schemes for upcoming regulatory challenges. In this report the 
analytical framework is applied for comparative ex-post evaluations of media content-
rating schemes in the film/broadcasting industry and of Internet codes of conduct in 
North America, Australasia and the European Union. The analysis focuses on selected 
performance criteria in the two application fields studied. The starting point for the 
evaluations is basic assumptions regarding theoretically plausible interrelations between 
selected performance criteria (outcome/impact) on the one hand and corresponding 
institutional/organisational success factors and contextual factors on the other. 
 
4.1 Key Findings: Rating Schemes in the Film/Broadcasting Industry 
For media content-rating schemes, we have prioritised the performance indicators 
awareness of and attitude towards the rating schemes. The success of a content-rating 
scheme depends on broad public and industry awareness of the scheme and of the 
meanings of the content classifications in use. It further demands public confidence in 
the rating institutions, the rating schemes and the ratings as such. Empirical analysis 
shows context conditions for alternative modes of regulation in the area of content 
rating, performance differences of rating schemes and it shows how performance 
differences may be explained by differences regarding available resources, the 
involvement of non-industry members and the support/involvement of governmental 
actors. 
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The main findings are summarised as follows: 
First, our evaluation of selected contextual factors for content-rating schemes shows 
that there is substantial public interest concerning media content. Effective rating 
schemes with reliable and consistent information can provide added value for 
consumers. Conversely, the failure to adopt a rating system, or a systematic failure in 
providing accurate, reliable and consistent information, involves transparency losses.  
Regarding the provision of rating schemes, at least three arguments support the 
suitability of alternative modes of regulation:   
• In western democracies, self-regulation is generally the preferred solution 
because state intervention in media affairs can be seen as counter to freedom of 
speech (censorship).  
• Expenditure on coding, rating and classifying an increasing amount of 
audiovisual content would involve very high costs in a “state rating solution”. 
• The limited impact of an individual case of non-compliance does not demand 
more uniform and binding minimum standards.  
These arguments suggest the need for some alternative form of regulation. Yet any such 
alternative system must be able to respond to consumers’ expectations of a high level of 
accuracy, reliability and consistency in a ratings system, and for an adequate level of 
protection of minors. Again, three arguments indicate that content rating is not suitable 
for pure, unlimited industry self-regulation and that there is a demand for some kind of 
public oversight: 
• The sharp conflicts between public and private interests provide incentives for 
systematic “under-labelling” of media content, which may undermine the 
public’s desire for reliability.  
• Not all producers and suppliers of media content share a common level of 
interest in reducing market failures; there are strong incentives for free-riders to 
ignore an established system.  
• The potentially strong economic impacts that may be felt by individual 
companies as the result of a rating suggest the need for institutional mechanisms 
that make it possible to object to a given rating and to guarantee fair practice. 
On balance, these six arguments favour a regulatory arrangement with significant 
industry involvement in the rating practice, combined with some degree of public 
oversight, which could be implemented via governmental intervention (e.g. co-
regulation and/or periodic reviews). 
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Second, our evaluation of performance criteria shows significant differences among the 
four rating schemes studied:  
• NICAM and Kijkwijzer are widely known, adopted and respected, which 
contributes to their success. Of interest is the high number of complaints – 
which in fact may be related to the high level of public awareness as well as to 
the complaints process. That is, the complaints may in fact be an indication of 
system health rather than one of system failure. 
• CMCF is supported by the industry and government, but public awareness 
seems to be lacking and could be considered as a priority area for improvement. 
A lack of public awareness suggests that the complaints process is under-
utilised. On the other hand, the number of complaints could also reflect other 
barriers to making complaints (e.g. cultural factors), to higher level of general 
compliance and other factors. 
• The TV Parental Guidelines may be known to the public, but public awareness 
seems to have declined in the period since its implementation. The “ratings” 
aspect of the system is fairly comprehensively and evenly implemented in terms 
of application of ratings labels across programmes and categories. More 
significant, the Parental Guidelines are poorly understood by the public; the V-
Chip is hardly used as a filtering device. One of the biggest concerns with the 
performance of the Parental Guidelines involves the belief (and evidence) that 
the ratings are applied inconsistently and incorrectly, undermining public trust in 
the ratings scheme. 
• The MPAA system taken as a whole probably has the greatest recognition by 
consumers. It is well known, used broadly by the film industry and considered 
useful by parents. Compliance and complaints handling are considered to 
operate more or less seamlessly, because of the relationship between the 
industry and the MPAA as well as the availability of an appeal system. The lack 
of transparency in how the ratings are determined and the way they are used in 
film marketing have, however, generated critics. 
The performance differences among the four rating schemes leads to the question of 
whether and how the differences may be explained by contextual factors and 
institutional/organisational factors. Evaluations of selected factors according to basic 
assumptions on interrelations between performance and success/contextual factors are 
summarised as follows: 
• Results partly support the assumption that adequate resources lead to high 
public awareness of the institutions. Individual examples (CMCF) show how a 
lack of financial resources results in a lack of broad public awareness campaigns 
and thus in a lack of public awareness. In other cases (NICAM, TV Parental 
Guidelines) satisfactory funding and substantial promotion investments have led 
to higher levels of public awareness.  
• Explanatory differences were found for communications strategies related to the 
industry. Rating systems that assure an ongoing dialogue with and between 
coders, raters and classifiers (NICAM, MPAA/CARA) show a higher level of 
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consistency in the ratings than systems that operate merely in a decentralised 
way, without institutionalised compliance support (TV Parental Guidelines). 
• The criterion of adequate involvement of non-industry members is only partly 
fulfilled. MPAA/CARA and NICAM, which have delegated significant 
decision-making power to non-industry members at selected stages of the 
decision-making process, perform their roles better than the institutions 
dominated by industry members.  
• Finally, results show that state involvement in alternative regulatory institutions 
clearly promotes public policy makers’ awareness of the alternative regulatory 
institutions. This is important because the political responsibility to protect 
minors demands an awareness of rating/classification issues among policy 
makers, as well as awareness of how various rating schemes across the 
communications industries relate to each other. 
However, some performance differences between the four rating schemes cannot be 
explained solely with the analytical instrument applied. There are additional influencing 
factors that have to be taken into account and which require further research: 
• A comparison of NICAM and the TV Parental Guidelines shows that public 
awareness is not a linear function of the resources deployed for communication 
strategies. Additional influencing factors have to be considered (e.g. the maturity 
of a system). 
• Investigations show that there is no standard pattern of involvement by non-
industry members in alternative regulatory institutions. The available data does 
not permit a final conclusion regarding the assumption that extensive 
involvement of non-industry members and/or adequate governmental 
involvement in alternative regulatory institutions result in good attitude (trust, 
credibility and legitimacy) towards the institution.  
• The modes of involvement of non-industry members differ depending on the 
institutional structure of the organisations. In general, adequate involvement of 
non-industry members does not depend on significant involvement of non-
industry members in each individual unit but on an appropriate mix of industry 
and non-industry members in various decision-making units (a mix that has to 
be decided and evaluated case-by-case). Moreover, under certain circumstances, 
non-industry groups may perform a critical watchdog function more effectively 
from outside the alternative regulatory institution. 
Finally, the question emerges of whether and how state authorities may adequately 
support and oversee alternative regulatory institutions in the area of rating schemes: 
• State authorities have various options to support alternative regulatory 
institutions. These range from soft forms of governmental involvement 
(symbolic support, inspiration, integration of personnel), to financial subsidies, 
periodic review and direct control in a co-regulatory framework.  
• The intensity of state involvement may vary depending on different 
combinations of the instruments of intervention applied. In fact, involvement 
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and support for alternative regulatory institutions differs considerably between 
the cases studied. For example, state involvement and support is very extensive 
in Malaysia, extensive in the Netherlands, and rather light in the US self-
regulation schemes (MPAA/CARA, TV Parental Guidelines).  
Potential causes and consequence of such differences may be summarised as follows: 
• Despite a legal commitment to co-regulation in Malaysia, which involves 
possibilities for delegation of regulatory powers to the industry, strong 
governmental oversight of the co-regulatory system and continued proposals for 
direct regulation by legislators are evident. This may be a consequence of low 
levels of public awareness of the newly introduced co-regulatory system.  
• In the US, the V-chip model does not include a strong self-regulatory entity. It is 
more a question of enforcement by programme makers and distributors, with 
enforcement left to the Federal Trade Commission or congressional oversight. It 
is the example with the most apparent external legislative and governmental 
involvement, but the fact that the industry’s compliance took place at the end of 
a legislative gun may have weakened not strengthened the self-regulatory 
mechanism.  
• In the NICAM system, parliament is closely involved in monitoring whether 
suitable performance criteria have been met. In terms of the assumptions for 
content-rating systems, NICAM is probably the best example where the strength 
of the system tracks the logic of the assumptions. 
• The MPAA is an example where extensive industry involvement and a 
concerted effort to court government have led to effectiveness. Success in terms 
of awareness of the MPAA system may be a result of several factors related to 
state involvement – e.g. the political sophistication of the stewards of the system 
and the marketing of the system to cinema owners and consumers as a 
preventive tool against state censorship efforts.  
In sum, state authorities can draw on a range of instruments to support alternative 
regulatory institutions, to make active use of them and oversee them. The modes of state 
involvement may be varied, as may the (combinations of) intervention instruments used. 
The success of NICAM under a co-regulatory framework is often referred to as a best-
practice example in the literature. But results in this comparative analysis show that co-
regulation is not the only means available to state actors to promote and oversee 
industry rating schemes. As noted, periodic review of the MPAA system contributed to 
further enhancements of an already working system. This shows that periodic state 
review of a self-regulatory scheme, its outcomes and its impacts based on key 
performance indicators can provide a valuable alternative to a potentially costly 
regulatory arrangement. 
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4.2 Key Findings: Internet Codes of Conduct 
The regulation of Internet services is a subject of intense international debate. Many of 
the issues discussed concern questions regarding adequate levels of consumer 
protection. Due to their gate-keeping position, Internet service providers (ISPs) are 
regarded as one the key actors with respect to the achievement of regulatory goals.  
Since the mid-1990s, hotlines for illegal Internet content have been installed in several 
countries; these use “notice and take down procedures” (NTDs) to support 
governmental agencies in combating illegal content. Moreover, national Internet service 
providers associations (ISPAs) have been set up to take over self-regulation tasks and 
develop codes of conduct which comprise (combinations of) provisions regarding 
illegal activity, limiting access to material harmful to minors, hate speech, bulk e-mail, 
data protection and privacy. An overall evaluation of general contextual factors for 
Internet codes of conduct is not possible, because the various fields of activity involve 
very different types of regulatory issues. Hence, evaluation calls for case-by-case-
assessments of performance, selected success and contextual factors and the respective 
interrelations.  
Our evaluation of prioritised performance criteria (adoption and action) shows 
significant differences among the four Internet organisations and codes studied: 
• The ISPAI Code of Practice and Ethics seems to be well supported and adopted 
by both industry and government. Adopting the code is a mandated requirement 
of joining the ISPAI. Overall, the code seems to be a valuable complement to 
the hotline, which is what the public associates with ISPAI. 
• The CAIP Code of Conduct was the first Internet code of conduct, and has since 
been used by many outside Canada as a model. But the enthusiasm for the code 
among Canadian stakeholders, as measured in adoption and compliance, seems 
to have decreased over the years. 
• Regarding the HKISPA’s Code of Practice, there is hardly any up-to-date 
information available. In early reviews, adoption and effectiveness of the code 
were considered to be successful. No information was found to suggest that its 
effectiveness may have been weakened in recent times. 
• The Internet service providers in New Zealand have clearly and repeatedly failed 
in terms of code adoption. As a consequence, “action” so far is merely related to 
adoption issues (e.g. consultation, etc.) but there is no action in relation to the 
code as such (e.g. in terms of compliance actions).  
• Further, it seems that the older codes, such as the CAIP and the HKISPA code, 
have lost much of their initial strength and awareness. Instead they have become 
valuable complements of more targeted complaints systems, such as hotlines.  
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Our evaluation of prioritised success and contextual factors (intensity of competition, 
international involvement, and powers to sanction malpractice) also shows significant 
differences between the four Internet organisations and codes studied: 
• Findings suggest that competition – measured by the number of ISPs per million 
inhabitants and by the number of ISPs per million Internet subscribers – is to a 
certain degree more intense in Canada and Hong Kong than it is in New Zealand 
and Ireland.  
• National Internet organisations are undergoing a process of internationalisation, 
but the extent of this process varies across continents. International cooperation 
in Europe is high, with the European Internet Service Providers Association 
(EuroISPA) and the 22 European Internet hotlines participating in the 
International Association of Internet Hotlines (Inhope). EuroISPA and Inhope 
are engines of the regulatory internationalisation of alternative regulatory 
institutions. Both organisations are undertaking significant efforts to broaden 
their international outreach. Regulatory internationalisation appears to be less 
intensive in North America, where there is no transnational ISP association, and 
in Australasia, where transnational cooperation within the Asia & Pacific 
Internet Association (APIA) is limited to mutual exchange of opinions.  
• Finally, the four Internet organisations differ considerably with regard to their 
sanction mechanism in the event of adjudicated violations. CAIP can not resort 
to any sanction powers; the sanction possibilities of the HKISPA are not clearly 
defined, and InternetNZ was planning considerable sanction mechanisms 
(including organisational sanctions) but thus far the code is not in force and 
compliance provisions could be weakened before it is adopted. In sum, only the 
ISPAI has a defined adjudication procedure in place and can in fact already 
impose credible sanctions (including financial sanctions). 
The performance differences among the four Internet organisations and the differences 
regarding contextual and institutional/organisational success factors lead to the question 
of whether performance differences may be explained by contextual factors and 
institutional/organisational success factors. The results of an evaluation of selected 
factors according to basic assumptions are summarised as follows: 
• The available data are partly in line with the theoretical assumption that a high 
number of players and greater competition in a market is linked to lower 
adoption of alternative regulatory institutions (organisations and norms/codes). 
In the two countries with a higher number of ISPs and greater competition 
(Hong Kong, Canada), membership of Internet organisations is lower than in the 
two countries with less competition (New Zealand, Ireland). However, in New 
Zealand, the comparatively positive conditions for self-regulation (lower number 
of providers, less intense competition, higher membership of Internet 
organisation) have not yet led to the adoption of norms (a code of practice).  
• Results of analyses tend to indicate that the extent of adoption of alternative 
regulatory modes at a national level is related to the involvement of a national 
Internet organisation in an acknowledged international Internet organisation. 
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The Irish ISPAI shows a high level of adoption and is closely involved in 
acknowledged international organisations (EuroISPA, Inhope).  
• Finally, the analysis tends to support the assumption that strong powers to 
impose sanctions for violations of principles of a code of conduct promote 
industry compliance with rules and obligations under a code. Comparative 
analysis shows that the ISPAI can resort to strongest sanction powers and that 
action under the ISPAI code is low, which is one indicator of high industry 
compliance with a code. The HKISPA’s and CAIP’s sanctioning powers are 
more limited, which may have contributed to more compliance challenges. It is 
too early to make a judgment on New Zealand, because the code is not yet in 
force and consequently there is no “action” (in terms of compliance) in relation 
to the code.  
However, not all performance differences among the four Internet organisations can be 
explained by the analytical instruments applied and the available data. There are 
additional influencing factors which have to be taken into account for further research: 
• Regarding interrelations between market conditions (market structure, 
competition) and adoption of alternative regulatory institutions (organisations, 
norms), the New Zealand example shows that comparatively positive conditions 
for self-regulation (lower number of providers, less intense competition, higher 
membership of Internet organisation) have not yet led to the adoption of norms 
(a code). The failure to finalise the code in New Zealand may be the result of 
competing forces and voices within the industry, generating a lowest-common-
denominator atmosphere among industry players regarding content control. 
Further research on additional factors of influence is needed in order to assess 
whether there is empirical basis for this assumption. 
• Regarding interrelations between adoption of alternative regulatory modes at the 
national level and international involvement of national Internet organisations, 
analysis was limited to formally institutionalised relations with international 
Internet organisations. Further involvements in other domestic or international 
consumer protection initiatives were not investigated, although these might have 
a (positive) influence on adoption and attitude. 
• Analysis of interrelations between sanction powers and action shows the 
limitations of the assessment instruments applied. The number of complaints or 
actions results is not solely the result of an Internet organisation’s powers of 
sanction under a code of conduct. Further factors have to be taken into account – 
e.g. the age of the entity, its enforcement practice and the conformance to 
prevailing norms of the institutions that are regulated. Lack of action under a 
code may also result from a rather weak alternative regulatory enforcement 
regime, which only theoretically provides credible sanction powers. Lack of 
action on the part of an alternative regulatory institution may also result from 
rather strict governmental monitoring, enforcement and adjudication measures 
that restrict the leeway for self-regulatory action.  
Thus, the reasons for adoption failures (New Zealand) and action differences need 
further and more in-depth assessment on a case-by-case basis. The lists of performance 
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criteria, success factors, contextual factors and the related indicators for empirical 
measurement (sections A-1, A-2 and A-3) can serve as guidance for systematic follow-
up research. 
Finally, the question emerges of whether state authorities may adequately support 
alternative regulatory institutions in the area of consumer protection on the Internet. 
Even in the absence of a systematic comparative assessment of the modes of state 
involvement across the four institutions studied, some conclusions can be derived.  
In general, self-regulation efforts on the Internet occur in an atmosphere where there is 
an assumption of greater barriers to regulation. Nevertheless, there are strong political 
concerns regarding consumer protection on the Internet and governmental involvement 
in alternative regulatory institutions, which differ between the countries studied.   
Reviewing CAIP (Canada) and ISPAI (Ireland), we can see a long tradition of 
government involvement in establishing the schemes for codes of conduct.  
• The European provider has a relationship with government that has a more 
substantial tradition of collaboration and governmentality. There has been a 
longer and far more systematic relationship with the European Commission, 
which has kept the attention on self-regulation high through the work with 
various research institutes.  
• In Canada, much of the original work was similar, but there has been a less 
consistent relationship with the government and other entities that reinforce the 
self-regulatory impulse.  
• It is too early to come to a conclusion about New Zealand, and there is too little 
evidence, or transparency, to truly evaluate Hong Kong. New Zealand seems to 
be at an intermediate point between ISPAI and CAIP. It does not have the same 
length of institutional development as Canada, but there is substantial current 
involvement by a variety of players, which might substantiate the assumption 
concerning adoption and action.  
Further conclusions can be drawn regarding the possibilities for (inter)governmental 
authorities concerning adoption of alternative modes of regulation at the international 
level: 
• As mentioned above, the extent of internationalisation of alternative modes of 
regulation varies across continents. While international cooperation in Europe is 
intense, and EuroISPA and Inhope are engines of further regulatory 
transnationalisation, the level of internationalisation appears to be less intensive 
in North America and Australasia.  
• Inhope, in particular, serves as an example of alternative regulatory reaction to 
transnational challenges by means of internationalisation. Inhope can draw on 
financial support under the EU Safer Internet Action Plan, which suggests the 
potential of “soft” intervention resources that governmental players can utilise to 
support self-regulation (e.g. framework agreements, financial subsidies). Such 
soft intervention resources appear suitable to achieving regulatory goals 
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regarding consumer protection on the Internet, taking into consideration the 
overall atmosphere where there is an assumption of a greater barrier to direct 
“command-and-control state regulation”. 
To sum up, the application of parts of the regulatory check list, combined with an 
assumption-driven approach, yielded numerous illustrative answers to the research 
question of whether and how success and failure of selected self- and co-regulatory 
schemes can be explained by their respective institutional design, by characteristics of 
the industries involved and by the established regulatory environment. The comparative 
analysis proved the potential of the approach, pointed out its limitations and highlighted 
several open questions regarding the institutional design and context of the regulatory 
schemes studied. Most of these could be tackled in systematic follow up research 
guided by the already elaborated check list of success and contextual factors. 
 80 
List of Abbreviations 
APIA Asia & Pacific Internet Association 
APRICOT Asia-Pacific Regional Internet Conference on Operational 
Technologies 
ARI Alternative Regulatory Institution 
ATSC Advanced Television System Committee (USA) 
AUP Acceptable-Use Policy  
BIAC Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD  
CAC Content Advisory Centre of the Content and Multimedia Forum of 
Malaysia (CMCF) 
CAIP Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers 
CAN Canada 
CARA Classification and Rating Administration of the MPAA 
CATA Canadian Advanced Technology Alliance 
CCAICE Canadian Coalition Against Internet Child Exploitation  
CCC Customer Complaints Code (New Zealand) 
CMA The Communications and Multimedia Act (Malaysia) 
CMCS Center for Media and Communications Studies (Central European 
University, Hungary) 
CMCF Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia 
CoC Code of Conduct 
COIAO Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance (Hong Kong) 
CoP Code of Practice 
CoP&E Code of Practice and Ethics 
CRS Congressional Research Service (USA) 
CTEL Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing (Hong 
Kong) 
DBS Direct Broadcasting Satellite 
DNS Domain Name System 
EC European Commission  
ECLG European Consumer Law Group 
ECPAT End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of 
Children for Sexual Purposes 
ECPAT NZ End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of 
Children for Sexual Purposes New Zealand 
EuroISPA European Internet Service Providers Association 
FCC Federal Communications Commission (USA) 
FTC Federal Trade Commission (USA) 
G Content Classification: Guidance  
HK Hong Kong 
HKITEF Hong Kong Information Technology Foundation 
HKISPA Hong Kong Internet Service Providers Association 
HON Health on the Net Foundation 
ICoP Internet Code of Practice 
ICRA Internet Content Rating Association  
 81 
Inhope International Association of Internet Hotlines 
InternetNZ Internet Society of New Zealand 
INSOCNZ Internet Society of New Zealand (now InternetNZ) 
IP Internet Protocol 
IRL Ireland 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ISPAI Internet Service Providers Association Ireland 
ISPANZ Internet Service Providers Association of New Zealand 
ITA Institute of Technology Assessment 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
IWF Internet Watch Foundation (UK) 
KFF Kaiser Family Foundation  
MA Marketing Association (New Zealand) 
MAL Malaysia 
MCA Ministry of Consumer Affairs (New Zealand) 
MCMC Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission 
MPAA Motion Picture Association of America 
NAB National Association of Broadcasters (USA) 
NAICS North American Industry Classification System 
NATO National Association of Theatre Owners (USA) 
NC-17 No Children Under 17 Admitted 
NCC National Consumer Council (UK) 
NCTA National Cable Television Association (USA) 
NICAM Netherlands Institute for the Classification of Audiovisual Media 
NL Netherlands 
NTDs notice and take down procedures 
NZISPA New Zealand Internet Service Providers Association 
NZL New Zealand 
OAW Austrian Academy of Sciences 
OBS European Audiovisual Observatory 
OCW Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur an Wetenschap (Netherlands) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
Ofcom Office of Communications (UK) 
OFTA Office of the Telecommunications Authority (Hong Kong) 
Oftel Office of Telecommunications (UK) 
PG (PG-13) Content Classification: Parental Guidance is recommended (for 
viewers under 13) 
PSIP Program System and Information Protocol 
PTC Parents Television Council (USA) 
R Restricted 
RM Malaysian Ringgit (officially: MYR) 
RTM Radio Televisyen Malaysia  
TCF Telecommunication’s Carrier Forum (New Zealand) 
TDRS Telecommunications Dispute-Resolution Service 
TELA Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority  
TV-MA Content Classification: intended for mature audiences  
TVPG TV Parental Guidelines (USA) 
 82 
V-chip Viewing Television Responsibility Chip 
VSDA Video Software Dealers Association  
VWS Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Wlzijn an Sport (Netherlands) 
 83 
List of Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Analytical Categories for the Evaluation of Self- and Co-Regulation............ 10 
Table 1: Check List for Regulatory Choice – Overview of Evaluation Criteria ............24 
Table 2: Selected Cases ...............................................................................................25 
Table 3: Selected Evaluation Criteria for Media Content-Rating Schemes ...................28 
Table 4: Selected Evaluation Criteria for Internet Codes of Conduct ...........................30 
Table 5: Selected Basic Characteristics of Content-Rating Schemes ............................37 
Table 6: Selected Resources of Media Content-Rating Schemes..................................41 
Table 7: Involvement of Non-Industry Members in Media Content-Rating Schemes ...45 
Table 8: Involvement of Governmental Actors in Media Content-Rating Schemes ......50 
Table 9: Selected Characteristics of Internet Organisations and Codes of Conduct ......56 
Table 10: Intensity of Competition in ISP Markets ......................................................61 
Table 11: International Involvement of National Internet Organisations ......................64 
Table 12: Modes of Cooperation in International Internet Organisations......................65 
Table 13: Sanction Power of Internet Organisations in Case of Malpractice ................68 
 
 84 
Bibliography 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970): The Market for Lemons – Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488–500. 
Ayres, I./Braithwaite, J. (1992): Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R./Cave, M. (1999): Understanding Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bekkers (2005a): NICAM/Kijkwijzer: Ein Klassifizierungsmodell für Europa? Paper presented 
on the Medienkongress Wien, Vienna: 24-25 November 2005. 
www.kijkwijzer.nl/upload/download_pc/35.pdf (9 September 2007). 
Bekkers (2005b): Protection of minors – How to regulate audiovisual content in the 
convergence era. Presentation, Luxembourg: 30 Mai 2005. 
http://www.kijkwijzer.nl/upload/download_pc/28.pdf (10 September 2007). 
BIAC/OECD (1998): Summary record of the BIAC/OECD Forum on Internet Content Self-
regulation. Paris: 25 March 1998. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1893343_1_1_1_1,00.html (10. 
September 2007). 
Boddewyn, J. J. (1988): Advertising Self-Regulation and Outside Participation. A Multinational 
Comparison. New York: Quorum. 
Braithwaite, J./Drahos, P. (2000): Global Business Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cabugueira, M. (2000): The Positioning of the Firm on the Environmental Regulation – What 
makes the Firm Participate and what is its Role. Paper presented on the 2nd POSTI meeting, 
Strasbourg: 27-28 May 2000. http://www.esst.uio.no/posti/workshops/cabu.pdf (28 August 
2002). 
Campbell, A. J. (1999): Self-Regulation and the Media. In: Federal Communications Law 
Journal, 51 (3), 711-771. 
Cane, P. (1987): Self Regulation and Judicial Review. In: Civil Justice Quarterly, 6, 324-347. 
Chan, E. (2002): A Self-Regulatory Framework for the Transmission of Obscene and Indecent 
Articles through the Internet in Hong Kong. Speech by the Commissioner for Television and 
Entertainment Licensing, Mr Eddy Chan, at the Symposium on Protection of Children 
Online, 9 March 2002. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200203/09/0309142.htm  (10 
September 2007). 
Cook, P./Kirkpatrick, C. B./Minogue, M./Parker, D. (eds.) (2004): Leading Issues in 
Competition, Regulation and Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Durrant, P. (2005): Context for the development of the Irish solution. In: EuroISPA Newsletter, 
March-Apil 2005. http://www.euroispa.org/newsletter_archive/0502.PDF (10 September 
2007).  
ECLG (2001): Soft Law and the Consumer Interest. ECLG/071/2001. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/eclg/rep03_en.pdf (6 September 2007). 
EuroISPA (2005): EuroISPA Articles of Association. http://www.euroispa.org/docs/euroispa-
aoa_en-sept2005.pdf (6 September 2007). 
FCC (2007): In the Matter of Violent Television Programming And Its Impact On Children.  
FCC 07-50, MB Docket No. 04-26147. Adopted: April 6, 2007; Released: April 25, 2007. 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-50A1.pdf (6 September 2007). 
FTC (2000a): Marketing violent entertainment to children: A review of self-regulation and 
Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Game Industries. 
Report of the Federal Trade Commission, September 2000. 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/vioreport.pdf (10 September 2007). 
 85 
FTC (2000b): First Amendment Issues In Public Debate Over Governmental Regulation of 
Entertainment Media Products With Violent Content. 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/Appen%20C.pdf (9 September 2007). 
FTC (2007): Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children. A Fifth Follow-up review of self-
regulation and Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic 
Game Industries. Report of the Federal Trade Commission, April 2007.   
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/070412MarketingViolentEChildren.pdf (6 September 
2007). 
Gunningham, N./Rees, J. (1997): Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective. In: 
Law & Policy, 19 (4), 363-414. 
Gunningham, N./Sinclair, D. (1999): Integrative Regulation. A Principle-Based Approach to 
Environmental Policy. In: Law and Social Inquiry, 24 (4), 853-896. 
Gupta, A. K./Lad, L. J. (1983): Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, Organizational, and 
Political Analysis. In: Academy of Management Review, 8 (3/4), 416-425. 
HBI/EMR (2007): Studie über Co-Regulierungsmaßnahmen im Medienbereich. Endbericht 
Studie für die Europäische Kommission, GD Informationsgesellschaft und Medien. 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/coregul/coregul_final_rep_de.pdf  (10. 
September 2007). 
Hamilton, J. T. (1998): Who Will Rate the Ratings? In Price, M. P. (ed.): The V-Chip Debate: 
Content Filtering from Television to the Internet. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 133-156. 
Hemels, J. (2005a): Regulierung, Selbstregulierung und Medienkompetenz in den Niederlanden. 
Die Entwicklung und die öffentliche Debatte. Hilversum: NICAM  
http://www.kijkwijzer.nl/upload/download_pc/7.pdf (6 September 2007). 
Hemels, J. (2005b): Self-regulation with regard to audiovisual productions in the Netherlands 
Kijkwijzer and the development of the European PEGI system for games. http://www.gpi-
online.de/upload/PDFs/EU-Media/_Hemels-Selbstregulierung-NL-ENG.pdf  (10 September 
2007).  
HKISPA (1997): Code of Practice. http://www.hkispa.org.hk/cop-970410.htmn (6 September 
2007). 
HKISPA (2003): Code of Practice - Practice Statement on Regulation of Obscene and Indecent 
Material Revision. http://www.hkispa.org.hk/Obscene_e.htm (6 September 2007). 
HKISPA, (2005) Anti-SPAM - Code of Practice. http://www.hkispa.org.hk/antispam/cop.html 
(6 September 2007). 
Holznagel/Jungfleisch (2005): The Netherlands. In: Baldi, P. (ed.): Broadcasting And Citizens. 
Viewers' Participation And Media Accountability In Europe. Rom.  
http://www.eavi.org/reports/The%20Nederlands.pdf  (10 September 2007). 
Hutter, B. (2001): Is Enforced Self-Regulation a Form of Risk Taking? The Case of Railway 
Health and Safety. In: International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 29, 379-400. 
Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau/Legco Panel on Information Technology and 
Broadcasting (1998): Regulation of Obscene and Indecent Material Transmitted Through the 
Internet (released on 14 September 1998). http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-
99/english/panels/itb/papers/it1409_4.htm 
Inhope (n.d.): INHOPE Articles of Association. 
https://www.inhope.org/en/about/statutes#articles (6 September 2007). 
Insafe (2005): Rating system introduced for Dutch mobile content. 
http://www.saferinternet.org/ww/en/pub/insafe/news/articles/0405/nl_kijkwijzer.htm (10 
September 2007). 
InternetNZ (2005): Draft Internet Code of Practice. 
www.internetnz.net.nz/pdfs/issues/current/icop/2005-03-23_icop_draft.rtf (6 September 
2007). 
 86 
InternetNZ (2007): InternetNZ Annual Report 2006-2007. 
http://www.internetnz.net.nz/pubs/ar/20062007AnnualReport (10 September 2007). 
Intomart (2002): Eindrapport onderzoek zelfregulering audiovisuele producten. Hilversum: 
Intomart. 
Intomart (2003): Meningen van ouders over de Kijkwijzer. Hilversum: Intomart.  
Iskandar, E. F.  (2007): Challenges in implementing a convergence legislation – Regulating the 
Broadcast Industry.  http://www.capstrans.edu.au/resources/conferences/2007/iceaps2007-
papers/eneng-earidahl-iskandar.pdf (9 September 2007).  
ISPAI (2002): Internet Service Providers Association of Ireland - Code of Practice and Ethics. 
http://www.ispai.ie/docs/cope.pdf (10 September 2007). 
ISPANZ (n.d.): Constitution. 
http://www.ispanz.org.nz/pdf/ISPANZ_Constitution.pdf?PHPSESSID=0bcf26b6505351c74
637495f6ca1389e (6 September 2007). 
Just, N./Latzer, M. (2002): European Self- and Co-Regulation in the Mediamatics Sector as 
Indicator of a Transformed Statehood. Paper prepared for the European Concerted Research 
Action: Government and Democracy in the Information Age (COST A15). WG 5: 
Regulation and Control. 
Just, N./Latzer, M./Saurwein, F. (2007): Communications Governance: Entscheidungshilfe für 
die Wahl des Regulierungsarrangements am Beispiel Spam. In: Donges, P. (Hg.): Von der 
Medienpolitik zur Media Governance? Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 103-126. 
Kaiser Family Foundation (2004): Parents, Media and Public Policy: A Kaiser Family 
Foundation Survey.  http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/Parents-Media-and-Public-Policy-
A-Kaiser-Family-Foundation-Survey-Report.pdf  (10. September 2007). 
King, A. A./Lenox, M. J. (2000): Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical 
Industry’s Responsible Care Program. In: Academy of Management Journal, 43 (4), 698-
716. 
Kinney, D. G. (2004): Comments of the Coalitions of Independent Ratings Services. In the 
Matter of Violent Television Programming And Its Impact On Children. 
http://www.independentratings.org/data/CommentstoFCCSeptember2004.pdf (10 September 
2007).  
Latzer, M. (2007): Regulatory Choice in Communications Governance. European Journal of 
Communication, 22 (3), 399-405. 
Latzer, M./Just, N./Saurwein, F./Slominski, P. (2002): Selbst- und Ko-Regulierung im 
Mediamatiksektor – Alternative Regulierungsformen zwischen Staat und Markt. Wiesbaden: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Latzer, M./Saurwein F. (2007): Trust in the Industry – Trust in the Users: Self-Regulation and 
Self-Help in the Context of Digital Media Content in the EU. Report for Working Group 3 of 
the Conference of Experts for European Media Policy “More Trust in Content – The 
Potential of Co- and Self-Regulation in Digital Media”. Leipzig: 9-11 May 2007. 
Liikanen, E. (2001a): Better Regulation – From Principles to Practice. Alternative Regulatory 
Models Conference. Brussels: 6 February 2001. 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.Gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/01/57|0|R
APID&lg=EN (28. August 2002). 
Lindblom E. C. (1977): Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books. 
Loughlin, M./Scott, C. (1997): The Regulatory State. In: Dunleavy, P./Holliday, I./Gamble, 
A./Peele, G. (eds.): Developments in British Politics 5. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Majone, G (1999): The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems. In: West European 
Politics, 22(1), 1-24. 
Marcovitch, S. (2004): Safer Use of the Internet – The Role of ISPs. 
http://www.euroispa.org/docs/041010_libe_presentation.pdf (6 September 2007). 
 87 
MCA – Ministry of Consumer Affairs (1997): Market Self-Regulation and Codes of Practice. 
Discussion Paper. http://www.consumer-ministry.govt.nz/papers/selfreg1.doc (6 September 
2007). 
MCMC (2007): Industry Performance Report 2006.  
http://www.mcmc.gov.my/what_we_do/Research/ipr/IPR06.pdf (10 September 2007). 
Michael, D. C. (1995): Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique. In: Administrative Law Review, 47 (2), 171-253. 
Ministry of Economic Development (2006): Current ICT Safety and Security Issues - A 
Strategic Consideration of ICT Security and Confidence in New Zealand. Discussion Paper 
(published on 16 March 2006) 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____18171.aspx (10 September 
2007). 
Moloney Figliola, P. (2005): V-Chip and TV Ratings - Monitoring Children’s Access to TV 
Programming. CRS Report for Congress (updated 2 May 2005). 
http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/crs/vchipchildren.pdf (10 September 2007). 
MPAA/NATO (2007): Classification and Rating Rules. 
http://www.mpaa.org/Ratings_Rules.pdf (6 September 2007). 
NAB/NCTA/MPAA (1996): TV Parental Guidelines. 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Public_Notices/1997/fc97034a.pdf (6 September 2007). 
NICAM (2006): Jaarverslag 2005.  NICAM: Hilversum. 
http://www.kijkwijzer.nl/upload/download_pc/40_Jaarverslag_2005.pdf (10 September 
2007).  
NICAM (2007): Kijkwijzer: The Dutch Rating System for Audiovisual Productions. 
http://www.kijkwijzer.nl/upload/download_pc/24_verantwoording_Kijkwijzer_41.pdf (10 
September 2007). 
NCC – National Consumer Council (2000): Models of Self-Regulation. An Overview of Models 
in Business and the Professions. London: NCC. 
http://www.ncc.org.uk/pubs/pdf/models_self_regulation.pdf (6 September 2007). 
Newman, A./Bach, D. (2001): In the Shadow of the State: Self-Regulatory Trajectories in a 
Digital Age. Paper prepared for the 2001 Annual Convention of the American Political 
Science Association. San Francisco, CA: 30. August - 2. September 2001. 
OBS/CCPMM (2005): Co-/Self-Regulation Bodies in the Mass Media. Report on the workshop 
jointly organized by the Moscow Media Law and Policy Centre and the European 
Audiovisual Observatory with the Grand Jury of the Russian Union of Journalists. July 2005. 
http://www.obs.coe.int/online_publication/expert/moscow_workshop.pdf (10 September 
2007). 
Ofcom (2004): Criteria for promoting effective co and self-regulation. Statement on the criteria 
to be applied by Ofcom for promoting effective co and self-regulation and establishing co-
regulatory bodies. http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/co-
reg/promoting_effective_coregulation/co_self_reg.pdf (6 September 2007). 
Ofcom (2006): Online protection. A survey of consumer, industry and regulatory mechanisms 
and systems. http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/technology/onlineprotection/report.pdf (6 
September 2007). 
Office of Regulation Review (1998): A Guide to Regulation. Second Edition: December 1998. 
http://www.pc.gov.au/orr/reguide2/reguide2.pdf (6 September 2007). 
OFTA (2007): List of Internet Service Providers. http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/tele-lic/operator-
licensees/isp.pdf (6 September 2007). 
Oftel (2001): The Benefits of Self and Co-regulation to Consumers and Industry. July 2001. 
http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/about_oftel/2001/self0701.htm (6 September 2007). 
Ogus, A. (2001): Regulation, Economics and the Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 88 
Ogus, A. (1995): Rethinking Self-Regulation. In: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 15 (1), 97-
108. 
Olsberg/SPI et al. (2003): Empirical Study on the Practice of the Rating of Films Distributed in 
Cinemas Television DVD and Videocassettes in the EU and EEA Member States. Report 
prepared on behalf of the European Commission. May 2003. 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/finalised/studpdf/rating_final_report2.pdf 
(10. September 2007). 
O’Neill, O. (2002): A Question of Trust. The BBC Reith Lectures 2002. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
PCMLP (2004): Self-Regulation of Digital Media Converging on the Internet: Industry Codes 
of Conduct in Sectoral Analysis. http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/text/IAPCODEfinal.pdf (10 
September 2007). 
Parker, C. (2002): The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pierlot, P. A. (2001): Self-Regulation of Internet Content: A Canadian Perspective. 
http://www.isoc.org/inet2000/cdproceedings/8k/8k_2.htm (10 September 2007). 
Price, M. E./Verhulst, S. G. (2000): In Search of the Self. Charting the Course of Self-
Regulation on the Internet in a Global Environment. In: Marsden, C. T. (ed.): Regulating the 
Global Information Society. London/New York: Routledge, 57-78. 
Puppis, M./Künzler, M./Schade, E./Donges, P./Dörr, B./Ledergerber, A./Vogel, M. (2004): 
Selbstregulierung und Selbstorganisation. Unveröffentlichter Schlussbericht zuhanden des 
Bundesamtes für Kommunikation (BAKOM). Zürich: IPMZ. 
http://www.mediapolicy.unizh.ch/forschung/selbstregulierung_report.pdf (6 September 
2007). 
Rees, J. (1994): Hostages of Each Other. The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three 
Mile Island. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Schuppert, G. F. (2006): Governance im Spiegel der Wissenschaftsdisziplinen. In: Schuppert, 
G. F. (Hg.): Governance-Forschung, Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien. 
Schriften zur Governance-Forschung, Bd. 1. Nomos: Baden-Baden, 371-469. 
Swire, P. P. (1997): Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection 
of Personal Information. In: U.S. Department of Commerce: Privacy and Self-Regulation in 
the Information Age. http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm#1A (28 August 
2002). 
Task Force on Industry Self-regulation (2000): Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets. 
Report prepared by the Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation. 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1131/PDF/final_report.pdf (9 September 2007). 
Tasman Asia Pacific (2000): Analysis of market circumstances where industry self-regulation is 
likely to be most and least effective. 
http://www.consumersonline.gov.au/downloads/selfreg/taskforce/ConsultantReport/ch1.pdf  
(10 September 2007).  
van der Stoel, A. L. et al. (2005): Self-regulation in audiovisual products. Final Report 
commissioned by the Youth Policy Directorate of the Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport. 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/vaneijk/Wijzerkijken.pdf  (10 September 2007). 
Vogel, S. (1996): Freer Markets, More Rules; Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial 
Countries. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. 
Wiedemann, V. (1994): Die 10 Todsünden der freiwilligen Presse-Selbstkontrolle. In: Rundfunk 
und Fernsehen, 42, 82-94. 
Wilson, J. Q. (1980): The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books. 
 
 89 
Annex 
Evaluation of Performance Criteria 
I. Media Content-Rating Schemes (related to report section 2.2)  
1) Netherlands Institute for the Classification of Audiovisual Media (NICAM, 
Netherlands) http://www.kijkwijzer.nl  
2) Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia (CMCF, 
Malaysia) http://www.cmcf.org.my/  
3) TV Parental Guidelines & V-Chip (USA) http://www.tvguidelines.org/ 
4) Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA, USA) 
http://www.mpaa.org/index.asp 
1) Netherlands Institute for the Classification of Audiovisual Media 
(NICAM/Kijkwijzer) 
NICAM 
 
Findings 
Public awareness  Consumer surveys123 conducted since the implementation of the rating system in 2001 have 
shown that more than 90% of parents are now familiar with Kijkwijzer. Of these, 95% think 
that Kijkwijzer is a useful system, 86% appreciate the combination of advice regarding age 
and pictograms regarding content; 77% use the advice of Kijkwijzer in practice and 41% of 
all parents use the Kijkwijzer pictograms (Intomart 2006; NICAM 2007, 23). 
There is also a high level of awareness among children. According to NICAM,124 “70% of 
children in the age category 8 to 11 years know what Kijkwijzer is, rising to 93% in the 12 to 
15 years category. . . . More than a quarter of the children stated that they also use the 
pictograms as a source of information when choosing a TV programme, cinema film or 
video.” 
Industry awareness  More than 2200 companies and organisations are affiliated to Kijkwijzer, either through their 
sector organisations or directly to NICAM125 
Awareness across 
communications 
sectors and policy 
makers 
The introduction of Kijkwijzer has led to a considerable tightening up of the 16-year age limit 
in cinemas and in the sale and rental of DVDs and games.126 
At the beginning of 2005, NICAM signed a contract with five major mobile operators (KPN 
Mobile, Orange, Telfort, T-Mobile and Vodafone) based on which these operators introduced 
the Kijkwijzer system on 1 April 2005.127 “As soon as a mobile-phone user searches for 
pornographic images or text, a Kijkwijzer icon pops up with a recommended age restriction. 
For the moment Kijkwijzer only applies to sexually explicit content, but there are plans to 
extend the application to other types of sensitive material”(Insafe 2005).  
In the government’s official view, the Kijkwijzer system is a success and has proved its right 
to exist; in 2004 it received a positive evaluation in parliament. The government and 
parliament suggested a number of improvements to the system (Bekkers 2005b).  
Adoption  On 18 February 2004, the Dutch parliament decided to continue the Kijkwijzer-experiment of 
the three previous years. “Suggestions, also from outside the political parties, and 
governmental proposals have been discussed and most of them in all probability will be 
implemented.” (Hemels 2005b, 14) 
Attitude A 2006 survey by Intomart, on behalf of NICAM, found that only two per cent of parents 
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consider Kijkwijzer unreliable. The majority of parents always or often agree with 
Kijkwijzer.128 
On July 2003, the Media Authority, responsible for overseeing NICAM, ascertained that 
generally speaking Kijkwijzer works excellently. The authority arrived at this conclusion 
following an analysis of the data from the NICAM Quality Monitoring report 2006. 
In June 2003 the European Commission published a study129 on the rating practice used for 
audiovisual works in the European Union. The EC study recommends the NICAM rating 
system as a most effective and successful model that could be applied elsewhere with the 
aim to reach uniformity in treating content in EU through a uniform rating system. 
“In the Netherlands, the classification process itself can be completed online within 10 
minutes, although it requires the applicant companies to have staff trained by NICAM in 
order for them to become official ‘coders’ and consequently legitimately responsible for the 
in-house rating procedures. This use of online procedures constitutes a case for ‘best-
practice’. In the other countries, the process is more time consuming.” (Olsberg/SPI 2003, 
56) 
Action Since the introduction of Kijkwijzer, the number of complaints has risen every month. In 
2002, 500 complaints were received by NICAM. In 25 cases the complaint went to the 
Complaints Committee, who passed a verdict. The office of NICAM dealt with the other 475 
complaints, for example gave an explanation of the system in accordance to the complaint. 
In 2003, 450 complaints were received, 40 of which went to the Complaints Committee. Most 
complaints are filed by private persons, mainly online on the Kijkwijzer Website. One in ten 
complaints is not serious. “A third of all complaints are dealt with inside a week and four out 
of five cases are closed within four weeks.”130 
Recent years, however, have seen a decline. According to the NICAM 2005 Annual Report , 
they received 293 complaints of which 29 were considered by the Complaints Commission. 
In 2004 they received 517 complaints of which 50 were sent to the Complaints 
Commission:131 
Assessment NICAM, and Kijkwijzer, are widely known, adopted and respected, which explains their 
success. Of interest are the high amount of complaints – which in fact may be related to the 
high level of public awareness about the rating system, and its complaints process. 
2) Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia (CMCF) 
CMCF Findings 
 
Public awareness  There are no survey results available, yet according to an official document from the 
Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Commission (MCMC): “CMCF has ... undertaken 
several activities for the purposes of publicity and creating greater awareness of its role and 
functions. In relation to this, CMCF conducted several media interviews and participated in 
18 seminars, exhibitions and conferences nationwide.”132 
In an article reviewing the Malaysian efforts, Eneng Faridah Iskandar, Director of content 
regulation at MCMC, stated that: “for a code to be properly implemented there must be a 
body of complaints to drive it and one of the major issues that the Content Forum faces is 
lack of awareness of the Content Forum as an avenue for complaints. In this regard, the 
Content Forum with the Commission has embarked on a series of roadshows and publicity 
campaigns which are aimed at creating greater awareness of the Content Forum and the 
Content Code to the general public”133. 
Industry awareness  The CMCF membership is open to six member categories summing up all the relevant 
industries: advertisers, audiotext service providers, broadcasters, content 
creators/distributors, Internet access service providers and civic groups. At present there are 
46 members listed on the CMCF Membership webpage, of which eight were 
broadcasters:134  
Speaking to the journal BizWeek on March 24, 2007, Tony Lee, the CMCF Chairman, said 
that “the Industry people in particular are very clear about the self-regulatory environment, 
and the next step is to make the public at large – parents, consumers, everybody – aware of 
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this.”135 
Awareness across 
communications 
sectors and policy 
makers 
Starting from 2004, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) 
has been holding annual dialogues with industry representatives where the CMCF has a 
major role in publicising the importance and effectiveness of the content code for the 
provision of services.136  
Adoption  In his 2006 report, the chairman highlighted signs of possible intervention by the authorities 
to ban certain broadcast content: “Recent situations indicate that some authorities are 
reluctant and unwilling to understand the nature of self-regulation. There are cries that the 
content on television is polluting the morals and culture of this country that pan-Asian faces, 
though Malaysian citizens, cannot be featured in commercials, that fast-food is bad...” 137 
Further, not all broadcasters are using the same programme classifications shown on TV. 
According to Mr Lee, the chairman: “We want to see the same color and the same typeface 
across the channels to communicate the message better.” CMCF does not cover RTM1, 
RTM2 and Astro channels, as these are not governed by MCMC. “In the future it is the 
MCMC’s vision to have every broadcaster under one set of rules and guidelines and CMCF 
supports it,” Lee indicated in the same article.138 
Finally, according to Mr. En Mohd Mustaffa Fazil Mohd Abdan, Executive Director of 
CMCF,139 most of the TV stations only follow the mandatory ratings from the Film 
Censorship Board of Malaysia, and thus hardly use the CMCF classifications. 
Attitude Because the CMCF is relatively young, there were no reliable sources available that could 
provide evidence regarding the public perception of CMCF. However, some sources have 
indicated that “some authorities are reluctant and unwilling to understand the nature of self-
regulation.”140  
Action In 2006, CMCF received and resolved 13 complaints and attended to four requests for 
content advice141.  
On why there have been so few complaints, speaking to The Star, on 22 April 2006, Mr. Lee 
said that one reason is that CMCF does not accept verbal complaints (it seems citizens tend 
to express their grievances verbally instead of using the standard complaint forms) – the 
complainant needs to write, provide full details and sign – whereas most people are afraid to 
disclose their identity when filing such complaints.142 
Speaking to the journal BizWeek on 24 March, 2007, Mr. Lee indicated that he feels that the 
CMCF complaints bureau – created in order to receive and mediate complaints on alleged 
breaches of the Content Code – “is being underutilized.” 
Assessment While industry and government are supporting CMCF, public awareness seems to be 
lacking, and is considered as a priority area for improvement by CMCF. Subsequently, the 
complaints process is underutilised (which may also be explained by cultural factors). 
3) TV Parental Guidelines & V-Chip (USA) 
TV Parental 
Guidelines 
 
Findings 
Public awareness  According to a 2004 Kaiser Family Foundation survey,143 (1) only 15% of all parents have 
used the V-chip; (2) 26% of all parents have not bought a new television set since January 
2000 (when the V-chip was first required in all sets); (3) 39% of parents have bought a new 
television set since January 2000, but do not think it includes a V-chip; and (4) 20% of 
parents know they have a V-chip, but have not used it.  
In addition, 50 % of all parents surveyed (1,001 parents were interviewed) stated that they 
have used the TV ratings. The 2004 KFF study indicated that even after years of being 
available, only 42% of parents who have a V-chip and are aware of it actually use it. Of the 
parents who had used the V-chip, 89% found it “somewhat” to “very” useful while overall, 
20% of parents had never even heard of the rating system. But about four in ten parents 
(39%) stated that most programmes are not rated accurately, and many parents did not fully 
understand what the various rating categories mean. For example, only 24% of parents of 
young children (two-six years old) could name any of the ratings that would apply to 
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programming appropriate for children that age. Only 12 % of parents knew that the rating FV 
(“fantasy violence”) is related to violent content, while 8 % thought it meant “family viewing.” 
One in five (20 %) parents said that they had never heard of the TV rating system, an 
increase from 14 % in 2000 and 2001. A more recent survey indicates that only 8 % of 
respondents could correctly identify the categories” (FCC 2007, 15f.). 
According to the most recent study conducted by the Parents Television Council – PTC, “A 
new Zogby survey indicates that fewer than 15% of consumers are using the V-Chip. One 
likely reason for this abysmal adoption rate is that parents realize what the networks don’t 
want to admit – that the V-Chip doesn’t work.”144  
Industry awareness  Given the voluntary nature of the rating, it is hard to assess the awareness across industry, 
yet according to the FCC: “Most television programs are now assigned a rating according to 
a system established by the broadcasting industry”145  
Awareness across  
communications 
sectors and 
policy makers 
“Under current legislative and regulatory mandates, the V-chip is only required to ‘read’ the 
TV Parental Guidelines and the MPAA (movie) Ratings. This means that any independent 
system can only be used to augment parental knowledge, not to program the V-chip. So, 
while a range of varied, independent rating systems can serve to provide additional 
information to parents, they cannot be used with the current closed V-chip technology. In 
order for these ratings to become as useful as possible, the V-chip would have to be able to 
read them.” (Moloney Figliola 2005, 12) 
Adoption  According to an FCC report released in April 2007: “The Parents Television Council (‘PTC’) 
and the Annenberg Public Policy Center … have conducted studies indicating that the 
voluntary TV rating system is inaccurate, inconsistently applied, and cannot fully address 
parental concerns over children’s TV viewing. An economist studying the question of why 
networks consistently ‘underlabel’ their programs concluded that they are likely responding 
to economic incentives. He found that programs with more restrictive ratings command lower 
advertising revenues. The desire to charge more for commercials and fear of ‘advertiser 
backlash’ over shows with more restrictive ratings ‘means that networks have incentives to 
resist the provision of content-based information’.” (FCC 2007, 15f.) 
Attitude The same FCC report, which summarises the results of research on the rating practice, 
reports that there are very many indications that the performance of the scheme is poor, also 
in terms of awareness.146 “In this Report, we find that although the V-chip and TV rating 
system appear useful in the abstract, they are not effective at protecting children from violent 
content for a number of reasons. In particular, we find that the TV rating system has certain 
weaknesses that prevent parents from screening out much programming that they find 
objectionable.” (FCC 2007, 3) 
Action The Parents Television Council has been conducting studies ever since the ratings were 
introduced. At least half a dozen studies conducted by the council and others have 
documented persistent problems with the application of the TV ratings. The latest data (PTC 
2007) reveals that content descriptors are not being consistently used by any of the 
broadcast networks during prime time viewing hours. Two-thirds (67%) of the shows 
reviewed for this analysis containing potentially offensive content lacked one or more of the 
appropriate content descriptors. Other PTC 2007 findings include:  
• “54% of shows containing suggestive dialogue lacked the “D” descriptor.  
• 63% of shows containing sexual content lacked the “S” descriptor.  
• 42% of shows containing violence lacked the “V” descriptor.  
• 44% of shows containing foul language lacked the “L” descriptor.  
• On ABC, 100% of the TV-14 rated programs lacked one or more descriptors.  
• 92% of NBC’s TV-14 rated programs lacked one or more descriptors.  
• On CBS, 73% of the TV-14 rated programs containing sexual content lacked the 
“S” descriptor.  
• None of the programs included in this analysis received a TV-MA rating, meaning 
every program was deemed appropriate by the networks to be viewed by a child 
aged fourteen or younger, including (for example) an episode of C.S.I. Miami in 
which a woman died of asphyxiation during an oral rape.”147  
Assessment The parental guidelines may be known by the public, but are certainly poorly understood. 
Further, the V-Chip, as a filtering device, is hardly used. One of the biggest concerns with 
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the performance of the parental guidelines involves the belief (and evidence) that the ratings 
are used inconsistently and incorrectly, undermining the public trust in the rating scheme. 
4) Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
MPAA Findings 
 
Public awareness 
 
According to an important 2000 report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reviewing 
the rating practices: “A high percentage of parents are familiar with motion picture ratings 
(surveys show more than 90% awareness) and a large majority (more than 70%)148 find the 
ratings useful . . . Consumer survey evidence suggests that parents want more from the 
movie rating system. Although it appears that over 90% of parents are familiar with motion 
picture ratings and about 75% find the ratings useful, some surveys show the system could 
do a better job of informing parents about the level of violence in movies. For example, a 
survey of parents conducted by the Commission for this Report in May and June 2000 found 
high satisfaction with the movie rating system in general but much less satisfaction regarding 
the information about violence the system provides: 50% of the parents surveyed said the 
movie rating system does a fair or poor job of informing them of the level of violence in a 
movie, while 48% stated the rating system does an excellent or good job. Similarly, a Gallup 
poll conducted in June 1999 reported that 58% of the respondents believed that the movie 
industry does not provide adults with enough information about violent content to make 
decisions about what is appropriate for children, while 40% stated that it does.”  
A 2007 follow-up to the 2000 FTC report stated that “Parents continue to report a relatively 
high satisfaction level with the MPAA system. Nevertheless, the MPAA system has been 
criticized as lacking independence, being overly subjective and devoid of child development 
expertise, and not fulfilling the information requirements of parents and consumers.”149 
Industry  
awareness  
 
According to MPAA, the awareness and use of the rating system by cinema owners and 
video retailers is widespread: “Motion picture theater owners, who co-founded the rating 
system in 1968, were the first group in the entertainment industry to voluntarily enforce its 
guidelines. NATO [National Association of Theatre Owners] estimates that the majority of the 
theater owners in the nation observe the rating system. In the mid 1980s as home video 
grew in popularity, video retailers joined theater owners in embracing the voluntary 
guidelines of the rating system. Parents who relied on the rating system found that the 
information provided by the rating classifications were equally helpful in home video. To 
facilitate its use, ratings are displayed on both the entire home entertainment package and 
the videocassettes and DVDs themselves. The Video Software Dealers Association (VSDA), 
which is the major trade association for video retailers in the United States, has adopted a 
policy (so called ‘Pledge to Parents’ ) which strongly endorses the observance of the 
voluntary movie rating system by video retailers.”150 
Awareness across 
the communications 
sectors and policy 
makers 
In relation to the TV Parental Guidelines and V-Chip: “Under current legislative and 
regulatory mandates, the V-chip is only required to “read” the TV Parental Guidelines and 
the MPAA (movie) Ratings. This means that any independent system can only be used to 
augment parental knowledge, not to program the V-chip. So, while a range of varied, 
independent rating systems can serve to provide additional information to parents, they 
cannot be used with the current closed V-chip technology. In order for these ratings to 
become as useful as possible, the V-chip would have to be able to read them.”151 
Adoption  According to the MPAA, the adoption by industry is high: “No one is forced to submit a film to 
the Board for rating, but the vast majority of producers/distributors opt to do so. Any 
producer/distributor who wants no part of any rating system is free to go to the market 
without any rating, or with any description or symbol they choose, as long as it is not 
confusingly similar to the G, PG, PG-13, R, and, NC-17. The rating symbols are federally 
registered certification marks of the MPAA and may not be self-applied.”152 153 
The FTC reports confirmed this: “Although the system is voluntary, all MPAA member 
companies have agreed not to distribute a film without a rating. As a result, the vast majority 
of films are rated.” 154  
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The NATO indicated a high adoption by cinema owners: “While the decision to enforce the 
rating system is purely voluntary, the National Association of Theatre Owners estimate that 
the majority of theaters observe the Classification and Rating Administration's guidelines.”155 
Attitude  According to MPAA: “Nationwide scientific polls, conducted each year by the Opinion 
Research Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey, have consistently given the rating program 
high marks by parents throughout the land. The latest poll results show that 78% of parents 
with children under 13 found the ratings to be ‘very useful’ to ‘fairly useful’ in helping them 
make decisions about what movies their children see.”156 
However, parents and filmmakers have recently criticised the secrecy of the decision-making 
process of the rating system. 157 
In response the MPAA has pledged to become more transparent.  
Action A 2004 FTC report shared their findings regarding enforcement in cinemas: “In connection 
with two previous reports, the Commission conducted nationwide undercover studies to 
determine the extent to which unaccompanied children under 17 were able to purchase 
tickets to R-rated films. In its September 2000 Report, the Commission reported that almost 
half of the theaters studied sold tickets to the ‘mystery shoppers’, and the Commission found 
a similar result in its December 2001 Report. In response to these reports, the MPAA, the 
NATO, the VSDA, and individual motion picture studios have continued to urge theater 
owners and video retailers to improve their enforcement of the rating system. The 
Commission conducted its third undercover survey in July and August 2003. The results 
indicate an improvement in theaters’ performance in restricting children’s access to R-rated 
motion pictures: only 36% of the ‘mystery shoppers’ were able to buy tickets to R-rated films, 
as compared to 48% in the 2001 survey. In addition, more theaters checked the ages of the 
teen shoppers, increasing from 39% in the 2001 survey to 48%.” 
Critics have complained about the abuse of the ratings by the film industry: “The film industry 
uses it to their advantage as a marketing tool. They are required, in compliance with the 
MPAA, to place the film's rating prominently on all advertisements for their films. Because of 
this, naturally they do so in whatever way they see most suited for their advertising. This 
seems to happen almost unconsciously. If a film's studio believes the rating will be to their 
benefit, it is placed more prominently in newspaper ads, movie posters, and other assorted 
publicity. If however they feel the film could be harmed by the rating, it's featured less 
prominently. Furthermore, although NC-17 is not intended as a stamp for censorship, few 
‘respectable’ movie theaters in the country will show NC-17 films. These and other reactions 
to the MPAA Rating System not only show a misunderstanding among the very people 
participating in the system, but also this misunderstanding and redirection of information is 
filtered down to the public as a whole.”158  
Assessment On the whole, the MPAA rating system is well known, used broadly by the film industry and 
considered useful by parents. The lack of transparency in how the ratings are determined, 
and the way ratings are used in film marketing have however generated a growing group of 
critics. 
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II. Internet Codes of Conduct (related to report section 3.2)  
1) Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers (CAIP) 
http://www.cata.ca/Communities/caip/  
2) Internet Society of New Zealand (InternetNZ) http://www.internetnz.net.nz/ 
3) Internet Service Providers Association of Ireland (ISPAI) http://www.ispai.ie/ 
4) Hong Kong Internet Service Providers Association (HKISPA) 
http://www.hkispa.org.hk/ 
1) Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers (CAIP) 
CAIP Findings  
 
Adoption In 1996, CAIP became one of the first Internet industry associations in the world to 
develop a code of conduct. CAIP membership comprises over 110 member companies 
throughout Canada,159 including commercial Internet service providers (ISP's) as well as 
enterprises interested or involved, directly or indirectly, in the industry of Internet service 
provisioning.160 Adoption of CAIP's Code of Conduct is voluntary for CAIP members, and 
there is no readily apparent way by which a consumer can verify, at the level of the 
Association, whether or not a current member complies with the code's principles. Some 
CAIP members state on their own Web sites that they adhere to the code. “Moreover, an 
ISP need not agree to comply with the Code to become a member, or stay a member, of 
CAIP. This eliminates the possibility of using loss of membership as a way to punish 
behavior that runs contrary to the Code.”161  
According to Christopher Knight, CAIP has 106 ISP members and 38 affiliates — vendors 
that sell to ISPs.162 According to Statistics Canada there have been more than 467 ISPs 
operating in Canada.163 In sum, membership in CAIP is <30% of the Canadian ISP market. 
According to a joint statement by the Canadian minister of industry and justice: “Many 
Internet service providers, including cable, telephone and independent companies, have 
implemented a variety of practices to help their customers have a safe Internet experience. 
These practices include providing information on Internet safety, operating complaint lines 
and making available Internet filtering software or information on where customers can 
obtain such software. Most Internet service providers have ‘acceptable use policies’ and 
‘terms of service policies’ in place that define acceptable on-line behavior, and many 
adhere to a code of conduct. The Canadian Association of Internet Providers code of 
conduct states that members will cooperate with law enforcement officials and adhere to 
Canada's laws.”164 
Awareness Principle 3 of the CAIP Code of Conduct states that “CAIP members are committed to 
public education about Internet issues and technology.”165 
“The main aims of CAIP are to: 
• provide effective industry advocacy respecting public policy and regulatory 
matters (e.g. access, copyright, privacy and security issues, e-commerce 
guidelines) affecting Canada’s ISP industry; 
• promote a positive image for the Internet industry and the Association through 
pro-actively educating Canadians about, and building awareness of Internet 
industry issues; and 
• offer value to members through the timely communication of relevant business 
information.”166  
CAIP was also instrumental in establishing CCAICE (the Canadian Coalition Against 
Internet Child Exploitation) and along with individual members of CAIP has been very 
 96 
active in developing a national action plan designed to help protect children from online 
sexual exploitation and to assist in bringing those who victimise children to justice. In a 
press release CAIP stated that this is a “significant step in helping to win the battle against 
online child exploitation. It is also another way in which Internet Service Providers are 
working collaboratively with public agencies and law enforcement to deal with this 
problem.”167  
Through its webpage, CAIP encourages all Canadians to learn about the great potential 
the Internet provides. It provides advice and tips on how to make the experience a safe 
one by making available sources like: Cybertip.ca (provides the public with a mechanism 
to report illegal content on the Internet, and facilitates the investigation and prosecution of 
those who use the Internet to victimise children); WebAware (provides the tools parents 
need to help keep children safe online); ICRA (Internet Content Rating Association – 
provides an important self-regulatory tool for labeling websites).168 
Attitude CAIP is often used as a model of self regulation. For instance: 
“At the media launch of the Centre’s seventh annual report on Internet Hate and Terrorism, 
Rabbi Copper (Associate Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre's Snider Social Action 
Institute, based in Los Angeles) presented a plaque to CAIP Chairman Tom Copeland, 
thanking CAIP for its support in fighting hate on the Internet and working to encourage the 
responsible use of the internet . . . ‘CAIP is an example of how a working partnership can 
move swiftly to deal on an issue – we are grateful for CAIP’s support and leadership . . .  
When I travel internationally, I use Canada and CAIP as models of the right way to fight 
hate and terrorism on the Internet,’ said Rabbi Abraham Cooper.”169 
Action There is no concrete evidence regarding compliance and complaints with CAIP’s Code of 
Conduct. In considering the question of the potential liabilities faced by ISPs, Margo 
Langford (CAIP representative to BIAC/OECD Forum: Internet Content Self-Regulation, 
Paris, 25 March 1998) indicated that “not enough people know about the existence of the 
CAIP code, and the media continues to project a negative image of the Internet. 
Furthermore, very few complaints are actually made, and responses are not consistent.”170  
In addition, some have complained that “the way in which complaints are handled by the 
Association is not clearly specified, which negatively impacts upon both the transparency 
and accountability dimensions of the Code.”171 According to Principle 6 of CAIP Code of 
Conduct – “CAIP members will make a reasonable effort to investigate legitimate 
complaints about alleged illegal content or network abuse, and will take appropriate action. 
– Commentary 6.2 Information about the procedures to receive and respond to complaints 
or inquiries established by each CAIP member, shall be made available to users.” Prior to 
taking action, CAIP members will: 
• conduct an internal review to determine the nature and location of the content or 
abuse, and where warranted; 
• consult with legal counsel and/or outside authorities, and/or; 
• notify the content provider or abuser of the complaint, with a request for a 
response within seven days (Commentary: 7.1 Notice is generally only given 
when the abuser is a customer of a CAIP member or the illegal content has been 
published by a customer of the CAIP member).172  
In addition, the CAIP Code of Conduct does not contain provisions on sanctions to be 
imposed on ISPs in case of non-compliance with the principles regarding illegal content. 
“The Government of Canada has participated in the development of several voluntary 
codes, including the Canadian Standards Association’s Model Code for the Protection of 
Personal Information, and more recently the Principles of Consumer Protection for 
Electronic Commerce. The Government of Canada has also produced a guide called 
Voluntary Codes: A Guide to Their Development and Use that may be helpful to those 
involved in code development or implementation”173 
Assessment While the CAIP code was the first Internet code of conduct, and has since been used by 
many outside of Canada as a “model”, the enthusiasm for the code among Canadian 
stakeholders, as measured in adoption and compliance, seems to have decreased over 
the years. 
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2) Internet Society of New Zealand (InternetNZ) 
InternetNZ Findings  
 
Adoption According to Statistics NZ, there are 57 ISPs operating in New Zealand currently. Keith 
Davidson (InternetNZ, Executive Director) says that around 30 ISPs are InternetNZ 
members.174 
According to the InternetNZ, a code of practice is presently being developed and is 
approximately six months away175. ”This is an effort in industry self-regulation to get best 
practice standards followed across the industry: in the interests of consumers, of providers 
and so on.”176  
Drafting the code proved to be a much tougher job than anticipated. “The society has not 
even managed to appoint a person to co-ordinate the work towards the code yet, and is 
unlikely to do so before late April, executive director Peter Macaulay says. A number of 
crucial decisions still need to be made, such as whether formulation of the code will 
involve just ISPs or the broader community, and whether ISPs will be actively involved in 
the drafting of the code from the beginning. The alternative will be to draft the code and 
present it to ISPs for sign-up or criticism and amendment… Some of the major ISPs are 
still diffident about the need for a code, though Macaulay sees the largest, Xtra, as having 
come round from an opposed to a neutral position. ‘We certainly have to have all the 
leading ISPs involved,’ he says. Without them, there’s be no point in doing it.”177 
“While InternetNZ is developing a draft code of practice for ISPs the issue of content safety 
is largely unaddressed. The recent consideration and enactment of the Films, Videos and 
Publications Classification Amendment Act 2005 prompted consideration of the issue of 
what obligations ISPs should be subject to in relation to the hosting of ‘objectionable’ 
material. It was determined that ISPs should not be liable for distribution offences without 
the requisite mental elements. It was considered that ISPs could not reasonably monitor all 
the electronic material on the Internet because of the volume and changing nature of 
material subscribers can access, limitations placed by privacy legislation, and the 
unreliability of automated filters.”178 
Awareness From the InternetNZ draft COP:  
“2. ACCESS TO THE INTERNET CODE OF PRACTICE - Minimum Standard:  
2.1 All Signatories of the Internet Code of Practice must use best endeavors to inform their 
customers of their adherence to the Code, and of the existence of the Complaints 
Procedure in the Code. This shall include the following methods:  
• Provide information about the Code along with its Internet service agreements 
with customers and users, and strongly recommend that their customers and 
users within New Zealand comply with the Code;  
• Include in a prominent location on their web-sites the logo of the Internet Code of 
Practice, a statement of support by the ISP of the Code of Practice, and a link to 
the Code of Practice document;  
• Provide a link to the Internet Code of Practice Home Page, which will provide 
information to the client about their rights under the Code.“ 179 
“8.1 The Executive Body shall undertake appropriate activities to ensure that consumers 
and industry are aware of the Code and understand its obligations.”  
Regarding consumer awareness on complaints procedure, “each Signatory shall produce 
information in plain language which shall explain the following issues: how a customer can 
gain access to the procedure; how the procedure works; The timeframes within which the 
procedure will be carried out; and the customer’s right to access the Code of Practice 
Complaints Procedure or the legal system if dissatisfied with the Company’s decision or 
the way it has been reached. Signatories must use reasonable means to bring this 
information to the attention of their Customers.” 180 
Attitude Not applicable (as the code is still in the process of development) 
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Action One issue that has been causing the delay in adopting a CoP concerns penalties for non-
compliance, says InternetNZ executive director Keith Davidson. “Some ISPs are happy 
with a bare set of instructions on how to be a good member of the ISP industry. But others 
want to have enforceable penalties for offences such as failing to back-up a customer’s 
data or allowing a customer’s domain name to expire. The TCF code is, basically, a 
dispute-resolution scheme, but if a dispute cannot be resolved via corrections and 
apologies an ISP subscribing to the code could have a ‘determination’ enforced against it, 
carrying a fine of up to $12,000, some or all of which may be paid to the aggrieved 
customer. Davidson sees the possibility of two codes operating together, with InternetNZ’s 
code of practice setting out standards for ISPs and the TCP dispute-resolution scheme 
providing forceful back-up in the case of serious breaches. ‘We want to see progress on 
[the internet code of practice] in this calendar year,” Davidson says. But he admits it is 
doubtful much work can be done on it given that other large issues — including the 
reforms to telecoms law and copyright law — are now occupying InternetNZ.181 
 
From the 2006-2007 Annual Report of InternetNZ: “INTERNET CODE OF PRACTICE – 
The decision has been made to adjust the Internet Code of Practice to complement the 
TCF’s new Customer Complaints Code and Telecommunications Dispute Resolution 
Service. The Internet Code of Practice will provide for best practice in supply of Internet 
services while not requiring the same level of overhead in enforcement that was originally 
envisaged. A working group has been formed to progress this long-standing project.” 182 
“The recent consideration and enactment of the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classification Amendment Act 2005 prompted consideration of the issue of what 
obligations ISPs should be subject to in relation to the hosting of ‘objectionable’ material. It 
was determined that ISPs should not be liable for distribution offences without the requisite 
mental elements. It was considered that ISPs could not reasonably monitor all the 
electronic material on the Internet because of the volume and changing nature of material 
subscribers can access, limitations placed by privacy legislation, and the unreliability of 
automated filters.”183 
 
“The Internet in New Zealand is self managed, meaning that there is no specific 
government legislation with regards to Internet matters, which are covered under general 
government legislation.”184  
Assessment  The failure to finalise the code is the result of competing forces and voices within the 
industry, generating a lowest-common-denominator atmosphere among industry players 
regarding content control. 
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3) Internet Service Providers Association of Ireland (ISPAI) 
ISPAI 
 
Findings  
Adoption Membership of ISPAI is voluntary and requires adoption of the ISPAI Code of Practice and 
Ethics.  
There are currently around 56 ISPs operating in the Irish ISP Market.185 According to the 
ISPAI website, the 22 members of ISPAI, comprising Internet access and hosting 
providers, have agreed with the Irish government that a self-regulatory approach to the 
industry has greater opportunities for success and effectiveness. “As part of this, the ISPAI 
established the www.hotline.ie service which permits members of the public to report 
suspected child pornography or other illegal content they may encounter on the Internet. 
The Hotline has been in operation since November 1999. In addition, a common Code of 
Practice with a common Acceptable-Use-Policy (AUP) were adopted. ISPs agree to 
adhere to this when they become members of the ISPAI.”186  
According to the Internet Advisory Board Chairman: “To have a meaningful effect, any 
code of practice must have the support of all members of the industry it seeks to regulate. 
Accordingly in view of the importance of the codes for self-regulation, the Advisory Board 
will be closely monitoring the implications of any unevenness in subscribing to the 
code.”187 
“Each member of the association is an Internet Service Provider in the Irish market and 
nominates one representative to attend the monthly board meetings. Each member also 
makes a financial contribution to the running of the association and a commitment to 
develop and enforce the necessary code-of-practice and common AUP.”188  
Awareness There are no survey results available. The ISPAI run seminars on a regular basis for 
parents and other groups to promote safer use of the Internet, particularly by children, and 
to promote visibility of the hotline.189  
Attitude There are no results available, beyond the annual review of the ISPAI Hotline activities, 
which are judged to be very successful.190 
Action 2005 Report on Complaints – by Paul Durrant, General Manager, ISPAI, and EuroISPA 
Council Member: “To date, there have been no valid complaints made about any of ISPAI 
members in relation to content, and any minor transgressions of operational details have 
been quickly fixed when brought to the operator’s attention. The Hotline has been widely 
used and reports from the public have continued to increase year on year. Again, to date, 
all reports determined by the Hotline to be probably illegal under Irish law have been found 
to be hosted outside the jurisdiction and had to be passed through Inhope or International 
Police channels. Hence, in the IAB review discussions that have taken place so far, there 
is very much a view of ‘let’s not try to fix something that isn’t broken’.”191  
Assessment  The ISPAI Code of Conduct seems to be well supported and adopted by both industry and 
government. Adopting the code is a mandated requirement of joining the ISPAI. Overall 
the code seems to be a valuable complement of the hotline which is what the public 
associates with ISPAI. 
4) Hong Kong Internet Service Providers Association (HKISPA) 
HKISPA  
 
Findings  
Adoption According to a 1997 article: “We have consulted all our members in drawing up the code of 
practice and the practice statement and have obtained their full support in its 
implementation. All our members agree that they have an important social responsibility to 
fulfill, the group said. The HKISPA's 40 members provide services that cover about 95 
percent of the Internet market in Hong Kong.”192 – Currently, in 2007, there are 56 HKISPA 
members as listed on HKISPA website.193 In total 176 ISPs hold a license for Internet 
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service provision.194  
Awareness No substantial evidence  
Attitude No substantial evidence  
Action According to a “Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child,”195 released in October 1997, the Hong Kong 
Internet Service Providers Association (HKISPA) (with the government’s assistance) 
adopted a self regulatory code of practice that addressed the question of obscene and 
indecent materials on the Internet in the spirit of the COIAO. A complaint handling 
mechanism was also established. In January 1999, TELA conducted a review of these 
arrangements. Its findings indicated that the self-regulatory regime was effectively and 
satisfactorily dealing with objectionable web sites and public complaints.” 
In 1998, the following information regarding complaints cases was made public:196 “Since 
the implementation of the Practice Statement in October 1997, HKISPA has received a 
total of 20 complaints, 17 of which involved obscene material. No further action could be 
taken on ten cases because in five cases the material under complaint no longer exist; in 
another three cases, the complainants had failed to provide sufficient information and in 
the remaining two cases, the material concerned had originated from overseas and was 
outside the jurisdiction of Hong Kong. Of the remaining ten complaint cases, the Web sites 
of three cases have been blocked by the ISPs concerned. For two cases which involved 
Web pages with hyper link to other pornographic Web pages, the ISPs concerned have 
disconnected the hyper link in question. The remaining five cases have been referred to 
the Police for further investigation, one resulted in the arrest of a youngster for publication 
of obscene articles.”  
Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing (CTEL), Mr Eddy Chan, at the 
Symposium on Protection of Children Online 2002: “Since the implementation of the Code 
of Practice in October 1997, the Association has received a total of 141 complaints. Of 
these, 33 complaint cases required follow-up actions. The web sites of seven cases with 
obscene content, which were hosted overseas, were blocked or had the hyper-link 
removed by the Internet Service Providers concerned. The remaining 26 cases were 
referred to the Police for further investigation and prosecution. Of these, 13 cases resulted 
in convictions leading to a penalty ranging from one to six months imprisonment, and three 
cases which involved minors under the age of 18, were dealt with under the 
Superintendent's Discretion Scheme. The Police was unable to take further follow-up 
actions on the remaining 10 cases because of insufficient evidence. For those 108 cases 
on which no further action could be taken, these were mainly sites which had already 
disappeared upon investigation or their publication was in full compliance with the relevant 
statutory provisions.” 197 
Assessment  While there is hardly any up-to-date information available regarding HKISPA’s Code of 
Practice, the early adoption and review of the code’s effectiveness was considered to be 
successful. No information was found that proved its effectiveness may have been 
weakened in recent times. 
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Endnotes 
A Analytical Framework 
1 Given the limited literature on performance criteria for self- and co-regulation, we were mainly 
informed by the growing literature on assessing the performance of “regulation”. In particular we 
consulted: Ayres/Braithwaite (1992); Baldwin/Cave (1999); Braithwaite/Drahos (2000); Cook et al. 
(2004); Hutter (2001); Lindblom (1977); Loughlin/Scott (1997); Majone (1999); Ogus (2001); O’Neill 
(2002); Parker (2002); Vogel (1996); Wilson (1980). 
2 See Latzer et al. (2002, 152f.) who presented a set of factors in form of a “regulatory check list”. This 
basic check list and the amendments developed for this report are based on analyses of:  Gupta/Lad 
(1983); Ayres/Braithwaite (1992); Rees (1994); Gunningham/Rees (1997); Swire (1997); Office of 
Regulation Review (1998, D4f.); Gunningham/Sinclair (1999); Tasman Asian Pacific (2000, 9f.); 
Cabugueira (2000); Newman/Bach (2003); Puppis et al. (2004); Just et al. (2007); Schuppert (2006); 
Latzer (2007). 
3 The check list summarises factors and criteria that proved most helpful for empirical analysis of 
alternative regulatory institutions. However, the lists are not exhaustive and additional factors may be 
considered depending on the analytical objectives. The Office of Regulation Review (1998) mentions the 
incentives for individuals and groups to develop and comply with self-regulatory arrangements (industry 
survival, market advantage) and cost advantage as further factors. Tasman Asia Pacific (2000) argues that 
the effectiveness of self-regulation also depends on the characteristics of products (homogeneous / 
heterogeneous) and on external costs. 
4 For a systematic application of these factors to analyse selected regulatory challenges (interconnection, 
market transparency for e-commerce, spam) see Latzer et al. (2002, 152ff.); Just et al. (2007). 
5 It is very high for example in the case of an accident in a nuclear power station, but low if a single 
television movie is classified inadequate. 
6 Self-regulation in the direct-marketing industry, for example, has generally been introduced with the 
aim of protecting the reputation of the branch (Latzer/Saurwein 2007, 56). 
7 See Latzer/Saurwein (2007) for an overview on degree and forms of governmental involvement in self-
regulatory institutions. 
8 Advantages, disadvantages and institutional/organisational success factors of alternative modes of 
regulation are discussed by: Cane (1987); Boddewyn (1988); Ayres/Braithwaite (1992); Wiedemann 
(1994); Michael (1995); Ogus (1995); MCA (1997); Office of Regulation Review (1998); Campbell 
(1999); King/Lenox (2000); NCC (2000); Task Force on Industry Self-Regulation (2000); NCC (2000); 
ECLG (2001); Liikanen (2001); Oftel (2001); Latzer et al. (2002); Just/Latzer (2002a); Ofcom (2004). 
9 Objectives of a scheme may either complement or substantiate/concretise governmental/statutory 
regulatory provisions. 
10 The level of the “openness” of an alternative regulatory organisation for external review by interested 
parties is influenced by decisions of the organisation. An organisation may decide to publish performance 
reports, to establish an information bureau or to actively participate in reviews by third parties. However, 
the decision if the interested third parties (e.g. stakeholders) are in fact reviewing an alternative regulatory 
organisation and its performance depends on the decisions of the respective third parties. Hence, the 
external review factor depends on an organisational success factor (openness for review) on the one hand 
and a contextual factor (decision for external review) on the other. 
11 See Ofcom (2004, 12). 
12 Here it has to be recognised that the ability to cope with transnational regulatory challenges mainly 
depends on the existence of recognised international organisations and on the modes of cooperation 
within these international organisations (contextual factors). However, a national organisation can decide 
whether or not to participate in such an international organisation (e.g. via membership) and/or to 
cooperate with other national regulatory organisations (e.g. via bilateral agreements). Hence, 
“international involvement” is referred to as an institutional/organisational success factor because the 
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decisions for involvement/non-involvement or cooperation/non-cooperation are taken on the level of the 
national organisation. 
B Comparative Analysis of Selected Cases 
1 Overview and Approach 
13 Moreover, a reduction of factors was necessary because of the limited resources allocated to this 
research project. The list of success and contextual factors (section A-2 and A-3) could guide systematic 
follow-up research on further factors. 
14 It goes without saying that the quality of empirical assessments increases with the number of factors 
researched.  
2 Media Content-Rating Schemes in the Film/Broadcasting Industry 
15 The following factors have to be assessed case by case: differences in market power of the companies 
involved and barriers to entering the market; recognised organisations which could take over additional 
regulatory tasks; industry culture supporting public policy objectives; adequate involvement of 
governmental actors. For a detailed analysis of state involvement in the four cases studied see section 
2.3.3. 
16 In the USA, “First Amendment concerns” provide a high hurdle for governmental intervention in any 
media content.  In other countries, government intervention in media content is generally more accepted 
and the barriers are significantly lower. 
17 In course of the establishment of the US TV Parental Guidelines, the initiators estimated that 2000 TV 
programme hours a day have to be reviewed  
(http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Public_Notices/1997/fc97034a.pdf). 
18 But as the Malaysian example shows, even a large number of television programmes can be controlled 
(censorship and rating) by statutory authorities. Almost all television programmes have to be approved in 
advance by the national Film Censorship Board. 
19 See Akerlof (1970). The concept of adverse selection refers to a market process in which “bad” market 
results occur because “bad” products or customers are more likely to be selected due to information 
asymmetries between buyers and sellers.  
20 Empirical evidence shows that there are complaints about inconsistent rating practices. See the 
performance analysis in section 2.2. 
21 Referring to the MPAA ratings for motion pictures it is stated that unrated and NC-17 movies do not 
make money. The average NC-17 film takes in less than $4 million; the average unrated film does less 
than $1 million. The difference between an “R” and an “NC-17” can be tens of millions of dollars 
(http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2007-04-09-movie-ratings-main_N.htm). 
22 “Although the National Association of Theatre Owners says there is no written policy on banning NC-
17 films it acknowledges that some exhibitors won’t show the movies.”  
(http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2007-04-09-movie-ratings-main_N.htm). 
23 The names of the members of the MPAA Rating Board are not provided to the public or any producer 
or distributor submitting a motion picture for rating. The reason for maintaining confidentiality is to avoid 
even the appearance that they may be subject to outside influences. 
24 “An economist studying the question of why networks consistently ‘underlabel’ their programmes 
concluded that they are likely responding to economic incentives. He found that programmes with more 
restrictive ratings command lower advertising revenues. The desire to charge more for commercials and 
fear of ‘advertiser backlash’ over shows with more restrictive ratings ‘means that networks have 
incentives to resist the provision of content-based information’.”  (FCC 2007, 17 with references to 
Hamilton 1998) 
25 NICAM points out that in the course of the establishment of NICAM, parents expressed a desire to be 
informed of the content of media products, particularly in relation to violence, frightening scenes, sex, 
discrimination, drug abuse and strong language, as these were the areas about which they were most 
concerned. 
26 The Ministry of Education, Culture & Science (OCW), the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport 
(VWS) and the Ministry of Justice were involved in the process of establishment. 
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27 The MPAA’s rating board CARA classifies more than 900 films a year  
(http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2007-04-09-movie-ratings-main_N.htm). 
28 In 1996, in the course of the establishment of the US TV Parental Guidelines, the initiators estimated 
that there is a “huge amount of programming – some 2,000 hours a day – that must be reviewed” 
(http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Public_Notices/1997/fc97034a.pdf, 12). 
29 Coders answer questions on the content of the production in question through a special internet site, 
using an extensive questionnaire. 
30 Satellite television networks have an agreement with the Censorship Board which allows them in-house 
self-rating in accordance with the mandatory ratings system of the Censorship Board. 
31 An exception is made on television for news and live programmes, as it is not possible to classify these 
in advance. However, the suppliers of these are obliged to take the broadcast time into account. Viewers 
must also be warned of shocking images in advance. The Internet is not covered by Kijkwijzer. NICAM 
is following developments in this area with interest. 
32 For a detailed analysis on the modes of support and involvement of statutory authorities on the 
institutions see section 2.3.3. 
33 As outlined above (section A-2 and A-3), institutional success factors can be designed or modified at 
the organisational level of an alternative regulatory institution. Contextual factors are related to the 
market and policy context of alternative regulatory institutions. In combination, contextual factors can 
provide a more or less “enabling context” for alternative modes of regulation. In contrast to 
institutional/organisational success factors, their modification is not possible at the organisational level 
but – if at all – by reforms to their regulatory environment. 
34 Ofcom (2004, 11): “The body will need to be adequately funded and its sources of finance would need 
to be robust and sustainable. Staff resources would need to be sufficient to cope with the volume and type 
of work which is likely to arise. The body will, however, need to balance this objective with the need to 
keep the costs of co- and self-regulation under proper control; regulation should only be applied where its 
benefits exceed the costs of regulation. The body should publish its annual accounts.” 
35 Cf. Iskandar (2007, 26); confirmed in a telephone interview with En Mohd Mustaffa Fazil Mohd Abdan 
(Executive Director of CMCF), 16 August 2007. 
36 According to Wim Bekkers (Director of NICAM) the industry share in NICAMs funding increased 
from 25% (2000-2003) to 35% (2004) and (50%) 2005 (see Bekkers 2005a). The NICAM system 
comprises two cost factors: 1) The NICAM institute paid for by government and industry, and 2) the 
internal cost for TV stations and distributors: all classification and information activities inside the 
member companies (OBS/CCPMM 2005, 26). Following an investigation carried out by a consultant for 
NICAM, the total cost of NICAM’s system of self-regulation (i.e. cost of staff and training) amounts to 
€10 million per year, with the rating personnel in the broadcasting sector being the most labour intensive 
(Olsberg/SPI et al. 2003, 51f). 
37 The MCMC has to date given annual grants amounting to RM 2,525,000 (€529,219) to the Content 
Forum for its operations and management; which include rental of premises, renovations, staff costs and 
activities (cf. Iskandar 2007, 26).   
38 Those fees are assessed in relation to the negative cost of the motion picture submitted and the 
submitting party's yearly aggregate gross income from motion picture distribution. 
39 Telephone interview with Courtney Hagen (TV Parental Guidelines Monitoring Board), 28 August 
2007. 
40 CARA is run by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the National Association of 
Theatre Owners (NATO). The TV Parental Guidelines are the result of collaboration between the 
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), and the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). 
41 See OBS/CCPMM (2005, 26). The reason is that the protection of minors is the joint responsibility of 
the industry and the government. 
42 Telephone interview En Mohd Mustaffa Fazil Mohd Abdan (Executive Director of CMCF), 16 August 
2007. 
43 See section 2.2. 
44 The CMCF Content Advisory Centre (CAC) shall provide a resource whereby clarification can be 
obtained regarding the interpretation of the Content Code prior to production and/or dissemination. 
(http://www.cmcf.org.my/about.asp). 
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45 The National Consumer Council (NCC) recommends that up to 75 per cent of a co-regulatory 
organisation’s governing body should be made up of independent representatives (NCC 2000, 51). 
46 See Article I of the Classification and Rating Rules (MPAA/NATO 2007, 2). “There are no special 
qualifications for Board membership, except that the members must have a shared parenthood experience, 
must be possessed of an intelligent maturity, and most of all, have the capacity to put themselves in the 
role of most American parents so they can view a film and apply a rating that most parents would find 
suitable and helpful in aiding their decisions about their children and what movies they see.” 
(http://www.mpaa.org/Ratings_HowRated.asp). 
47 But the Malaysian example shows that even a large number of television programmes must not 
necessarily be rated by industry actors themselves. Almost all television programmes have to be approved 
by the national Film Censorship Board in advance. Employees of the Board work directly in the various 
free TV stations.  
48 NICAM is supported in the performance of its duties by an Advisory Committee, whose members are 
experts in the areas of media, youth, education and welfare, representatives of parents` organisations and 
other social organisations, as well as of the companies participating in NICAM. NICAM’s board consists 
of representatives of both public and commercial broadcasters, film distributors and cinema operators, 
distributors, videotheques and retailers (http://www.kijkwijzer.nl/pagina.php?id=3). 
49 USA: The Monitoring Board of the TV Parental Guidelines has a chairman, six members each from the 
broadcast television industry, the cable industry, and the programme production community. The 
chairman also selects five non-industry members from the advocacy community, for a total of 24 
members. 
Malaysia: The management of the CMCF rests with a chairman and 18 council members elected from the 
six “ordinary” member categories of advertising, broadcasting, content creators/distributors, audiotext 
service providers, internet access service providers, and civic groups. One of the members of the council 
is the Representative of the Federation of Malaysian Consumers Association. 
50 Netherlands: Sec. 53 (3), Media Act: “An organisation shall qualify for accreditation only if (. . .) 
provision has been made for adequate involvement of stakeholders, including in any event consumer 
representatives.” 
51 Malaysia: Section 94, CMA 1998: “The Commission may designate an industry body to be an industry 
forum (. . .) if the Commission is satisfied that (. . .) the membership of the body is open to all relevant 
parties.” 
52 It was planned that: “The Oversight Monitoring Board will have 19 members, six each from the 
broadcast television industry, the cable industry, and the programme production community, in addition 
to a chairman” (NAB/NCTA/MPAA 1996, 4). 
See http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Public_Notices/1997/fc97034a.pdf. 
53 NAB/NCTA/MPAA (1997), see http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/revprop.html. 
54 Ofcom (2004, 10f.): “The former would suggest reliance on expertise drawn from outside the industry 
being regulated; the latter would clearly work in the opposite direction. Consequently a system involving 
a mixture of lay and industry members will often be appropriate, if possible allied to a genuinely 
independent review and appeals mechanism.” 
55 Hemels (2005, 38) notes that the chairman of the parents’ organisation Ouders & Coo believes that 
rating in the Netherlands is left to a handful of employees of broadcasting corporations, film distributors 
and scientists. Katinka Moonen (NICAM) mentioned that there are representatives of Dutch parents' 
organisations in the NICAM Advisory Committee. Another Dutch parents’ organisation was invited to 
the Advisory Committee but refused to join. This parents’ organisation is demanding greater influence in 
the governing bodies of NICAM (Telephone interview, 17.  August 2007). 
56 The FCC has adopted the Programme System and Information Protocol10 (PSIP) standard into the 
Advanced Television System Committee (ATSC) standard for digital television, and the PSIP standard 
can accommodate multiple ratings (Kinney 2004, 3). 
57 Price/Verhulst (2000, 58). 
58 See Section 551 (e) (1), US Telecommunications Act. 
59 See http://www.mpaa.org/Ratings_HowItAllBegan.asp. 
60 For an overview see FTC (2000b): First Amendment Issues In Public Debate Over Governmental 
Regulation of Entertainment Media Products With Violent Content 
(http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/Appen%20C.pdf). 
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61 Latzer et al. (2002) suggest the category “self-regulation in the wide sense” in order to grasp these 
rather light methods of state involvement in alternative regulatory institutions empirically.  Self-
regulation in a wide sense can be distinguished from self-regulation in a narrow sense (without any state 
involvement) on the one hand, and from co-regulation on an explicit unilateral legal basis (e.g. an Act) on 
the other. 
62 NICAM’s funding: 2000/2003 industry 25%, government 75%; 2004 industry 35%, government 65%; 
2005 industry 50%, government 50% (see Bekkers 2005a). 
63 E-mail information by Wim Bekkers (NICAM Director), 10 September 2007. 
64 Iskandar (2007, 26). 
65 The Content Forum and the Commission have embarked on a series of roadshows and publicity 
campaigns aimed at creating greater awareness of the Content Forum and the Content Code. Additionally, 
CMCF and MCMC cooperated in course of CMCF’s establishment. The MCMC for example drafted a 
“Guideline for Development and Registration of Voluntary Industry Code” (technical support) (cf. 
Iskandar 2007, 26) 
66 NICAM itself also performs regular quality assessments of compliance with the rules. In addition, it 
regularly tests consumer perception and use of Kijkwijzer (http://www.kijkwijzer.nl/pagina.php?id=34). 
67 Section 55, CMA 1998 (Determination by the Commission): “(1) The Commission may, from time to 
time, determine any matter specified in this Act as being subject to the Commission's determination.”  
68 FTC (2007): Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children  
(http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/070412MarketingViolentEChildren.pdf). 
69 FCC (2007): In the Matter of Violent Television Programming And Its Impact On Children 
(http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-50A1.pdf). 
70 See http://www.kijkwijzer.nl/pagina.php?id=3. 
71 See FTC (2007, i). 
72  See http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/1998/nrcb8003.html. 
73 FCC (2007, 3) 
74 Malaysia: Sec. 94, CMA 1998 (Industry forum): “The Commission may designate an industry body to 
be an industry forum for the purposes of this Act by notifying that body in writing”. Sec. 212, CMA 
1998: "The Commission may designate an industry body to be a content forum for the purposes of this 
Part." CMCF was designated by the MCMC on 29 March 2001. 
Netherlands: Sec. 53 (1), Media Act:  “Our Minister may accredit an organisation that provides 
regulations concerning the classification and broadcasting of programmes. The government has officially 
recognised NICAM in 2001 on the basis of Sec. 53 (1) in the Media Act.” 
75 Sec. 95, CMA 1998 (Code by the industry forum): “(1) An industry forum may prepare a voluntary 
industry code dealing with any matter provided for in this Act— (a) on its own initiative; or (b) upon 
request by the Commission. (2) The voluntary industry code shall not be effective until it is registered by 
the Commission.” 
76 Netherlands: Sec. 53 (3), Media Act: “An organisation shall qualify for accreditation only if: (a) 
independent supervision by the organisation of compliance with the regulations referred to in subsection 1 
is guaranteed; (b) provision has been made for adequate involvement of stakeholders, including in any 
event consumer representatives, establishments which have obtained broadcasting time, experts in the 
field of audiovisual media and producers of audiovisual media; (c) the financial position of the 
organisation ensures proper implementation of the activities.” 
Malaysia: Sec. 94, CMA 1998 (Industry forum): “The Commission may designate an industry body to be 
an industry forum (. . .) if the Commission is satisfied that (a) the membership of the body is open to all 
relevant parties; (b) the body is capable of performing as required under the relevant provisions of this 
Act; and (c) the body has a written constitution.” 
77 Netherlands: Sec 52d (2), Media Act: “The television programme service of establishments which have 
obtained broadcasting time may only include programmes that may impair the physical, mental or moral 
development of persons under the age of sixteen if the establishments are members of an organisation 
accredited by Our Minister, as referred to in section 53, subsection 1, and are subject to the rules and 
supervision of that accredited organisation in relation to the broadcasting of the above-mentioned 
programmes. Establishments which have obtained broadcasting time and are members shall demonstrate 
this by submitting a written declaration from the accredited organisation to the Media Authority.” 
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Malaysia: Sec. 99, CMA 1998 (Directions to comply with a registered voluntary industry code): “The 
Commission may direct a person or a class of persons, in accordance with section 51, to comply with a 
registered voluntary industry code.” Sec. 100, CMA 1998 (Civil penalty for non-compliance): “(1) 
Notwithstanding section 53, a person who fails to comply with a direction of the Commission that the 
person complies with any provision of a voluntary industry code shall be liable to pay to the Commission 
a fine not exceeding two hundred thousand ringgit.” 
78 Malaysia:  Sec 94, CMA 1998 (Industry forum) “(3) The Commission may decide that an existing 
industry body that was previously designated under subsection (1) to be an industry forum is no longer an 
industry forum for the purposes of this Act, if the Commission is satisfied that the body no longer meets 
the requirements set out in subsection (1).” 
Netherlands: Sec 53 (5), Media Act: “Our Minister shall withdraw an accreditation if the organisation no 
longer complies with the requirements laid down by or pursuant to subsection 1 or 3. Our Minister may 
also withdraw an accreditation if the organisation fails to satisfy the conditions referred to in subsection 2 
or the further and other requirements referred to in subsection 4.” 
79 Especially in Malaysia, communication between CMCF and MCMC and governmental control over the 
media industry are strongly developed. HBI/EMR (2007, 155) report that MCMC is permanently 
“educating” broadcasters in the way of doing self-regulation, and that the state authorities play a 
significant role for the establishment of co-regulatory system. 
80 According to Sec 551 (e) (1) of the US Telecommunications Act the FCC was required to determine if 
distributors of video programming have established voluntary rules for rating video programming or not, 
if these rules are acceptable to the Commission and if distributors of video programming have agreed 
voluntarily to broadcast signals that contain ratings of such programming or not. On 12 March 1998 the 
Commission “adopted an order finding acceptable the video programming rating system currently in 
voluntary use and established technical requirements for consumer electronic equipment to enable 
blocking of video programming”  
(http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/1998/nrcb8003.html). 
3 Internet Codes of Conduct 
81 For example, the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) in the UK.  
82 For example, the mid-1990s saw the foundation of the Health on the Net Foundation (HON) and the 
adoption of a code of conduct for the sensitive medical and health-care information sector on the Internet 
(HONcode). See Latzer/Saurwein (2007, 44f.). 
83 According to CAIP the merger was undertaken “to ‘amplify’ CAIP's advocacy messages through a 
public affairs lobby that is generally acknowledged to be the best in its sector. CAIP members benefit 
from CATA's platform of services and resources” (http://www.cata.ca/Communities/caip/). 
84 The Internet Society of New Zealand (ISOCNZ) was formed 1995; in 2001 ISOCNZ rebranded to 
become InternetNZ. 
85 “Ordinary” membership of HKISPA, CAIP and ISPA involves voting rights and is limited to ISPs.  
However, all three institutions are also open to associated or affiliated members, e.g. “businesses that 
supply the IP industry with goods and services” (CAIP), “organisations who may not view themselves as 
full service Access and/or Hosting providers but have a vested interest in being part of self-regulation of 
the Internet” (ISPAI), or “any Internet related company which has a business registration in Hong Kong” 
(HKISPA). 
86 See http://www.ispai.ie/mission.htm. 
87 See http://www.hkispa.org.hk/mission.htm. 
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